INTRODUCING JAINISM

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Contents

1

The Long Tradition

The Jaina community is mainly confined within the borders of India. It is Indian in origin and is also the same, to a great extent, in expansion. Considered numerically migration of the Jainas to other parts of the world is not very significant. Major part of the population being from the traders, class, the Jainas are found in every big city and trading centre of the country. They have a satisfactorily high percentage of literacy and education. Inversely low is the percentage of crime among them, so law-abiding they are. They have now not only entered various professions of the country but have carved out a position for themselves in different fields. They are well-known for their philanthropy, charity and love of religious institutions and activities. They have sober food habits and are strictly vegetarian abstaining even from the use of liquor. They follow the religion of *ahiṁsā* to such an extent that they do not take food at night after sunset and drink strained water for fear of hurting life even in its tiniest form. Their number comes out to be not even one per cent of the population of the country, divided into a number of sects. Socially not much distinguished from their neighbouring brethren they hold somewhat marked differences from them in their religious convictions and practices. The Jainas are found in the provinces of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Mysore, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka of the Indian subcontinent. Only a few of them have crossed the Indian borders to settle in Nepal, Burma, Ceylon, Japan, America and some African and European countries. All of them own Jainism—a faith of Indian origin—as their religion.

Jainism has a very long tradition of truth and moral discipline, which can be well appreciated in the light of Jaina concept of the revolution of time, called the *kālacakra*, the cycle of time, and the geography of Jambūdvīpa which includes Bharatakṣetra along with its six regions into which it is divided. The *kālacakra* revolves like a wheel and gives us two broad aeons of time collectively called *kalpas* consisting of a very huge number of years. They are called the *avasarpiṇī kāla*, the declining aeon and the *utsarpiṇī kāla*, the rising aeon, named after the terms denoting quantum of pleasure and pain of life attainable during them. Incessantly, though only within a small part of the universe, the wheel of time revolves with its spokes (sāma), the gradation ranging from the paradisical to the catastrophical periods and back to the former, ceaselessly passing through the point denoting the present.[1] Considered geographically only the extreme two regions of the circular continent of Jambūdvīpa called Bharata and Airāvata are subject to the change of conditions of living while in other regions they remain fixed. The aforesaid two divisions of a *kalpa* are further divided into six ages each, and the names assigned to them indicate the quantum of pleasurable and easy conditions of life prevalent there.[2] Out of these ages only the fourth ones from each aeon are found congenial for spiritual and cultural development. The great leaders and teachers of the Jainas, called the *tīrthaṅkaras*, take birth during these ages.

Such is the belief of the Jainas regarding the passage and the long tradition of truth and righteousness from the hoariest past to the present age. Time has been rolling on without a beginning and without an end. During this beginningless and endless flow of time there appear the above referred ages wherein some great souls take birth to achieve their liberation from worldly existence by following a course of discipline, penance and meditation, because they themselves are born only as human beings. They are known the 'Jinas', meaning the conquerors. The term 'Jina' is derived from a Sanskrit root which means to conquer. So 'Jina' is a general epithet applied to every soul that qualifies itself for achieving its liberation. What these souls have to

conquer is their lower nature technically described in terms of *kaṣāyas* or passions or *karmas* that drag the *jīvas* whirling in the ocean of births and deaths. The term *'arhat'* is also used as equivalent to *'Jina'*, It points to the spiritual capacities consequent upon the attainment of the status of a *jina*; and after it Jainism is also called the Ārhat religion. Similarly the term *kevalin* is also used to represent a *jina*. It points to the fact that there are no higher heights to be attained by a *jina*. Thus a *jina* represents the divinized form of a human soul.

These conquerors have been conceived to be of two types, both destined to achieve their liberation at the end of their bodily existence. In general the course of life of these souls is much concerned with their own liberation. Only a few of them are born with such *karma*-adjunct as makes them concerned with the propagation of truth and righteousness. This *karma*-adjunct has been technically called the *tīrthaṅkara-nāma-karma* in Jainism. Says C.R. Jain, "Among the Deified ones those who have been consumed by a burning desire to remove the suffering of their fellow beings and to carry enlightenment and comfort to their hearts become the *tīrthaṅkaras*. They may be called Teaching gods."[3]

Such are the *tīrthaṅkaras* of Jainism, *tīrtha* meaning the religion which is potent to take the *jīvas* across the *saṁsāra*. It is like finding a ford through which a soul can wade to the safe shore, hence the term 'tīrthaṅkara'—*tīrtha* meaning a passable point—means the maker of such a *tīrtha* for the worldly souls. This concept of *Tīrthaṅkaras* in Jainism is comparable with that of *Bodhisattva* in Buddhism, who also desires to bring peace and liberation to all the *jīvas* in the universe. The truth and way of life preached by these *tīrthaṅkaras* is termed as Jainism, and the followers of the creed are called the Jainas.

The number of *tīrthaṅkaras* for every fourth age as explained above is uniformly given to be twenty four in the scriptures of the Jainas. "There is a special fascination" says C.R. Jain, "in the number four and twenty; the Hindus have twenty four *avatāras* (incarnations) of their favourite god, Viṣṇu; there are twenty four counsellor gods of the ancient Babylonians; the Buddhists posit four and twenty previous

Buddhas, that is, teaching gods. The zoroastrians also have twenty four Ahuras....[4] But the more remarkable case of identity of thought between Jainism and a non-Jaina creed is furnished by Jewish Apocrypha which acknowledges exactly four and twenty 'faces' on the ladder of Jacob.[5] For the present age of the declining aeon the Jainas reckon twenty four *tīrthaṅkaras* as their spiritual leaders and deities who graced this earth with their holy presence during the preceding age one after the other. Their names may be enumerated as Ṛṣabha, Ajita, Saṁbhava, Abhinaṅdana, Sumati, Padma, Supārśva, Candra, Puṣpadanta, Śītala, Śreyānsa, Vāsu pūjya, Vimala, Anaṅta, Dharma, Śānti, Kunthu, Ara, Malli, Munisuvrata, Nami, Nemi, Pārśva and Mahāvīra. The Jaina usage allows an addition of 'nātha' to the names of all the *tīrthaṅkaras* as a token of reverence the Jainas hold for them, but the last *tīrthaṅkara* is known as Mahāvīrasvāmi (also Vardhamāna Mahāvīra), svāmī meaning the master. During the cycle of time such auspicious ages must have appeared in the past and will appear in future. So the Jaina scriptures give us three sets of names of *tīrthaṅkaras* belonging to the present age, (i.e. the fourth of the current aeon), the past age (i.e. the fourth of the aeon immediately preceding the current one) and the future aeon (i.e. the fourth immediately following the present one). Thus goes on the wheel of time with the sets of twenty four *tīrthaṅkaras* without a beginning and without an end.

Being the first in the series of the *tīrthaṅkaras* attributed to the present age Ṛṣabha is also known as Ādinātha, the first Master. He belonged to a very distant past, while the last tīrthaṅkara, Mahāvīra (599 BC-527 BC), attained liberation just 2600 years ago. In between them there appeared the remaining twenty two *tīrthaṅkaras* with long spans of life and intervening intervals gradually decreasing in duration with the advance of time. So much so that the life span of Mahāvīra was only 72 years and his temporal separation from Pārśvanāth (877 BC-711 BC) was only by 250 years. The Jaina *ācāryas* and writers have produced a good amount of Purāṇa literature dealing with the life history of the *tīrthaṅkaras* and some contemporary personalities. These works stand a good evidence to their history as known to us.

The *Mahāpurāṇa*, a voluminous work, consists of two parts. The first part called the Ādipurāṇa written by Jinasena (8th century A.D.) deals with the life-history of Ṛṣabha. The second part known as the Uttara purāṇa written by Gunabhadra (9th century A.D.) contains the life-histories of the other tīrthaṅkaras. The *Padmapurāṇa* by Raviṣena (9th-10th century A.D.) has for its subject matter the life history of Muni Suvratanātha, the twentieth *tīrthaṅkara* along with his contemporary Rama, most venerated in Hinduism. Similarly the *Harivaṁśa Purāṇa* by Jinasena of later 8th century A.D. deals with the life-history of Neminātha, the twenty-second *tīrthaṅkara*, along with his contemporary Kṛṣṇa, equally venerated in Hinduism. There is the *Vīra Vardhamāna Carita* by Sakalakīrti dealing with the biography of Mahāvīra, the last *tīrthaṅkara*. In this context equally important is the work entitled as *Triṣaṭi śalākā puruṣa* by Hemacandra (12th century A.D.). Besides, there are some *apabhraṁśa* and Sanskrit literary works dealing with similar subjects. These works provide source material for a historical study of the *tīrthaṅkaras* of Jainism.

Besides, evidences in support of antiquity and also of independence of Jainism are available in Hinduism and Buddhism, which go to dispel the confusion regarding holding Jainism as an offshoot from them coming into existence at a later stage. The history of Hinduism is understood to start from the advent of the Aryans in India; and the Vedas, specially the Ṛg-veda, are the earliest and ancient books of Hinduism. The names of Ṛṣabha, Ajita and Supārśva, the first, the second and seventh *tīrthaṅkaras* of Jainism appear in the Vedas.[6] The Yajurveda contains a mention of Ṛṣabha, Ajita and Ariṣṭanemi.[7] In the words of C.R. Jain, "Hinduism itself has always admitted and never disputed the antiquity of Jainism and of its founder Ṛṣabhadeva whom the Hindus regard as an incarnation of Viṣṇu. He is mentioned in the Purāṇas which place his historicity beyond question, giving the name of his mother Marudevi and of his son Bharata after whom India came to be called Bhāratavarṣa in the past. In the Ṛg Saṁhitā (10.136.2) there is a mention of the naked saints who belonged to the monastic order of Ṛṣabha. In the Bhāgvat

(Chapter 5 of skaṅdha 5) it has been clearly said that Ṛṣabhadeva, renouncing his kingdom, became a naked recluse, and attained liberation. The identification of the Jaina *tīrthaṅkaras* by the names and terms mentioned in Vedas is not very difficult and the historians are inclined to agree to their being Jaina teachers and deities. So we may conclude that "Jainism, the creed of the holy *tīrthaṅkaras* far from being a daughter or rebellion child of Hinduism is actually the basis of that undoubtedly ancient creed.[8]

In Buddhistic literature we come across the names of *tīrthaṅkara* Supārśva in the Mahāvagga, *tīrthaṅkara* Puṣpadanta in the Mahāvastu, and *tīrthaṅkara* Anaṅta in the Āriya pariyesana sutta. The name of Mahāvīra appears very frequently as Nigaṅtha Nāyaputta in the religious books of Buddhism. Majjhima Nikāya, Saṁyutta Nikāya and Aṅguttara Nikāya accept the omniscience of Mahāvīra. In search of peace and tranquillity Buddha is said to have resorted to various faiths and disciplines. It is also held that he once initiated himself in the order of the twenty third *tīrthaṅkara*, Pārśvanāth. The fact is authenticated by a description of his ascetic life. He is made to say "I lived nude, took my food in hands: neither took food brought to me, nor aimed at and nor by invitation. I uprooted my hair, showed mercy even to a drop of water, lest any invisible animate being should be killed by me. For this, I remained minutely careful. Even in winter and summer I lived nude in a horrible forest, and never warmed my body, always meditating like a Muni."[9] The details contained in the above description may be easily identified to be the characteristics of a *nigaṅtha* (naked) Jaina ascetic and show convincingly that Buddha was then practising the Jaina way of discipline and meditation.

We find great similarity in the use of some philosophical and religions terms in Jainism and Buddhism. Both make use of the three *daṇḍas* or three *yogas* (of mind, body and speech), *āsrava*, *saṁvara* and *nirjara*, but from a closer study it will be clear that the original meaning of these terms is found in Jainism while in Buddhism they appear only as borrowed from elsewhere. This again goes in favour of temporal priority of Jainism over Buddhism; and hence Jainism, in no case, can be taken as a branch of Buddhism.

Moreover, Jainism has ever been held to be a rival faith in Buddhistic literature, and never as a newly born creed, which again supports the above conclusion. We may now conclude that we ought also to remember that Jaina religion is certainly older than Mahāvīra, his reputed predecessor Pārśva having almost certainly existed as a real person, and that consequently the main points of the original doctrine may have been codified long before Mahāvīra."[10] Mahāvīra, a contemporary of Buddha, was only a renovator of Jainism, and not its founder. B.C. Law also holds "Before the advent of Mahāvīra the faith of which he was the last exponent seems to have been prevalent in Vaisali and the surrounding country in some earlier form."[11] Dr. Radhakrishnan also thinks "There is no doubt that Jainism prevailed even before Vardhamāna or Pārshvanatha."[12] We may now conclude with Dr. Jyoti Prasad Jain that "Jainism with its perfectly non-violent creed, animistic belief, subtle and peculiar *karma* theory, its rejection of creator and creation theory and the like, is not only quite an original system but is also absolutely independent of all other systems."[13] In view of these evidences we may not find it difficult to appreciate that Jainism was prevalent in this country much earlier than Buddhism came into existence.

There are reasons why Jainism, in its various aspects, failed to attract the orientalists even within the country, for a closer and critical study of its history and literature. Basically the religious literature of the Jainas was never attempted to provide a historical document, nor did the Indian scholarship took and interpreted it in that sense. So it is not very strange to note that the merit and worth of the literary richness of Indian literature in general and Jainism in particular was first pointed out by western scholarship whose vision was mainly occupied by Buddhism, Brahmanism and Islam. So Jainism, due to the indifference of the pandits of the community, could attract them last of all. Dr. H.L. Jain points out, "As usual it is an irony with us that western scholarship has to make us aware of the greatness of our men and matter."[14] The Digambaras, being self-contained in a large degree, showed perfect apathy to such a study, (nay, they rather opposed it) by the western scholars. As a result

the literature of the Śvetāmbara sect was first available to them, and it was taken to represent the whole of Jainism, It was due to the efforts of Harmann Jacobi that the antiquity and independence of Jainism as against that of Buddhism and Hinduism was placed on a strong historical foundation, Following the same trend of thinking and research the distinctive features of the Digambara sect were brought to light in the recent days. Thus the Digambara Jainas were the last to join the chain aiming at the unfoldment of Jaina philosophy and religion, which is judged to be no less valuable by the modern scholarship. We feel highly indebted to the foreign scholars like Harmann Jacobi, George Buhler, Leumann, Walther Schubring, Ludwig Alsdorf Klause Bruhm and H. Von Glasenapp of Germany for their researches and deep study in the field of Jainology. Besides, the names of Pavolini of Italy, Bloomfield of U.S.A., A. Guerinot of France, R. Williams of England, and V. Deleu of Belgium deserve our thanks for their valuable work on Jainism. H.L. Jain and A.N. Upadhey were the equally active and energetic scholars of Jainology from India. Dalsukh Bhai was one of the scholars whose contribution to the study of Jainism is equally valuable and encouraging.

As already mentioned, from the Jaina purāṇas we are able to get some information regarding the lives of the *tīrthaṅkaras*. So far only the last two *tīrthaṅkaras* i.e. Pārśvanāth and Mahāvīra have been covered under the purview of history. The life-story of, the twenty-second tīrthaṅkara of Jainism, seems to emerge from the Paurāṇika labyrinth and touch the periphery of history, as historians have started thinking him a historical personality like Pārśvanāth. The Jaina tradition has evolved a frame to write the life histories of the *tīrthaṅkaras*. According to it there are five auspicious events called the *kalyāṇakas* that take place in the life of every *tīrthaṅkara*. These relate to the occasions of their conception, birth, renunciation, emergence of omniscience and liberation. So the life-histories of the *tīrthaṅkaras* are woven round these five great events which are described with dates and months of the Indian calendar in the Jain Purāṇas. An account of the previous lives of such souls also finds a place in the Purāṇas. It seems that the Purāṇas are not designed to work as

historical records, but only aim at arousing a spirit and zeal for religion among the people. The life-story of Lord Ṛṣabhadeva, the first *tīrthaṅkara* and founder of Jainism, who is believed to belong to a very distant past is dealt with on the same lines. As there has been no *tīrthaṅkara* for a very very long time prior to Lord Ṛṣabhadeva, the period which preceded his birth may be considered to be a dark age for religion. This period is technically known as *'bhoga bhūmi'*—the region of enjoyment—in Jainism, for during it the conditions of living were very simple and easy and people could live comfortably without any type of sweating. As time passed and complicacies of life began to evolve, the necessity of earning a living was felt by the people. Lord Ṛṣabhadeva explained to them not only the truth and the way of religion but guided and instructed them in matters of their family, society and national life. For these reasons he alone is designated as the founder of Jainism, the rest of the *tīrthaṅkaras* are only its renovators. The interval between Ṛṣabha on one hand and Pārśva and Mahāvīra on the other has been studded by remaining twenty one *tīrthaṅkaras* about whom the main source of information is only the purāṇa literature of the Jainas, though, as already referred to a few of them namely Ajita, Supārśva, and Nemi find a mention in Hinduism and Buddhism. The life-histories of these *tīrthaṅkaras* have been dealt in the same style by collecting various incidents round the five great events of their lives. The status of these teaching gods or *tīrthaṅkaras* is held to be the same, as all of them take birth with the same *karma*-structure namely the *tīrthaṅkara-nāma-karma* and following the same course of discipline responsible to determine it. The last two *tīrthaṅkaras* attract the readers most because their historicity has been unquestionably admitted. Thus Ṛṣabhadeva, Pārśvanāth and Mahāvīra mainly fall under our purview for treatment of their history.

To begin, Ṛṣabhadeva was born in the Ikṣvāku family of the Kṣatriyas of Kośala in its capital, Ayodhyā. King Nābhirāya and Marudevī were his parents. Following the calendar, the dates of his birth and *nirvāṇa*, as recorded in the Jaina purāṇas, are the ninth of the dark half of the month of Caitra and the fourteenth of the dark half the month of Māgha respectively. He had two queens, Yaśasvatī

and Sunaṅdā. Yaśasvatī gave birth to the great emperor, Bharata, after whom, as the Jainas believe, this country took its name. The other queen was the mother of Ṛṣabha's renowned son Bāhubalī whose colossus was hewn out of a rock by Cāmunda Rāya, a great commander of king Rājamalla of the Ganga dynasty, at Śrāvaṇa-belagola in Mysore. It was Ṛṣabhadeva who observed a fast for full one year with absolute unmindfulness of the pangs of hunger and thirst engaging himself in self-contemplation to achieve perfect peace, knowledge and selflessness. This was the way with him to prepare himself for the divine preaching which continued for many long years revealing the truth about soul, world and divinity to the people. He attained *nirvāṇa* from the Mt. Kailash in the Himālayas.

In the chain of the *tīrthaṅkaras*, Pārśvanāth was the twenty-third and the predecessor of Lord Mahāvīra. He was born at Vārānasī, the capital of Kāśī, in a Kṣatriya family. His father was king Aśvasena and mother, Vāmādevī. As usual the dates of his birth and *nirvāṇa* are given to be the eleventh of the dark half of Pauṣa and the seventh of the bright half of the month of Śrāvaṇa respectively. These dates have been perpetuated with their mention in the *purāṇas* and the worship-literature of the Digambara sect, and such texts are recited by them daily in their temples, though some difference of opinion in this regard exists between the Digambaras and the Śvetāmbaras. Pārśvanāth lived a span of one hundred years out of which a major portion was passed by him as a recluse. As regards his marriage the Śvetāmbaras hold that he was married with princess Prabhāvatī, the daughter of king Prasenajita of Kusasthala (Kannauj).[15] On the other hand the Digambaras hold that Pārśvanāth did not marry at all, and they also give a list of five *tīrthaṅkaras* including Pārśvanāth and Mahāvīra who were unmarried. Even in the Samavāyāṅga and the Kalpasūtra texts there is no mention of the marriage of Pārśvanāth. Pārśvanāth, as a homeless recluse, wandered from place to place, practising penances and meditation to achieve self-realization and omniscience. It is said that once he was inflicted with calamitous sufferings by an ascetic named Kamaṭha. But the former proved so strong a match for the latter that not even

his shadow could be harmed by the impious ascetic and all his evil hopes ended in frustration. At this very moment there appeared god Dharaṇendra with his consort Padmāvatī, in the form of a huge snake who spread his hoods over Pārśvanāth as a protecting canopy.[16] Since then on account of this incident the spot where the incident took place was called Ahicchatra (canopy made by a snake for protection), and is held in high esteem as a holy place by the Jainas. Goddess Padmāvatī is also recognized as a guardian deity in the Jaina pantheon. Immediately after the conquest over the calamitous incident, as the Digambara hold, Pārśvanāth attained omniscience. Like other *tīrthaṅkaras*, after attaining the status of a *kevalī*, Pārśvanāth continued to deliver his sermons to those who attended his audience designed for the purpose. At the expiry of his age he attained *nirvāṇa* from a top of the Pārśvanāth hill in the province of Bihar. He preceded Mahāvīra by 250 years.

A happy and strange coincidence is noticeable in the history of the world about the period 6th century B.C. It appears that this period was specially blessed with the births of some great souls who could show the path of righteousness and truth to humanity, for which it remains grateful to this date. As such there incarnated Mahāvīra and Buddha in India, Confucius in China, Socrates and Pythagoras in Greece and Zoroast in Persia to enlighten the path of spiritual welfare to the perplexed people of the world. Mahāvīra appeared in this country during the sixth century B.C. and had a span of life of seventy two years. He attained final emancipation in 527 B.C. as envisaged by the historians. The Vīra Nirvāṇa era is one of the so many eras current in this country. As its name shows it must have started with the day of *nirvāṇa* of Mahāvīra: or if started later, it must have been reckoned from the above date. Thus nearly 2,600 years have passed when Mahāvīra finally left this world of births and deaths and attained spiritual perfection, never to suffer a fall. The dates of Mahāvīra's birth and *nirvāṇa* are the 13th of the bright half of month of Caitra and 15th of the dark half of the month of Kārtika of the Indian calendar. He took birth in the Kṣatriya family of the Licchivī clan of Magadha. His parents were king Siddhārtha and Queen Triśalā. As regards the birthplace and

the place of *nirvāṇa* of Mahāvīra, the historians are unanimous in holding them to be Vaishālī and Pāwā respectively in the same province of Bihar. It was at the age of thirty years that Mahāvīra took to the life of a recluse by renouncing the worldly concerns and activities. Since then he engaged himself with the task of purification of his soul in respect of knowledge, conduct and other spiritual faculties by following a course of conduct, penance and meditation. As a result perfection dawned upon him and the fetters of obstruction to all his spiritual capabilities were completely broken and thrown away. As his body still lingered with him, he was an *arhat* or a *jina* in body. He became a *tīrthaṅkara*, qualified to teach the path of perfection, peace and spiritual good on the ground of his personal and direct experience. Wherever he moved, people gathered in large numbers to hear his sermons of universal love, concord and selflessness. The impact of his spiritual personality and word was so great that all those who had the fortune to see him benefited themselves by his serene presence and preaching.

Like other *tīrthaṅkaras*, Mahāvīra also upheld the fourfold order of the community of his followers. It consisted of the monks, the nuns, the laymen and the laywomen. As only the human beings, both male and female, are the fittest persons to tread the path of righteousness, the above four divisions of the order relate only to them. It is mentioned that when Mahāvīra departed from this world, his order contained 14,000 monks, 36,000 nuns, 55,000 laymen and 3,18,000 laywomen. This also gives, us an idea of the Jaina population in the country about Mahāvīra's time. What he preached in his gatherings has been called as 'Divya dhvani' the auspicious sound, the divine voice, a voice which is beneficial to all living beings. What Mahāvīra spoke in his gatherings was well understood by some special saints who had developed greater power for understanding by dint of the renunciatory discipline they followed. They were called apostles or *gaṇadharas* who were entrusted with the work of arranging and explaining the Lord's teachings. These apostles are mentioned to be attached with every *tīrthaṅkara*. In case of Mahāvīra the number of such apostles was eleven, the first among them being Indrabhūti Gautama. As stated

by a later learned ācārya, named Vīrasena, Indrabhūti Gautama was originally a Brahmin ascetic scholar well versed in the Vedas and other literature of Brahmanism. Hence it was quite natural that the word of Mahāvīra should have been compiled very systematically under such a learned scholar. The entire teachings of Mahāvīra were collected into twelve *aṅgas*, also known as *gaṇipiṭikas*. These formed what the Jainas call the *Āgamas*. There are the twelve divisions into which the Jaina learning—the preachings of Mahāvīra—were arranged. These *aṅgas* begin with the *Ācāraṅga* and end with the *Dṛṣṭivāda*. The *aṅga* literature was supplemented by the *Upāṅgas*, Cheḍasūtras, Mūlasūtras, Prakīrṇakas and Cūlikāsūtras containing expansion and explanation of the ideas contained in the aṅgas. With the advance of time the knowledge of the aṅgas dwindled gradually and was finally lost into oblivion leaving behind only a few fragments. "According to the Śvetāmbara version during the 6th century A.D. after the *nirvāṇa* of Mahāvīra, a council of monks was convened at Valabhi (modern Vala) in Gujarat, and under the chairmanship of Devardhigaṇī Kṣamāśramana, these eleven out of the twelve aṅgas were compiled and they are available today.... This entire range of Jaina Āgama or Jaina canons provides basic information about Jaina religion and philosophy, according to the Śvetambar sect.[17] On the other hand the Digambara did not accept the authenticity of Āgamas. It became expedient on the part of the Digambaras to compose works based on the remaining knowledge of the Āgamas compiled by Indrabhūti Gautama and other gaṇadharas to save the creed of Mahāvīra from distortion and extinction. This tradition was started under Dharasena who composed the Ṣaṭ khaṅḍāgama which is considered as important as the original Āgamas by the Digambaras. It was followed by the works of Kundakunda (2nd or 3rd century A.D.) by Umasvāmī (2nd century A.D.), Samaṅtbhadra (5th century A.D.). Kundakunda's most notable works are the Samayasāra, Pravacanasāra and Pañcāstikāyasāra. The work of Umāsvāmī is the famous Tattvārthasūtra, Samaṅtabhadra wrote the Āptamīmānsā, Ratnakaraṇḍa Śrāvakācāra and Svayambhūstotra. As for the Digambara Jainas the original Āgama literature is now not available, they hold the works

of these eminent ācāryas in the same esteem with the Āgamas. The later ācāryas attempted lucid and detailed commentaries on these basic works of the Digambara authors. The Samayasāra, Pravacanasāra and Pañcāstikāyasāra of Kundakunda have got the famous Sanskrit commentaries by Amṛtacandra (12th Century A.D.) and Jayasena. The Tattvārthasūtra of Umāsvāmī is the most commented and most popular of all the Jaina works. The Sabhāṣya Tattvārthādhigamasūtra is said to be an autocommentary on the Tattvārthasūtra. In the Digambara tradition the Sarvārthasiddhi of Pūjyapāda Devanandi (6th Century A.D.), the Tattvārtharājvārtika of Akalanka (8th century A.D.) and Tattvārthashlokvārtika of Vidyanda (9th century A.D.) are the most known commentaries of Tattvārthasūtra. Samaṅtabhadra was a famous logician of his time and his Āptamīmāmsā is a remarkable treatise on the concept of Syādavāda theory of relativity which is one of the distinguishing principles of Jaina philosophy. It has also been commented by Akalaṅka under the title Aṣṭaśatī which has been further extended under the title Aṣṭasahasrī by Vidyānanda. In the same chain a Hindi commentary written in the 20th century by Nyayāchārya Manik Chand Kondeya attracts our attention for its depth of thought, lucidity of expression and richness of information. Keeping the text of Vidyānanda's Ślokavārtika in the centre it spreads over more than five thousand pages arranged in seven volumes. As already mentioned the Śvetāmbaras maintain the continuity of the Āgama tradition and accept the authenticity of the Āgamas available at present after the redaction under Devarddhigaṇī Kśamāśramaṇa. The later Śvetāmbara ācāryas also contributed voluminous and valuable literature on Jainism by way of original works and commentaries on the existing ones. Siddhasena (5th century A.D), Haribhadra (8th century A.D.), Hemachandra (12th century A.D.) and Yośovijaya (18th century A.D.) are some of those whose names and works shine like bright stars in the sky of Jaina literature. Siddhasena's well-known works are the Sanmatisūtarkara and the Nyāyāvatāra dealing with the Jaina theory of knowledge with its two departments of pramāṇa (synthetic knowledge and naya (analytic knowledge). Haribhadra wrote

commentaries on the Jaina canons along with his famous works like Anekānta Jaya Patākā, Śāstra-vārtāsamuccaya, Saḍdarśana samuccaya, Yoga bindu, Yogadṛṣṭiviniścaya and Yogavimāśikā. Hemachandra a versatile writer, has written on varied subjects of Jaina philosophy. The Triṣaṣṭiśalākā puruṣa carita, the Yogaśāstra and the Pramāṇa mīmānsā are some of his well-known works. Yeśovijaya is considered to be an authority in the field of Jainistic studies. Some of his works are Anekānta Vyavasthā, Adhyātmopaniṣad, Jaina tarka bhāṣā and Jñanbindu.

The source of the validity of the tenets of Jainism initially lay in the tīrthaṅkaras themselves who, by dint of the purification of their faculties of faith, knowledge and conduct, could speak the truth directly and would not explain it otherwise. The Jaina monks who follow the path as preached by the tīrthaṅkaras are considered to represent the ideal for the people and hence are expected to carry the truth further and transmit it to others in a very truthful way. The carriage of the tradition of the treasure of Jainism which we find at present is mainly credited to such saints spread over the entire period beginning from Gaṇadhara Gautama to this date. Whatever differences that cropped up among various sects of Jainism and also within a particular sect may be liberally taken to be opinions on various subjects suggesting newer avenues of work and research to the modern minds. Besides, the periods of royal and social patronage of Jainism are also visible in the history of the country. It is held that emperor Chandragupta Maurya passed a part of his life as a Jaina and took to the life of a Jaina recluse. He performed penance and meditation as a Jaina *muni* on a hill named Chandragiri at Śrāvaṇabelagola in Mysore. In the history of India the number of Jaina kings and rulers is not large, but wherever they existed they worked as patrons of Jainism and non-violence. The catholocity of the non-Jaina rulers and the Jaina commanders and administrators under them helped the cause of Jainism very considerably. The Jainas were able to get heavy donations from them for their religious institutions. It is perhaps due this fact that we find great literary treasures of Jaina culture and literature preserved in Rajasthan and the Deccan. The literary genius for Jainism

was not lacking even among the Jaina householders who, in spite of the odds in their career, could maintain their missionary zeal to a very high degree. Āśādhara (13th century), Rajmalla (16th century), Todarmal (18th century), Daulat Ram (17th century), Banarasidas (17th century) etc. are some of examples in the field who made valuable contributions by writing independent works and translating the old texts of Jainism in regional languages.

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2

Schism in Jaina Order

The history of schisms in the Jaina order has been very eventful. It started during the very life-time of Mahāvīra and took serious dimensions after his *nirvāṇa*. Some of the followers of Mahāvīra, specially the members of his monastic order, had pseudo-differences on some points of theory and practice from what Mahāvīra had expounded. In their heart of heart they knew that the version of Mahāvīra was true; but they presented them in the interest of their own leadership by twisting them and concealing the true meaning from their followers. It is why such splits in the order have been called *nihnavas* meaning a deceitful misrepresentation of a position. Thus their way of thinking differed from the path of Mahāvīra though only partially. A number of such *nihnavas* is mentioned in the ancient works on Jainism. A general feature of these *nihnavas*, as judged from their description, is that they originate with a particular incident and the delusion caused by them is dispelled by another incident very often bringing its followers back to the original order. Sometimes the retreat could not be possible and, as a result, a new sect or a school of philosophy emerged out of it. The possibility of such *nihnavas* or defections or splits cannot be ruled out in case of other tīrthaṅkaras. There goes a story of Marīci, a grandson of Ṛṣabhadeva, who rebelled against his grand father's order in his very life-time. These defections stand refuted and rejected in Jainism for the rigidity of one-sided adherence in the form of one-sidedness, otherwise they could be absorbed in Jaina philosophy as partial truths governed by definite contexts.

The Śvetāmbara sect of the Jainas believe that Jāmāli was

the son-in-law of Mahāvīra. He broke away from Mahāvīra's order on the issue 'what is being accomplished is not the same as an accomplished fact.' Jāmāli's extreme insistence on the theme made it a *nihnava*, while Mahāvīra aimed at a compromise; hence a consistency was possible by governing the statements by different but appropriate contexts. This *nihnava* took place in the life-time of Mahāvīra. The theme for the second *nihnava* was that the last part of the soul completes its identity, and hence this part alone deserves to be called a soul. This *nihnava* came into existence just sixteen years after Mahāvīra's *nirvāṇa*. The third *nihnava* was based on the thesis that nothing is clearly and distinctively known in the world, all our perceptions are fraught with uncertainty. The one-sidedness of this view was not regarded consistent by Mahāvīra. This *nihnava* took place 214 years after Mahāvīra's *nirvāṇa*. The next *nihnava* upheld the view that all the objects of the world are transient and are destroyed immediately after their origination, hence the merit or demerit earned in one life cannot be taken to another. For Mahāvīra the true position implied unity-in-difference accommodating both transience and permanence. This *nihnava* originated 220 years after Mahāvīra's *nirvāṇa*. The next *nihnava* had for its central theme the idea that the experience of two different acts (like experiences of hot and cold) can be had simultaneously. For Mahāvīra it was possible only in quick succession but not simultaneously. The time of this *nihnava* is given to be 544 years after Mahāvīra's *nirvāṇa*. Under the sixth *nihnava* the author supported the existence of a substance distinct form *jīva* (conscious being) and *ajīva* (unconscious being) under the name 'no *jīva*', but no such substance was propounded in Mahāvīra's philosophy. The last and seventh *nihnava* upheld the theory that the *karmas* only wrapped a soul and could not bind it; while for Mahāvīra, the soul and the *karmas* mingled together like milk and water, and iron and fire. Ājīvakism was a sect of Jainism in the same chain upholding a theory of absolute determinism. These are the *nihnavas* highlighted in the Jaina works, and the possibility of many others differing from Mahāvīra's creed may be safely admitted. Though these *nihnavas* look more legendary than historical, yet they embody and reflect a

tendency for schisms in the Jaina order along with that of adhering to the main principles of Jainism. As the theses of the *nihnavas* are of a philosophical nature, it is not very illogical to think that some of them might have historically flourished in the form of a sect or a sub-school under Jainism in the country. A similar situation can be presumed behind the rift into the Digambara and Śvetāmbara sects in the Jaina order of Mahāvīra.

The two sects i.e. the Digambara and the Śvetāmbara, that have come down to this date are distinguished externally by the fact that saints in the former remain naked and those in the latter wear white clothes; while among the lay followers of the two sects there is no such distinction. Both of them hold themselves the followers of Mahāvīra and equally own the main principles of Jainism, the difference being based on some details of theory and practice. With the advance of time and conditions the differences crystallized so clearly that, in spite of the basic unity among them, they consider themselves antagonistic to each other and maintained their religious and social institutions separately. Though there are a few religious and philosophical works equally owned and accepted by the two sects, yet the literature of the two sects is distinguished to a very large extent. As such, we come across different versions as regards the origin of the rift in the Jaina order of Mahāvīra.

The Digambaras hold that originally the Jaina saints did not wear clothes and the Śvetāmbara sect came into existence at a later stage. They make a mention of a terrible famine extended over twelve years in the region of Magadha. It compelled the saints to move southward where they could satisfactorily follow the monkish rules including nudity. The march was headed by ācārya Bhadrabāhu. Those who remained in northern India took to easier ways of clothing and feeding themselves. They chose to cover their private parts with a strip of cloth, started keeping a number of pieces of cloth with them and called themselves the Śvetāmbaras. The incident is reckoned to take place in 932 A.D. On the other hand the Śvetāmbaras think that the Digambara sect appeared at a later stage. They hold that originally the use of clothes by saints was not an objectionable practice. One,

Śivabhūti, being annoyed by his mother and disallowed to enter his house by her went to a Jaina monastery where he was refused initiation by the ācārya. Then he, by himself, adopted the Jaina monkish life and wandered with other monks. A king known to him presented a valuable shawl to him, but his head-monk objected to his acceptance of so costly a gift and asked Śivabhūti to return it. When the latter did not pay any heed to his word, the senior monk tore the shawl into pieces and used it as a mattress. At this Śivabhūti was outraged and he took the revenge only by starting an order of naked monks. It is how, as the Śvetāmbaras hold, the Digambara sect came into existence 609 years after the *nirvāṇa* of Mahāvīra.

The historicity of the above two events resulting in a very notable division of an established order needs a fresh consideration. The story of Śivabhūti though recorded in the Śvetāmbara works, seems to be little strange. When nudity was not a rule of monastic life nor a tradition in the society of monks, how could Śivabhūti think of moving about naked and that too only to take a revenge for the insult done to him by a member of an established order of monks. The narrative relating to the famine in Magadha finds support from other sources as well but the doubtful personality of Bhadrabāhu, as there have been more than one Bhadrabāhu, does not lend required support to account for the great spilt in the Jaina order.[1] As we have already seen, the philosophical differences, even the minor ones, are nurtured in the minds of men and are not dependent on sudden and flashy incidents which may not be expected to have the required impact to determine an event. In the light of these events not only the story of Śivabhūti but the entire position to account for the origin of the Digambara sect seems to rest on a shaky ground. It is more reasonable to think that the seeds of the rift had taken roots in the life-time of Mahāvīra, and even earlier. They are more of the nature of philosophical and religious differences which must have taken ample time to mature and give birth to two distinct sects potent to come down to the present date.

To follow the Śvetāmbara texts, Mahāvīra chose nudity as the way to liberation for himself, though he made a start of monkish life as a robed saint, and he is considered to be

the wisest person possessed of omniscience by the followers of both the sects. It seems little difficult to digest how a master who had practically resorted to the way of nudity should preach his followers otherwise to attain the same spiritual heights as he himself attained. To accommodate the other alternative of having clothes as a concession for the weak may not appeal as an answer appropriate to the question. An easier way being available and permissible, why Mahāvīra preferred a difficult one for himself. Moreover, in the Sthānānga, Mahāvīra is mentioned saying, "I have propounded a religion having faith in nudity."[2] Mahāvīra has been addressed as Nigaṅtha Nātaputta in Buddhist scriptures, thereby recognizing his way and philosophy of perfect possessionlessness. In view of the high ideal of possessionlessness (nirgraṅthatva) to interpret the term 'acela' (absence of cloth) as having scanty cloth, though the linguistic use of the term may also permit such a meaning, does not seem to fit in the context.

While tracing the Jaina elements in the literature of the Hindus and the Bauddhas we do not come across such references as may lead us to think that the Jaina tīrthaṅkaras and saints put on clothes. On the contrary the Jaina saints have been described as wind-girdled in the Hindu literature.[3] It is also stated that before attaining enlightenment Buddha once entered the order of Pārśvanāth and remained there as a recluse for some time.[4] In the Majjhimanikāya, as already mentioned, Buddha is seen saying, "I lived nude, took my food in hands, and neither took food brought to me, nor aimed at and nor by invitation. I uprooted my hair, shown mercy even to a drop of water, lest any invisible animate being should be killed be me. For this, I remained minutely careful. Even in winter and summer I lived nude in a horrible forest, and never warmed my body, always meditating like a *muni*."[5] This description clearly shows that it related to a Digambara Jaina *muni*, and thereby proves the prevalence of nudity of Jaina saints in the time of Buddha and much before it in the time of Pārśvanāth.

The interval between Mahāvīra and his predecessor Pārśvanāth is 250 years. Mahāvīra added the rule of chastity and nudity and that of not taking food at night to the code

of Pārśva. We come across no substantial difference between the orders of the two leaders. But after Mahāvīra a number of recensions of the Āgama literature which is believed to originate from Mahāvīra and to be compiled by a team of gaṇadharas under him, took place. The first recension took place 160 years after the *nirvāṇa* of Mahāvīra. It is related with the famous ācāryas Bhadrabāhu and Sthūlabhadra. The second recension under Skaṅdila and the third one under Nāgārjuna are said to take place simultaneously 667 years after the first one at different places, the two leaders being mutually ignorant of each other. The fourth recension was organized under Devardhigaṇī Kṣamāśramaṇa 163 years later than the former two. These recensions were necessitated by the fact that the knowledge of the Jaina āgamas was on a decline and the leaders of the recensions wanted to restore it, so far as it was possible, to its original form with available information. It may be noted that the loss of original literature of Jainism, though oral, has not only started as early as 167 years after the departure of Mahāvīra but by then it must have taken as matured shape. The fact was felt and recognized at the time of the first recension-meet held for the purpose. Some idea may be gathered about the workings of these meets from what the scholars think about them. Muni Nathmal holds in the redaction of the Jaina āgamas their original identity has certainly undergone a change and the events and conceptions of the later period have been incorporated in them.[6] Dr. H.L. Jain remarks, "One can clearly see additions and omissions in the contents. Their language too is not the same Ardhamāgadhī as was used in the time of Mahāvīra: it displays linguistic features which developed in a period one thousand years later than him."[7] D. Malvania also mentions that really speaking the aṅga sūtras must have been organised by effecting modification, addition and correction in the Mathuri redaction. For this reason people must have begun to doubt their validity.[8] Moreover in the Śvetāmbara fold itself the authenticity of the āgama literature is not equally acceptable in its various divisions. The idolatrous section of the Śvetāmbara community believes in all the 84 āgamas, a part of the same group, in 45 āgamas, and another part only in thirtytwo āgamas. All

this is very likely to suggest that the Digambara and Śvetāmbara schisms of the Jaina order are very old and had developed, not at a certain point of time depending upon a certain incident; but it had taken a long period of one thousand years, after which along with finalization of the āgama literature, the schism was also given a stable form. It is in this way that these recensions also contributed largely to schismatic developments between the two orders. Under the situation so developed the Digambaras could only believe that the Āgama literature was totally lost long long ago leaving only some fragments behind; and they did not accept the authenticity of the Śvetāmbara āgamas whose identity was so finalized and confirmed in the course of various recensions. It became expedient on their part to write fresh works on various aspects of Jainism on the ground of the available information. This work is believed to have been started as back as first century B.C. This resulted in a clear division of Jaina literature into the Digambara and Śvetāmbara ones. Early Digambara Jaina works produced by Digambara saints of prominence are given the same importance as the Āgamas of the Śvetāmbaras by them. In the Śvetāmbara canons two ways of monkish career have been recognized under the categories of *jinakalpa* and *sthavira kalpa*. The former refers to naked saints, while the latter to the robed ones. On the one hand the Jinakalpa justifies nudity as a way of monkish life and assigns an important place to it; on the other, the total discontinuity of the tradition of nudity in the Śvetāmbara sect just sets our minds athinking about the problem.

In general the different religious sects chose to designate themselves after the colour of the uniform adopted by the saints. The Jaina saints who adopted a white robe organised their followers into the Śvetāmbara sect. The followers of naked Mahāvīra could not resist the temptation of applying a similar nomenclature to their sect and they adopted an *ambara* (symbol) of *dik* (space) under the name *'Digambara'*. Still going deeper than what is implied by the term 'wind griddled' used by the Hindus for the Jaina saints they replaced it by the term 'space-covered' thereby implying perfect freedom from all types of uniforms white or coloured. Iconography goes a long

way in the same direction. The most ancient images of the Jaina tīrthaṅkaras found in the Khaṅdagiri and Udayagiri caves and also in the excavation of Kankālīla are naked and the entire community of the Jainas worshipped them without any reservation. The idea of robed images could not be materialized till the Gupta period in the history of India. "It is noticeable that the images of Jaina Tīrthaṅkaras with clothing and drapery date from the Gupta times. It was in the Gupta period that hitherto nebulous distinction between the Jinakalpas and the Sthavirakalpas crystallized into the division of Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras".[9] A style for Jinas' robed images came into existence resulting in separate shrines and separate ways of worship. The Digambara images are naked, so the Digambara saints are naked. But the Śvetāmbara images have a strip engraved on the base in case of sitting ones or a hanging strip, in case of standing ones to indicate that they are with clothes. The uniform of the Śvetāmbara saints is not represented in the images.

The Digambaras and the Śvetāmbaras both claim the discipleship of Mahāvīra and other tīrthaṅkaras of Jainism. They believe in and uphold the basic doctrines of Jainism. To a very large extent the details of these doctrines are equally shared by the two sects. So much so that some works on Jainism, whether composed by Digambara or Śvetāmbara ācāryas, are equally acceptable as authentic to the members of both the sects. But unfortunately, with the march of time and the development of sectarian interests the differences between them became so pointed as to divide them into two distinct religious sects under Jainism more known so far in society for their conflicting points rather than their common beliefs.

As the names given to these sects imply, the monks of the former remain naked, while those belonging to the latter put on a white uniform. The total rejection of clothes by one and the acceptance of white clothes by the other may also be traced back as due to differences of philosophical nature. For the Digambaras nudity of saints is an essential condition for attaining liberation, as it alone can lead to a state of perfect possessionlessness. For the Śvetāmbaras, the use of clothes by their saints creates no difficulty in the way to liberation,

or rather it is accepted as an aid to meet out some human weakness. The saints belonging to both the sects possess a brush-like means called *picchi* or *rajoharaṅa* to clean the spots they make use of for avoiding violence to small living creatures. In case of the Digambaras it is made of peacock feather, while for the Śvetāmbaras it is made of soft-cotton threads with a handle of a long stick. The Śvetāmbara saints also put on a covering (mukhapaṭṭī) on their mouths to avoid violence to little creatures due to the warmth of air coming out of their mouths. The Digambara saints do not have such a covering on their mouths. Night eating is equally avoided by all these saints. The Śvetāmbara sect allows possibility of liberation even to householders and the monks belonging to folds other than the Jaina on the base of attainment of spiritual purity, thereby reducing the adoption of the monkish career to a secondary stage. In Digambara sect liberation is not possible, unless one adopts the discipline of monkish life.

In the Arhat stage, as the Digambara hold, a person does not indulge in worldly and bodily activities like taking food etc.; while the Śvetāmbaras believe that such souls engage themselves in normal human activities and functions like taking food, falling sick and undergoing treatment along with omniscience. They also differ from each other in regard of ability of observance of rules of saintly conduct by women and possibility of attaining liberation by them. The Digambaras hold that the women are basically incapable of observing the necessary discipline of saintly life required for liberation, hence they are required to be reborn as a male human being to achieve final emancipation. There are female saints in the Digambara sects, but spiritually speaking they are not held capable to attain the same level of purity as the male saints can. The Śvetāmbara think otherwise and hold the opposite view in this respect, and go to the extent of claiming the nineteenth tīrthaṅkara to be a woman, Malli by name, out of a list of twenty four. For Digambaras there has been no female tīrthaṅkara. These differences between the two sects have led to the differences in the forms of images of tīrthaṅkaras. Digambara images are perfectly nude and unadorned and undecorated, while the Śvetāmbara images are with a strip to cover private parts engraved on the base

and are also adorned in various ways with precious ornaments. Another difference between the two sects relates to the ways of begging and partaking of food by saints. The Śvetāmbara saints go about for begging from door to door with bowls in their hands. They would collect articles of food from a number of houses and bring them to the monastery to be shared with other saints without a residue. They will not stop at the house of a layman to consume it. On the other hand the Digambara saints do not possess anything like a bowl or plate to take food or therein collect it. The householders just receive them with due respect at the entrance of their residence, and they take food and water with all precautions avoiding blemishes as enumerated and prescribed in the religious books from the upturned palms of their hands. They take food and water only once a day, while the Śvetāmbara saints can go on a begging tour a number of times and can also consume food and water repeatedly during the day.

The Digambaras and the Śvetāmbaras give differing accounts regarding the personal history of Mahāvīra. The Śvetāmbaras hold that for Mahāvīra the embryo was transferred from that of Brahmin lady, Devanandā to that of the Kṣatriya queen, Trisalā. They also hold that Mahāvīra was married to a princess Yaśodā and had a daughter from her. They also maintain that he did not adopt the life of a monk till his parents were alive. On the other hand the Digambaras think that there is no transplantation of embryo for Mahāvīra, that he did not marry at all and that he adopted monkish life during the life-time of his parents. The two sects stich to their own views and versions and make their scriptures a base for them. Gradually the differences between the two sects—Digambara and Śvetāmbara—originated, developed and gained strength in the course of time. There were some who were worried about the split and who attempted to bring reconciliation between them. As the writer of the Darśanasāra mentions, there emerged the Yāpanīya sect with some specialities of its own. It came into existence in 148 A.D., Just sixty or seventy years after the Digambara-Śvetāmbara split. So all the three sects can be supposed to be, more or less, contemporary. Some of the features of this Yāpanīya sect resembled those of the Digambaras, while others were common

with the Śvetāmbaras. It believed, with the Śvetāmbaras, in the possibility of liberation in case of women and partaking of food by *arhats* like human beings. It also upheld the authority of the Śvetāmbara *āgamas*. With the Digambaras, it upheld nudity as a necessary condition for liberation, worshipped nude images, made use of the brush of peacock feathers and took food from their palms. Thus it showed dual allegiance to both the sects, for which it was denounced as a pseudo Jaina sect rather than being welcomed by either of them. Śāktāyana, the famous grammarian, belonged to this sect. Besides his Śāktāyana Vyākaraṇa, a work on Sanskrit grammar, two more works—Strimukti-prakaraṇa and Kevali-bhukti-prakaraṇa—have come to light dealing with topics as their titles suggest, as against the Digambara concepts. This way of the treatment of situation in the hands of the Yāpanīyas unfortunately failed to achieve the aim in view but resulted in an addition of a third one to the already existing two sects of the Jainas. It could not survive long and had to merge itself in the Digambara fold for its external behaviour relating to the conduct of saints and the ritual of worship. Not much is known regarding the literature of the Yāpanīya sect, but whatever literature it could produce seems to have been merged with the Digambara literature eliminating the points of difference so far as it was possible.

It was about the period from 16th to 18th century that the schismatic trend in the Jaina order took a different direction. Symptoms of internal schisms within the sects became more than clear. In the Digambara fold about 1515 A.D. there appeared Tāraṇasvāmī who started the Taraṇapaṅth after his name. Tāraṇasvāmī raised his voice against idol worship and worshipped the text of Jaina canons in place of the images of the Jaina tīrthaṅkaras. He did not recognize importance of castes in the society and laid emphasis on spiritual purity. The followers of this sect are found in Madhya Pradesh and Khandesh. In the Śvetāmbara fold a similar movement was started by Lonkashah who broke away from the existing order for his disbelief in idolatry. In 1652 A.D. this non-idolatrous sect came into existence under the name the sthānakavāsins with no institution of temples. Later on there emerged an important sect in the Sthānakavāsī

Śvetāmbara fold, and it is known as Terapantha. It has been flourishing since 1760 A.D.

During the current century a new wave and movement was started by Kahanji (1889-1981 A.D.), better known as the saint of Sonagarh (Gujarat). Originally Kahanji was a saint of the Śvetāmbara non-idolatrous fold, but being dissatisfied with the principles and practices prevalent in the fold, he made keen and honest efforts to understand the truth of Jainism for himself. He was very much influenced by the writings of ācārya Kundakunda of the Digambara fold. He came in contact with works like the Samayasāra, Pravacana-sāra, Pañcāstikāyasāra and Niyamsāra of Kundakunda and found a way to truth and spiritual solace in them. He actually accepted the discipleship of Kundakunda, and followed the way as propounded by him. He supplemented his studies from other scriptural sources mainly the commentaries on Samayasāra by Amṛtacandra and Jayasena. With his honesty of purpose, force of logic and way of expression he could attract a good number of followers both from the Digambaras and the Śvetāmbaras. His preachings were published in various books and journals by his followers. Like Kundakunda he emphasized the importance of the principle of the soul in its pure aspects, the independent functioning of the various substances, and the internal purity of human conduct. He has left behind him a good number of pandits and followers of his creed. This diversion may be expected to develop into a well established division under Jainism or in the Digambara fold. People sometimes call it as 'Kahanapantha' after the name of the leader of the movement. Besides Sonagarh where the leader organized his activities, his followers have established an institute at Jaipur for the propagation of their Gurudeva's views.

Regarding these schisms in the Jaina order it has been observed "... in spite of differing on some points of doctrine and discipline, they have broadly adhered to the main principles of the creed. Thus they present the panorama of diversity within unity, a characteristic of the history of all important Indian sects including Jainism. It is through them that the liveliness and dynamism of Jaina faith have been maintained and it has been saved from the torpor of a static

and fossilized cult."[10] It is true that on account of the various points of difference emerging under the schisms some problems of importance came to light and the intelligentsia of the Jaina society was obliged to give a serious thought to them. As a result it added to the philosophical richness and critical appreciation of the tenets of Jainism. More important than this is the safe preservation and carriage of the basic principles of Jainism through these schisms. Most of these schisms were confined only to peripheral differences and no serious damage could be done by them to Jainism as a whole. Mainly only two sects i.e. the Digambara and the Śvetāmbara have come to us with some differences which are not taken to be very weighty by the modern mind as regards the structure of Jaina philosophy and the organization of the Jaina society. The hold of sectarian rigidity being weakened in favour of an awakening for a critical study by scholars in the field of Jainology, a climate for the two sects to come closer to each other seems to be developed in the present age. Let us hope that some day these two sects will be able to drop down their differences for the sake of the truth in Jainism by a sympathetic mutual understanding and a spirit for the uplift of the undivided Jainism.

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3

Anekānta: The Life of Jaina Philosophy

परमागमस्य बीजं निषिद्ध जात्यन्ध-सिन्धुर-विधानम्।
सकलनविकसितानां विरोधमथनं नमाम्येकान्तम्॥
(पुरुषार्थसिद्ध्युपाय, 2)

"I bow to Anekānta which is the seed (root) of the highest of the scriptures, which negates (the validity of) the partial perceptions of an elephant by persons blind by birth (as the whole perception), and which destroys the opposition involved among all the *nayas* (the partial ways to approach to a real)."[1]

"While thus building stones of the Syādavāda are existent in canon already, yet the latter is still unaware of the completed building bearing this name or that of Anekāntavāda. Most certainly the invention of this theory of relativities (as it is frequently called in a somewhat playful manner) goes back to an early time, probably to Mahāvīra personally, but in its fully developed shape as the so called Saptabhaṅgī only later as an anonymous creation."[2]

Amṛtacandra, who has given the above couplet, belongs to a later age as compared with the age of the Āgamas and Mahāvīra himself. As such it points to the status and importance which the concept of Anekānta had gained by the time of this ācārya. The above couplet emphasizes three points about Anekānta. It holds that the principle of anekānta is the very life of Jaina philosophy, it brings about a reconciliation among the partial observations of a real and hence it is potent to liquidate the apparent contradiction

found among such partial observations. We feel indebted to the ācārya for explaining to us the identity and function of Anekānta. Schubring admits the antiquity of Anekānta but then it was only in a rudimentary form, while the completed system of Anekānta is a later production. He does not distinguish between Syādavāda and Anekāntavāda. For him the coverage of these two principles under the theory of relativity, as a modern Jaina would choose to hold, does not imply any philosophical depth. The last development of these two theories is identified with the famous Saptabhaṅgīvāda of the Jainas, but its authorship according to Schubring, has not been well discerned. The above two quotations taken together yield a picture, though not complete both from the historical and the philosophical points of view, to us.

Dr. N. Tatia holds, "The conception of substance, qualities and modes is the outcome the anekānta (non-absolutistic) attitude of the Jaina philosophers."[3] "Another important development of Anekānta was the doctrine of Syādavāda or relativism."[4] Yuvācārya Nathmal is of opinion that the basis for Anekānta is the nayavāda, which is generally understood as the logic of viewpoints, and the basis of Syādavāda is the Saptabhaṅgīvāda. Another writer holds, Saptabhaṅgī is concerned with the predication of a character of a subject. Its main object is predication and not cognition.[5] Ācārya Umāsvāmī has given us an aphorism meaning that pramāṇa and *naya* are the two ways of comprehending reality,[6] so the term *naya* appears as against pramāṇa. *Naya* means an analytic comprehension, while *pramāṇa* is a synthetic one. Nayavāda is also termed as Vibhajyavāda which means answering a question or sub-question after its division into its constitutive parts. "The Anekāntavāda of the Jainas," says S. Gopalan, "is based on the principle of division. Initially this division or distinction is conceived between mind and the world, but in Jaina philosophy it has been extended to a logical extreme, and thus there emerged the Anekāntavāda of objectivity and knowledge."[7] He further observes, "The nayavāda of Jaina provides a sort of frame-work for Syādavāda, for, according to it, the objective world can be perceived with varied points of view and no one viewpoint can be accepted as valid."[8] Professor A. Chakravarti points out

that Pramāṇa and Naya refer to understanding. (Pramāṇa Nayairadhigāmaḥ) knowledge is obtained through pramāṇa and Naya. Pramāṇa refers to comprehension of a real or valid knowledge. Naya refers to the different aspects of considering things. These are the two means of enriching knowledge. Saptabhaṅgī refers to the theory of predication, which is peculiar to Jaina system.[9]

This array of observations by different writers enables us to understand, to some extent, the implications of the terms Anekānta, Naya and Syādavāda or Saptabhaṅgīvāda, very often involved in the discussions on Jainism. It appears that we are faced with three orders, the order of existence, the order of comprehension and the order of expression or predication. The anekānta seems to cover all of these. It is why, as quoted above, one of the writer holds Nayavāda and Syādavāda as developments of Anekāntavāda. Existence necessitates its comprehension and comprehension requires expression or predication or communication to complete the series. Thus Anekānta may also be taken as belonging to the series of existence, then it would be a theory of existence. When interpreted in epistemological terms, it may be taken as belonging to the order of knowledge. Syādavāda, being mainly concerned with expression of what is comprehended, the existential implication underlying it becomes a part of Anekāntavāda as a theory of existence. Thus Anekāntavāda requires a treatment in the above referred three spheres or orders.

The term Anekānta can be split up into aneka, meaning many, and aṅta, meaning determinants or characteristics. Thus the philosophy of Anekāntavāda would mean a system that propounds the plurality of characteristics of a real and the world. Such a plurality is not a distinctive feature of Jaina theory, as there are so many pluralist schools of thought besides the Jaina. For such systems there are many reals in the world and each real possesses many characteristics by which it is cognized by us. The other break-up of the term anekānta can be made into an, meaning not, and ekānta, meaning absolute. Thus it will be taken to mean a system which negates the dictum that reality is possessed of one single, uniform characteristic, and all its perceptions not in

agreement with this uniform nature are false, delusive and apparent. "A real is existent only or non-existent only, such assumptions are termed as ekānta or absolutism. By refuting them to hold reality as existent-cum-non-existent, permanent-cum-impermanent etc. is anekānta."[10] As Jainism, along with being a pluralist philosophy, lays emphasis on the complex and variable nature of reality, the above interpretation of the term anekānta comes very close to it. The basic plurality, complexity and variability of reality in Jainism make such a conclusion necessary. So says the writer of the Aṣṭasahasrī, "On account of transcending all the absolute theses the anekānta reality belongs to a class different from that of the absolute systems."[11]

The latter meaning of the term 'anekānta' seems to be extended when one is found to hold, "The principle of relativity can be established only in the simultaneous existence of two contradictory *dharmas* or traits."[12] "A real is fabricated with the four dyads of *asti-nāsti* (is and is not), *nitya-anitya* (permanent and non-permanent), *eka aneka* (one and many), and *tat-atat* (the same and not the same)."[13] "Anekānta means the manifestation of two mutually opposed powers."[14] "The mutually opposed powers mean the powers of the form 'the same and not the same'."[15] "Opposed cognitions of the form the same and not the same can also be established. If such a position is acceptable to the reals themselves, what can we do there?"[16] A. Chakravarti also remarks, "This doctrine of Asti-Nāstivāda may be considered to be central to Jaina Melaphysics. Unfortunately it is also the view which is very often misunderstood by the non-Jaina writers. The non-Jaina thinkers cannot easily appreciate how it is possible to predicate two contradictory attributes of the same object of reality. *Prima facie*, it is impossible. You cannot say about the same object of nature that it is and that it is not. Naturally, it is extremely confusing and the non-Jaina thinkers very often consider this doctrine to be the weakest point in Jaina metaphysics. Even great thinkers like Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja without appreciating the true significance of this principle condemn this as merely prattling of a mad man."[17] Another writer observes. "If incompatible characters are not predicated of a subject simultaneously, then it does

not follow that they cannot be cognized simultaneously. We at once know a thing to be such and such and also not this and that. Hence knowledge of *sat* and *asat* is simultaneous, though with the dominance of one or the other."[18] All these passages quoted above explain the position regarding reality as a locus for contradictory characteristics.

The position now seems to have been explained along with the difficulties it has been taken to be fraught with. The main difficulty is of positing contradictory traits in a real and also of their simultaneous function. It has been observed that, "No dialectical solution can ever fully transcend these separations which are already present in the original formulation of problems, the history of metaphysics wavers between opposing tendencies, without being able to reduce the one from the other or to deduce them to each other."[19] "The traits that appear to be contradictory are concomitant."[20] "Existence is concomitant with non-existence in the same locus, non existence is concomitant with existence in the same locus."[21] "The traits or natures that look like opposed ones can be many."[22] "To think of position and negation without contradiction in an object with reference to a question is the Saptabhaṅgī."[23] Now so far what has been considered to be the abode of contradictory characters seems to have been reduced to that of separate distinct, concomitant and hence complementary characters or traits. Hence it may be concluded that the traits of existence and non-existence, permanence and impermanence, one and many, and the same and not the same should not be considered as contradictory. "We, too, do not hold negation as a different entity from position."[24] There is no entitive difference between position and negation. "The position itself becomes identical with negation because of a reference."[25] It shows that there is a unity behind the traits of position and negation. This underlying unity takes the form of position in one reference-system, and that of negation in another reference system.

Actually speaking, every real, every entity, and every thing that comes to our mind has got a trait by which it is able to establish itself, and at the same time, to make the above implication useful, it repels against what is other than itself by another trait. The former is termed as *bhāva* or position,

and the other, *abhāva* or negation. We can clearly see that there is no contradiction between these two traits, but they are only distinct from each other. "The negation of cloth in a jar is a trait of the jar itself. We speak of this negation with respect to others, so, in a concessional way, it is called the mode of others."[26] If the trait of position can perform both the functions, then the trait of negation can be held to be equally potent to perform this double function. So it is logically more consistent to hold separate traits of negation and position in the same locus. Similarly the other pairs of traits covered under Anekānta may be consistently treated.

Jaina philosophy, under its ontology enumerates six substances each with an infinite number of attributes and modes. With their distinctive features all exist in the same locus and perform their functions very consistently. "These six Dravyas, though mutually interpreting, and accommodating one another, and though getting mixed in view of occupying the same space, yet always maintain their identical nature without losing their respective qualities, general as well as special."[27] The self-establishment of an entity in respect of all the reals and its repulsion from what is other than itself is effected in terms of traits as already discussed. The nature of reality in Jainism is dynamic in such a way that its continuance is also maintained. Jainism defines a real by the term *sat*, and a special meaning is given to this term as a compendium of origination, decay and permanence.[28] One should not feel perplexed to note the simultaneous occurrence of origination, decay and permanence in a real. Says Amṛtacandra Sūrī, "There is no origination without decay, no decay without origination, and no decay and origination without permanence.[29] There is origination in terms of its present state, decay in terms of negating its previous state and permanence in both the states. The continuity or permanence thus lives by origination and decay, all the three being implied by the unitary real. Mac Taggart's remark in this respect is worth noticing, "Thus the continuity of the attribute is always sufficient if the substance changed, but it also proves that the substance remains unchanged."[30] An example given by Samantabhadra will make the point clear. Persons desirous of a jar, a crown and gold become sad,

happy and indifferent at the destruction (of the jar), the origination (of the crown) and persistence of gold. All this goes with their causes."[31] The states of sadness, happiness and indifference are facts of our experience, are caused by three different factors in the outside world, and are seen to be implied by the self-same real. Thus permanence and change (origination and decay) are the very essence of existence, and these can be affirmed of a real in the realm of traits, as we have already seen in case of position and negation.

The trio of substance attributes and modes can also be well illustrated by the example of a mathematical function. A mathematical function can depend on one, two or many variables. The variables put together and functioning together constitute the function. With the change in the variables the function also undergoes changes. If the function is deprived of the variables, it vanishes along with the variables. If the variables are given constant values, the function also attains a corresponding constant value. The substance of Jaina philosophy, like a mathematical function, is a unity of its attributes which are subject to incessant change. With the change of the attributes the substance also changes, the substance endures through these changes. There is no substance without the attributes and *vice versa*. In this continuous flow of change we put punctuations as to get the modes. Thus a mathematical function provides a good analogy to understand the substance theory of Jainism along with the concepts of substance, attributes and modes. As the Jainas posit infinite attributes and capacities to function and to manifest in a real, a mathematical function having infinite variables should be taken for consideration of the Jaina theory of substance.

Jainism enunciates five mutually irreducible and extended substances constituting the cosmos. They are divided into two main groups i.e. *jīva*, the conscious principle, and the *ajīva* the unconscious principle. The first group consists of an infinite number of souls characterised by consciousness. The other group consists of *pudgala* (matter) *ākāśa* (space), *dharma*—a substance that works as a medium for motions of souls and matter and *adharma*—a substance that is required as a medium to help the condition of rest for souls

and matter. These are held to be extended substances, and are technically called *astikāyas* because of their extended existence. Time is another such substance. It is not extended like other substances but exists in atomic form. It is again a medium of the continuance of every real. Matter also has an atomic structure, but these atoms have a capacity to combine together to give birth to molecules which acquire a capacity for synthetic and unitary function—for which it has been classed with the extended substances. The souls are also extended, and their extension can vary so as to enable them to inhabit bodies of different magnitudes. This concept of Jaina philosophy stands against the infinite and atomic dimensions of the souls as accepted by other systems of philosophy. The various constituents of the universe exist in the world agreeing among themselves in certain aspects and also maintaining their special characteristics. So far as the drama of the world is concerned only the substances of soul and matter are active members assisted passively by the other substances. The entire mundane life of the souls results from the encounter between the souls and matter, specially the *karma*-matter. Such is the belief about the constituents of the world in Jainism.

Prof. A. Chakravarti observes, "Complex reality naturally claims complex attitude of understanding. Any attempt to provide life and its problems with a simple readymade framework must certainly end in failure, for conceptual analysis always implies selection and obstruction. The reality which is described by a concept will certainly be richer in content than the content of the idea. Hence there is the possibility of describing the same fact of life by distinct and sometimes by diverse conceptual symbols."[32] It is the very nature of reality that necessitates the analytic way of its understanding. The vibhajyavāda, as the Jaina logic is initially called, means solving a problem by breaking it up into its sub-problems. Taken as a whole a complex problem requires a complex solution. It is wrong to expect one uniform answer to such a complex problem. These problems are be multi-dimensional on account of the complex nature of the underlying reality or on account of the varied points of view of the knower. This very process of understanding by divisions

or analysis is known as Nayavāda in Jaina philosophy. We very often isolate some aspects of a real for our comprehension. Things are also made known by this process as against another where we do not aim at such isolation. So the Jainas accept two well-known ways of comprehending reality.[33]

A distinction is drawn between the comprehensions by the above mentioned two ways. In a synthetic comprehension called *pramāṇa* one is more concerned with the whole and less, with the elements of its analysis. Though it is a type of knowledge or *jñāna*, the term *pramāṇa* suggests much more than mere knowledge. *Jñāna* has been replaced by *māna* which means measurement. Not being satisfied with simple measurement, the prefix 'pra' has been applied to it implying its kind to be very high. So the term *pramāṇa* means the measurement of a very high order, and hence implies a knowledge of an equally high order. It seems that knowledge without measurement will lose much of its grandeur. On the other hand the analytic way of comprehension is said simply to carry on the reality for our practical purposes[34] which is also not possible without effecting a type of comprehension.[35] The analysed part of reality upon which the process of comprehension is centred is also real, and the judgement regarding this part of reality has been called a naya."[36]

Nayas are said to be derived from *śruta* knowledge which being a pramāṇa comprehends things synthetically. As such knowledge based on *nayas* is to be accepted as valid. Varied approaches to reality, based on the selection of aspects from a totality on account of the purpose in view, are possible; and they result in varied partial perceptions of a real. These varied but regulated views of reality give us part-truths. To identify them as whole truths is to commit a fallacy. The obsession of a particular view so blinds our vision that we are misled to take it as a whole view. The absolute views seem to suffer from such a fallacy. We have said that the varied views represented by *nayas* are regulated. It means that before such views are accepted one must be conscious of its regulation. The point of view which makes us select a slice of reality for comprehension should be understood first, then alone we shall be able to appreciate the consequent partial truths. It is exactly supplying a proper reference-system to every

judgement we make. For example, we have varied reference systems in Analytic Geometry. An equation drawn in accordance with a particular reference system will represent the curve in that very system. This equation will be a misfit in any other system, and will not represent the particular curve in that system. So the misapplication of reference-systems is another source of fallacy in naya logic, and serious confusions are created when we fail to appreciate this situation. We can commit the mistake of upholding a particular equation as representative of a particular curve universally independently of the system. So also when a judgement is divorced from its regulative system and is held true universally, a similar fallacy must occur in our thinking. This practice, in the realm of logic, is termed as a form of absolutism and the resulting judgements are held invalid. Hence another condition of validity of naya knowledge is drawn as that the nayas should be mutually accommodating.[37] So long as a particular reference-system is operative in our thinking the partial knowledge so obtained is certainly true, but for that reason the application of another reference system should not be disallowed and consequently the validity of such resulting partial knowledge should not be questioned. All such varied judgements are true in their proper reference systems. Such is the spirit of Jaina Nayavāda.

The nature of our thinking is discursive, or to think the other way, all our thinking is an answer to some problem. It has already been mentioned that Nayavāda initially meant dealing with problems after analysing them into their constitutive sub-problems. It may lead us to think that no body can escape the technique of Nayavāda, it is a natural way of thinking for us. Says Rājamalla, "It is impossible to escape the flow of Nayavāda."[38] If so, how the question regarding the practice of Nayavāda outside the field and fold of Jainism and the special contribution of Jaina Nayavāda to the process of discursive thinking just tickles our curiosity. In common practice when an individual calls his father, he knows it well that the latter is much more than being father and he is making use of only his relationship with him. This type of selection of an element from a complex real is always present in our thinking, and the connected reference-system

is unwittingly presumed in the mind. It may be that we do not expressly make a mention of the reference-system. As we rise higher from the popular level or are involved in a perplexing situation the formulation and expression of the reference-system becomes very necessary to understand the implication of what we know or express. Coming to various systems of philosophy this type of relative thinking seems to have been recognized in them. Vedānta, to begin with, distinguishes among three levels of existence as the pārmārthika (absolute), the vyavahārika (empirical), and the prātibhāsika (apparent). Judgements are made and discussed with reference to them. Similarly Kant distinguishes between the noumenon (thing-in-itself) and the phenomenon (thing as it appears to us). Kant solves his anomalies by applying proper references to the judgements. Where plurality of existence is admitted, whatever may be the level of existence, selection of items from this plurality becomes a necessity for the advancement of our thinking. Even the modern scientists and mathematicians treat their problems by effecting an analysis of them, and thus they try to find out their solutions. So in practical life we see the naya-technique of thinking is present everywhere. It has been resorted to even in the field of philosophy and science. In this respect our conclusion is that Jainism has nothing very special to contribute to the process of our thinking by its technique of Nayavāda, it has only brought to the surface what was mistakenly thought to be inconsistent and buried deep in ignorance.

Still Jainism is proud of the fact that it alone has given a non-absolute philosophy which bases its truths on the application of reference-systems explicitly or implicitly, and labels all other systems as absolute ones. This may be true as regards the theories of ultimate existence and truths. For example the Vedantic concept of one reality behind all the false perception we make of it makes it an absolute system, because no status of truth of perception and reality behind them is recognized in this system. Similarly Kantian conception of noumenon becomes an absolutism, as all phenomena and phenomenal views, for him, are not the representations of the noumenon. Also the dualism of mind and matter of Descarte will be called an absolutism because

Descarte has created an impassable gulf between them, while, in our experience, mind and matter are seen working in unison. Just as plurality is discarded by the monists, so also unity may be discarded by the pluralists. It will again be a form of absolutism. The special contribution of Jainism in the shape of Nayavāda lies in recognizing an equal status for the multiple cognitions, obtained about a real by placing it in different contexts or applying different reference-systems where it finds a consistant place.

All this, as we view it in the modern context, seems to be a form a relativity as applied to existence and its perception. When the Jaina holds that the same real would yield varied perceptions if placed under different contexts, the Jaina theory looks more like a relativism in general. The well known example of a stone dropped from a running train may be usefully considered in this context. The path of the falling stone is seen as a parabola by a man on the platform, but it is seen as a vertical line by the man in the compartment. If the positions of the two persons are interchanged, their perceptions will also be interchanged. Herein the context is attached with the object of perception. In the most quoted example given by Samaṅtabhadra in his Āptamīmānsā the context is attached with the perceiving mind in the form of a purpose which determines the selection of a particular aspect from a complex real. Hence the conclusion is that this relativity can be determined both subjectively and objectively.

From what has said so far one is very likely feel that Jaina relativism is based on the setting in which a real is placed, and the purpose of the perceiver; and leaves the real totally untouched by them. We should bear in mind that the setting and the perceiver's purpose both contribute to the selection of aspects of a real. They are meant to bring the desired aspect of the real in the focus of the perceiver's consciousness. By it the other aspects of a real are not nullified but only thrown into background. The entire process of the naya technique of thinking follows this way in the selection of aspects of a real. Devanandi comments upon Arpaṇā—the regulative principle of naya logic—as "arpita means to raise anyone characteristic selected from a complex reality on account of some objective in view for expression to a position of dominance

or importance. What is opposite of it is called 'anarpita' for lack of relevance for us. The absence of desire for expression may exist even in case of existing elements, hence what becomes irrelevant is called 'anarpita'.[39] At another place it has been said that "the core and secondary positions are possible only in case of the existing characteristics."[40] This makes it clear that naya technique is concerned with the existing aspects of a real, hence it is objective in nature. The cognitions obtained under naya technique are equally faithful to reality, but as it would require, the governing reference-system must also be taken into account. It is not the Jaina view that reality remains untouched under such cognitions. It is on this ground that the validity of partial judgements made under naya logic is acceptable to the Jaina. We have already discussed some of the fallacious ways which vitiate the knowledge yielded by adopting the technique of naya.

The other phase of Anekāntavāda is Syādavāda which is generally identified with Nayavāda, as its nomenclature also suggests. Syādavāda as Saptabhaṅgīvāda is a theory of predication emerges to distinguish it from Nayavāda. In our discursive thinking cognitions about reality are experienced. These need expression for communication with others, and sometimes with ourselves. We are now to consider whether predication alone is the special region for Saptabhaṅīgvāda and how it is related with the Jaina theory of existence. Its relation with Nayavāda is very close, as predication presupposes the existence of cognitions in the mind. Just as Nayavāda has been seen to be tied with reality, so also Saptabhaṅgīvāda may be found related to with the theory of existence.

The term 'syāt' has been variously translated as perhaps, somehow, and under certain circumstances etc. These terms basically point to the application of reference-systems to a subject in a proposition thereby implying that absolute predication of a characteristic to a subject is inconsistent. These terms may be graded from a general meaning to the actual statement of governing conditions. Naya-knowledge also precedes on the ground of such governing conditions, and thus, in this respect Saptabhaṅgīvāda cannot be distinguished from Nayavāda, as both of them are concerned

with some from of relativism. Anekāntavāda as a theory of existence must be there in the root of both these theories. Taking into account the seven bhaṅgas (propositions) which are covered under Syādavāda, the theory has also been termed as the Saptabhaṅgī Nayavāda—which brings it very close to Nayavāda. The only distinctive feature herein is the inclusion of the seven propositions expounded about a real. Saptabhaṅgīvāda, with its domain of predication, may be taken as a corollary of Syādavāda.

"The Saptabhaṅgī proceeds by conditional position and negation by effecting a division of reality into substance and mode, and universal and particular."[41] Kundakunda states, "Some how a real exists, does not exist both exists and does not exist, is inexpressible, exists and is inexpressible, does not exist is inexpressible, and exists and does not exist and is inexpressible. A substance admits of these seven descriptions on account of contexts or reference-systems."[42] Prof. A. Chakravarti holds that these are the seven possible ways of *a priori* description, every description is convertible to one of these. To have a complete description the thing must be taken in all these seven ways. These propositions aim, at the most, only at probable truth.[43] "To think of position and negation without contradiction in a real on account of a query is the Saptabhaṅgī."[44] The genesis of the seven bhaṅgas or propositions depends on the emergence of seven questions, which depend on seven doubts, which in turn, depend on seven traits or *dharmas* of a real.[45] So the basis for seven propositions has been located in the seven *dharmas* or traits implied by a real.

A substance is a continuum, which when differentiated with a view to maintaining the continuity of the elements obtained from such differentiation, yields what we call attributes. Each of such attributes may also be considered as a continuum, which when differentiated with respect to its existence in time points, yields what we call modes. These modes, along with substance and attributes, follow another way of differentiation and yield what we call *dharmas* or traits. Prof. Stcherbastsky explains, "To every unit of quality there is corresponding subtle element (*dharma*) which either directly manifests itself or according to Sarvāstivādins,

remaining for ever a transcendental reality, produces a reaction (kāritva lakṣaṇa) which we wrongly interpret as a quality."[46] This is something like finding a metaphysical basis for the seven propositions, as we could find such a base for naya logic in the analysis of a real. As regards the identity of these *dharmas* of Saptabhaṅgī we get ample support for the traits of position and negation from the Anekānta theory of existence. Regarding the third trait of position-cum-negation (asti-nāsti), it is not only a combination of position and negation, because we experience it as real and distinct from such a combination.[47] The asti-nāsti bhaṅga has got only one trait behind it.[48] Similarly other combinations of these traits are to be taken to be distinct entities so as to make the number of traits seven in a real. Basically we have only three such unitary traits i.e. position, negation and inexpression. By taking combinations of these three traits, we get exactly seven entities when mathematically calculated, but the resulting entities hold the same status as the three basic ones.[49] If we substitute algebraical symbols X, Y, Z for the basic traits, the seven traits take the form as (i) X (ii) Y (iii) XY (iv) Z (v) XZ (vi) YZ and (vii) XYZ. Herein we are able to note the distinguishing feature of Syādavāda as Saptabhaṅgīvāda with its spirit of agreement with Nayavāda. When R.G. Collingwood said that a windowpane is 50 per cent hot and 50 per cent cold at the same time,[50] his statement was confined only to the two basic traits. The Jaina propounds the theory of seven traits of a real, then the contribution of each trait to the real will come out to be 100/7 per cent, if such a measurement is permissible. So for formulating the various propositions under Saptabhaṅgīvāda what we are required to do is simply to effect a choice from a multitude of seven traits. These propositions will embody partial truths about the real. It is perhaps wrong to say that a simultaneous or successive consideration of these traits is involved in getting the propositions related with the asti-nāsti and avaktavya bhaṅgas. It will also be wrong to say that to get the bhaṅgas depending on the combination of the basic traits of a real a duration of two or three moments for effecting the functions of the individual bhaṅgas in the combination is necessary.[51]

The concept of the first two bhaṅgas based on the traits of position and negation is not difficult to understand. We, wittingly or unwittingly, make use of them in our common discussions. These two bhaṅgas were known in the times of the Rigveda, and even before it. The passage to the inexpressible seems to have been carved out through the concept of neither-existent nor non-existent given in the Nāsādiyasūkta. In the Upaniṣads the idea of the ultimate reality as inexpressible has emerged very clearly, and the concept of neither existent nor non-existent seems to have been translated into that of the inexpressible. The Catuṣkoṭi of Buddhism deals with the four above positions, if by 'neither existent nor non-extent', is taken as equivalent to inexpressible. Special importance is attached to the discovery of the inexpressible by the Jaina writers who do not mention any bhaṅga as 'neither existent nor non-existent' but they very clearly mention the bhaṅga 'existent-cum-non-existent' which also appears in the Catuṣkoṭi of Buddhism. The formulation of the last three bhaṅgas as asti-avaktavya, nāsti-avaktavya and asti-nāsti avaktavya may be exclusively attributed to the Jaina; and their treatment in the concerned books is detailed along with the first four bhaṅgas. We have already seen that the Jaina has derived the seven bhaṅgas of the Saptabhaṅgī by providing an ontological basis to the whole theory in terms of traits or *dharmas* behind them. Connected with this very topic a question was raised as 'As we have been able to get the Saptabhaṅgī (the theory of seven bhaṅgas), (by following the same chain of reasoning) the śata bhaṅgī (the theory of hundred bhaṅgas) will also be deduced.' The solution is not far to seek. The process of combination of traits under Saptabhaṅgīvāda proceeds on the three primary traits which include position (asti), negation (nāsti) and in expression (avaktavya). Hence the total number of resulting combinations is exactly seven which give rise to seven propositions (bhaṅgas), Herein our inquisitiveness about the search of traits of a real gets satisfied. It will be futile to extend this search for further combinations which will yield no sense and meaning for us. Thus there remains no scope for multiplying traits and propositions any further. Jainism strongly upholds and supports the theory of sevenfold predication under its Saptabhaṅgīvāda.

Samaṅtabhadra has stated, "Syādavāda and kevalalajñāna (perfect knowledge) both yield enlightenments about the entire reality, but the difference between them is that of being indirect and direct."[52] In other words the dualism of knowables and their references is there in Syādavāda, while it is absent in perfect knowledge. Thus Syādavāda seems to represent the complete system of Jaina philosophy in general. Samaṅtabhadra's well-known work, the Āptamīmāṅsā, and its commentaries by Aklaṅka and Vidyānanda embody a unique treatment of reality after the doctrine of the Saptabhaṅgīvāda. The theory of seven bhaṅgas or propositions and the seven traits underlying them are very essential ingredients of Syādavāda. The terms Anekāntavāda, Nayavāda and Syādavāda may be taken to imply each other's if taken in a general sense. Existence, knowledge and predication are the three orders noticeable in the world. Knowledge cognizes what is existent, and predication communicates what is cognized. Hence an affinity is observable among these three orders, and this fact accounts for their partial identification and hence of mutual implication among Anekāntavāda, Nayavāda and Syādavāda and Saptabhaṅgīvāda. If we aim at distinguishing among the domains of these theories, we can do so by mainly relating them to the above mentioned three orders or spheres.

So far we have been able to review the transition of Anekāntavāda, through Nayavāda to Syādavāda. It is something like a translation of reality from existence, to its ways of understanding and then to those of expression or communication. In the context which we are taking into consideration the term *'dharma'* in a different sense. In the ethical context the term *'dharma'* has a very popular and wide use. There it means righteousness, moral discipline and religious practices; and stands for a science of spiritual emancipation of the fallen souls. These two implications of the term *'dharma'* are very much different from each other on account of the contexts attached with them; and as such they must not cause any confusion. *Dharma* as an ethical concept leads to the discussion of the conscious substance of the soul and the doctrine of *Ahiṁsā* in their various aspects as expounded in Jaina philosophy following the methodology

given Anekāntavāda in respect of existence, knowledge and predication.

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4

The Soul

One is directly familiar with the facts of perception memory, imagination, love, anger, pleasure and pain in case of oneself, but as regards their truth in case of others it is not directly experienced but is known only as a deduction based on an analogy with one's own experience. What is experienced directly by one can be known only indirectly by others. Severally each one is having such experiences, and by some it has been seen only as mere behaviour bereft of the attendant experience of consciousness. Actually speaking all experience worth the name is conscious, only the function or the behaviour of inanimate objects is unconscious. The fact of consciousness in case of the animate beings cannot be denied without running the risk of self-contradiction. The behaviour of others in the form of memory, perception etc. may be misread as simple behaviour like that of inanimate objects being indirectly known to us, but its similarity with our own must lead to the truth of its being conscious. The existence of the life-principle in the vegetable world was established on the ground of a distinct type of behaviour of the plants. This behaviour implied consciousness in the plants in the same way as we deduce it in case of other human beings and animals. The truth of consciousness seems to be well established. As we go back to the lower forms of manifestation of the life-principle, our assurance about its universality grows weaker on account of an indistinct expression of the life-principle in such forms. The difference of opinion about the function of the life-principle as consciousness among various systems of philosophy is not so keen as

their difference about the concept of the functionary behind it. George Berkeley reduced all the sensory qualities of the external world to mere perceptions residing in the soul. So he lost the external world but could save the reality of the souls. David Hume held that we are able to perceive only the functions of the self and matter, and do not perceive the subtrata independently of their functions. With Hume we find a loss of both the internal and the external worlds under the force of his arguments. Leaving aside the external world for the time being the entire problem under consideration is focussed at the reality of the functionary behind the conscious function or behaviour of the living beings.

The Jaina, being a realist, must locate and propound a real basis as the cause of these conscious functions. For him the functions cannot fly in empty air without a causal agency behind, or we shall be left with no regulative principle to determine the variety of the flow of these functions. We find it easy to understand that unconscious functions of matter originate from something real, but it becomes a little difficult to presuppose a similar basis for conscious functions. This basic reality behind conscious functions has been variously named as ātman, *jīva* etc. in Jainism. It exists in the world in a real and distinct way like matter, and it is due to its association with our body that the body itself seems to be enlivened and is very often confused with the soul-principle of consciousness. Generally this principle of consciousness is experienced through the medium of body, and the body accompanies it, in its fineness of development; in the shape of fine and gross structures. The body appears to be much more than a mere carrier or container of the soul on account of a very close affinity and correspondence between the two. When the Cārvāka was compelled to locate the source responsible for the generation of consciousness in matter, he, by dropping the grosser forms of matter, had to posit this capacity for consciousness functions in a very fine type of matter as distinguished from what we mean by matter in general. The Jaina thinker, Vidyānanda, at once concluded on the ground given by Cārvāka that this finest element responsible for the generation of consciousness in a body does not belong to the class of matter but is a distinct category

which is conscious as against unconscious matter. It may not be taken to be an efficient proof to establish the identity of the soul, but it certainly points to a way by which one can reach the concept of the soul which is finer than the finest of matter. We shall be required to take a jump from the world of fine matter to enter the world of soul, as the passage between them is not continuous. The Jaina believe that the soul and matter are two different substances.

Like Cārvāka, as already mentioned, the science of life also conceives of protoplasm to account for the emergence of consciousness in an organism. This protoplasm is physical in nature but potent to generate consciousness. The ford between the physical and the mental does not seem to be bridged over, though the two are brought close to each other. There is no smooth passage between the physical and the mental. To overcome the difficulty Bausfield had to devise another element in the name of psychoplasm to give a better account of the emergence of consciousness in an organism. The conception of psychoplasm stands between that of protoplasm and the soul of Jaina philosophy, which Vidyānanda wanted to extract from the position of the Cārvāka. Then the passage from gross physical structure, through fine physical structure, protoplasm and psychoplasm, to consciousness may be taken to lead to the reality of the soul, In Jainism the soul is distinct from the body, but they work in unison to give rise to empirical self. The soul does not belong to the category of matter, nor is it a function of matter or body.

The Cartesian proof for the existence of the soul given as 'Cogito ergo sum' meaning I think, therefore I am and the Jaina argument for the same as based on 'svasaṁvedana' i.e. self-consciousness amount almost to the same contention. Descartes makes thinking the base for the existence of the soul, he must then take thinking in a wide sense to cover all the functions of the underlying principle. Then, thinking as equivalent to consciousness will imply the existence of the soul. By *svasaṁvedana* we mean the experiencing of the self in every bit of our conscious activities. So where there is a conscious activity like cognition, affection and conation, the attendant consciousness of the self or soul must also be there. It is called 'svasaṁvedana pratykṣa' meaning the direct

experiencing of the self or soul. Actually speaking cognition, affection and conation, in their various forms, are the forms of the existence of the soul, hence along with their experience, the experience of the soul is always there. We know material bodies in terms of their properties perceived and experienced by us with the help of the senses and the mind, and the process of our knowing is not confined only to these properties but the idea of their being a thing, a real behind them also accompanies our cognitions. This is how the experience of the soul is held to be direct in our experiences of pain, pleasure etc. 'Mind is the first and most direct thing in our experience, all else is remote inference.'[1] The object about which one has doubt may be non-existent, but the existence of the doubter cannot be denied without the risk of smashing the whole structure completely. Max Mullar puts it as "There is in man something that can be called Ātman or self. It requires no proof, but if a proof were wanted, it would be found in the fact that no one can say I am not (I being the disguised Ātman)."[2]

The purposivist school of psychology distinguishes between the purposive and the mechanical behaviours, attributing the former to the living beings and the latter to inanimate objects. The purposive behaviour is always accompanied by consciousness, thereby implying the truth of mind as a separate entity from matter. McDougall rightly holds, "I believe that the mind has a nature and a structure and functions of its own which cannot be fully adequately described in terms of structure of the brain and its physical processes. He further says, "On really impartial and unprejudiced consideration of the problems, it does appear that no aggregation of elements or bits of conscious stuff, or of conscious processes, call them sensations or ideas or what you will, can produce self-conscious ego, a self-directing being aware of itself and its continuing identity over against other similar selves and the physical world."[3] At another place it has been said that the "mental structure is that enduring growing framework of mind which we infer from the observed manifestations of mind in experience and behaviour."[4] A good many aspects of the concept of soul are made clear with the help of the above quotations from works on psychology. Mind

has distinct existence from matter, it is not only conscious but is self-conscious, it has got a structure which endure in time, it is distinct from similar structures of others and for that reason location can be assigned to it, and has its own manifestations by which we are able to perceive it. We are here again reminded of the famous Jaina tetrad of substance (dravya), place (kṣetra), time (kāla) and modification (bhāva) with reference to which the treatment of a real is effected in Jainism. In case of the mind of modern psychology almost the various dimensions seem to be clearly admitted, but as regards the substantiality of mind the position is given a different turn. To quote C.R. Jain "cognition and emotion cannot inhere in nothing, nor can volition be the function of a non-entity. Hence they must be the states of something which exists, consequently of a substance."[6] Again the same fact has been emphasised as " Nothing that exists, or be the abode of qualities, cannot exist independently of a substantive basis."[7] The psychologists talk of the stuff of the mind but abhor the idea of the substance of mind. When the three dimensions of the Jaina tetrad are admitted to be applicable to mind, the fourth one, i.e. of being a substance, should be admitted in the same logical chain in the presence of conditions favouring its possibility. Hence the Jaina upholds the substance-theory about the soul very strongly and confidently.

So in Jainism both soul and matter are substances, besides some other constituents of the world (as enumerated later), are also admitted as substances. This also makes it intelligible that soul and matter cannot be in absolute opposition but must agree with each other at least in being substances i.e. in respect of their general attributes. These general attributes are existence, thinghood (capacity to function), knowability, substantiality, occupation of space, and the like. In addition to these they have some special attributes. The special attributes of the soul are consciousness and incorporeality, and those of matter are unconsciousness and corporeality. The other attributes which are special to the soul are knowledge, apprehension, bliss and power. Similarly those of matter are touch, taste, smell and colour.[8] Soul and matter differ from each other in respect of their

special attributes. In other words the soul can never possess or develop the special qualities of matter in itself, so also matter is incapable of possessing or developing the special qualities of soul in itself. All these attributes are intrinsically connected with their substratum i.e. they hold a relation of identity with it. They can be talked about independently of the substratum but cannot be separated from it. The variations in respect of the attributes of a substance are the variations of the substance itself.

Mostly consciousness has been admitted as a differentia of the *jīva* in Jaina works, but the use of the term 'upayoga' as a defining characteristic of the jīva[9] just raises the question of difference between consciousness and *upayoga*. Dr. T.G. Kalghatgi has identified *upayoga* with purposiveness of modern psychology. The activities of living things according to the purposivist school of psychology are all directed to fulfil some aim or purpose. Such activities are motivated by some purpose; and, when the purpose is fulfilled, the activities come to a stop. This is how the purposive behaviour of the living beings is explained, and thus purposiveness amounts to an important ingredient of life. Consciousness, when translated into action, shows these symptoms. Hence *upayoga* can be understood as consciousness in action. "Just as mental activity is a fact of mental functioning, and the mental capacity, a fact of mental structure, in the same way consciousness or *cetanā* may be taken as a fact of soul's structure and *upayoga*, as a fact of soul's function or *vṛtti*."[10] The most significant manifestation of the soul in respect of consciousness is knowledge. It has been admitted to be an important and unique attribute of the soul and has been given a separate, distinct and detailed treatment in the works on Jaina epistemology. This knowledge, thus, can be viewed in its two aspects i.e. as a fact of soul's structure and also as a fact of soul's functioning.

According to the Jaina belief, knowledge is a power of the soul, and it works in its mundane existence in various ways all limited and distorted, owing to the obstructions caused by the obscuring *karmas*. Some of these obstructions work in such a way that the soul is obliged to accept the instrumentality of the senses, and thus there result the five

types of sensuous knowledge depending on the five senses of touch, taste, smell, colour and sound. In the process of knowledge this stage provides what may be called the 'given' as W.T. Stace puts it or 'knowledge by acquaintance' as Bertrand Russel designates it. According to Devanandi the soul in its mundane being incapable of comprehending objects by itself, accepts the assistance of the senses. The knowledge so determined is called *matijñāna* or sensuous knowledge. It is immediately followed by another type of knowledge which is built up on it and also transcends it.[11] It is called the *śrutajñāna* or perceptual knowledge. Says Umāsvāmī, "Śruta knowledge always presupposes mati-knowledge."[12] Ācārya Nemicandra observes. "Śruta or perceptual knowledge is the knowledge of object other than one known by the sensuous knowledge."[13] The contents of these two types of knowledge are not the same, though the difference may be caught only after fine analysis. *Śruta*-knowledge is a construction on the *mati*-knowledge. It is not mere reproduction of the contents of the latter. The mind, with its capacity for manipulating the contents of sensuous knowledge, adds newer details to it to transform it into Śruta knowledge, W.T. Stace rightly observes, "The mind starts from a certain fundamental data which we call the given, and it builds upon these data the whole fabric of knowledge by means of constructions and inferences between constructions."[14] In psychology when sensations are supported by the apperception-masses, there results the perceptual knowledge. In Jainism both these capacities for sensuous knowledge and perceptual knowledge are posited in the mundane souls as limitations of its power for infinite perception. Attenuation of these obstructions increases its power for sensuous and perceptual cognitions.

Umāsvāmī divides the entire scope of knowledge into two groups i.e. direct and indirect. The first two i.e. the sensuous and the perceptual types fall under the indirect, and the rest are direct. The direct type of knowledge covers *avadhijñāna* (clairvoyance), *manaḥparyayajñāna* (telepathy) and *kevalajñāna* (omniscience).[16] Regarding direct or *pratyakṣa* knowledge Akalaṅka observes, "Pratyakṣa is the detailed comprehension (of objects) independently of the senses and

the mind (conceived as a quasi-sense in Jainism) and is free from faults."[16] Gradually the soul may reduce the use of the senses to zero and comprehend things directly. We can trace a parallel truth and position in the phenomena of clairvoyance, clair audience, telepathy and psychometry in parapsychology. H.H. Price also observes, "The evidence for telepathy and clairvoyance is both abundant and good, and the evidence for precognition—the most paradoxical, perhaps, of all supernormal phenomena is very considerable."[17] McDougall very hopefully asserts, "In my view the evidence for telepathy is very strong, and I foretell with considerable confidence that it will become stronger and stronger the more we investigate or sift the evidence."[18] According to Jainism *avadhi* or clairvoyance is concerned with the direct comprehension of material objects. Without using one's senses manaḥparyaya or telepathy takes so subtle a form that it can comprehend the ideas in the mind of others, directly without any medium. *Avadhi* is not able to do so, being a lower type of attainment than *manaḥparyaya*. These two types of knowledge, though directly determined, represent only limited manifestations of knowledge attribute of the soul. When these obstructions in the form of *karmas* are completely eliminated from the soul, its infinite power for comprehension becomes fully manifest. It is the stage of omniscience which the Jaina advocates unflinchingly. It is a natural state of the soul in respect of its knowledge-attributes. The objects of knowledge are related with it on account of their capacity for being known. Fire has the power to burn things and the combustible articles have the capacity for being burnt, hence the process should go on in a natural way provided no obstruction intervenes. A magnet has the power to attract and iron has the capacity for being attracted, hence the process between them should go on if not disturbed by any external factor. The knowing power of the soul in its pure form and the capacity of objects for being known will permit the possibility of omniscience. It should embrace all the substances and their modes, as Umāsvāmī maintains.[20] H. Joachim thinks, "Omniscience, we may admit, must be the knowledge of everything and in the infinite experience nothing can be lost.... In this sense past and future are no

less and not otherwise than the present, there is no difference between the trivial and the important."[21] C.R. Jain observes, "The knowledge possessed by a perfect soul would, then, consist in the knowledge of all that its own nature is capable of revealing. It would, to a very large extent, not be a knowledge of things actually existing, but of the forms of all things as lying in the womb of possibility."[22] It may be added that no details are superfluous and redundant for omniscience, like a mirror it should reflect all that comes under its span.[23] So wide and unlimited is the scope of omniscience.

Rene Descartes stressed the opposition of consciousness and extension. He held, "... extension solely belongs to matter, and consciousness is an exclusive quality of the soul. Extension and consciousness cannot coexist."[24] On the other hand Jaina philosophy, by holding the soul as an *astikāya*, meaning extended existence, clearly admits that the soul exists in space. The concept of the substance of space in Jaina ontology is enunciated with a definite function assigned to it as accommodating all the substances including the soul. So for the Jaina the soul, like other substances both corporeal and incorporeal, must occupy some space to exist in the universe. As to the identity of extension it is said, "Extension is length, breadth and thickness, hence extension and space are identical."[25] To hold the soul to be an extended substance is to assign the spatial dimensions to it. The idea of extension is easily understood in case of material things. How the Jaina applies it to the soul is what he is required to explain. The stuff of the soul is different from that of matter. To understand it, as we have already said, one is to imagine a substance subtler than the subtlest of matter. This is only a way leading to the comprehension of the soul, while the soul is in no case covered under the category of matter. Hence the spiritual extension is to be differentiated from the material one. Matter occupies space and offers resistance to other matter to enter the same space. The soul occupies space and allows other souls and matter to enter it. This mutual interpenetration of the substances is a truth of Jaina cosmology. The Jainas go even to the extent of conceiving of the fine type of matter which does not give resistance to any other substance or matter, resistance being recognised as quality gained by matter only

in some forms of its existence. Co-extension of the soul and body as admitted in Jaina philosophy makes it necessary that the soul should have extension along with the body it happens to inhabit. When the soul is able to shake off the vestige of *karma* completely and attains final emancipation, extension is still admitted of it in Jaina philosophy, but it is an spiritual extension distinct from the material one. Extension is a necessary implication of a substance, whatever may be its dimension. The Jaina is prepared to accentuate spatiality to the mental structure of modern psychology to provide it a concrete base with the help of its tetrad of substance, space, time and modes—the necessary dimensions of reality.

The Jaina has to face another problem in this context. The varied organisms are seen as having different magnitudes, so the soul for the Jaina, must possess the capacity for contraction and expansion to find a lodging in a particular body. The Nyāya and the Sāṅkhya uphold the all pervasive nature of the soul, and for Rāmānuja and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmānsakas the soul is infinitely small. These systems may explain the functioning of the soul within a body in their own ways. The position of the Jaina stands in between these groups. Prabhācandra observes, "The soul is felt as I in the forms, I am happy, I am sad and I know a jar in the organism itself, not in the organisms of others, or in the intermediate space."[26] "The soul is coextensive with the body, because its qualities are seen as pervading the body,"[27] says Yaśovijaya. The Jaina theory advocates extension of the soul in space along with its expansion and contraction. It is wrong to say that the soul is extended on account of its association with the body, though the variability of its magnitude to inhabit different bodies is certainly due to its contamination by *karmas*. It does not lose its extension even when emancipated.[28]

This aspect of the Jaina theory of soul has raised many a question which need clarification. Says S. Radhakrishnan, "We may grossly conceive the soul as capable of becoming bigger or smaller by addition and subtraction of parts. New particles will be constantly carried in and old particles will be getting out, so that we can never be sure that the same soul continues for any length of time."[29] Sushil Kumar Maitra observes, "If it be said that the soul is capable of contraction

and expansion like the light of a lamp, then it will follow that the soul is susceptible of modifications and is non-eternal, which will strike at the very root of the law of *Karma*, so that merit will go unrewarded and demerit, unpunished."[30] The gist of the above criticisms is that expansion and contraction of the soul involve a gain or loss in the substance of the soul, which disturbs the continuity of the soul and thus raises a moral difficulty. The Jaina explains the situation in a different way. In Jainism the soul is said to have an innumerable number of *pradeśas* or soul-units, which can be conceived but cannot be separated. The innumerable of Jaina philosophy is also definite but cannot be counted like the numerable. By this it is meant that the quantum of substance in a soul is fixed, and it is measured in terms of *pradeśas* or soul-units. It may sound like a form of monadology entering Jainism, but the situation is quite different. In Liebniz's philosophy the monads are basically separate and distinct entitles. In the process of evolution one of them attains the status of a queen monad to rule over the remaining ones. In Jainism the soul-units are not separate, the soul is not actually divisible into its soil-units. There is a perfect unity of the soul, which continues in all its states. This very fact led Akalanka to up hold the reality of the soul-units in one context but, in another they never imply the division of the soul's substance.[31] The processes of contraction and expansion take place by interpenetration and extirpation of the soul-units. Hence there is no loss or gain in the substance of the soul undergoing contraction and expansion; and thus, the identity of the soul being not disturbed there is no occasion for the moral difficulty as referred to above, Jainism is definite about assigning spatiality, contraction and expansion to the soul in the above mentioned manner.

The Jaina conception of soul, with its necessary details, necessitates the fact that there should be a plurality of souls, along with the empirical support we get in its favour. So the Jaina assumes that there is an infinity of souls in the universe with their distinct structures and functions. The souls are individual, one distinct from the other. In the mundane existence generally all have distinct bodies to inhabit, and for that reason every living being is able to

experience its own mental operations. To quote Lord Haldane "The self that knows is distinguished from other selves by the details of experience, by its own peculiar surroundings, by its history, by contents stored in memory of which it is aware, if they are reflected on and so made an object for our thinking, ... what is that makes me and my friend and animals separate animals? It is our own separate organisms and their histories and their individual experience."[32] As the mundane souls, according to Jainism, cannot function without an organism, the distinct and separate organisms may be taken to lead to plurality of souls as well. The mutual separateness and distinction we notice in the psychological selves as sensation, perception, memory, thinking and other forms of experience, just support the position enunciated by the Jaina. The Jaina goes to the extent that this plurality of souls, determined structurally, is not lost even in the state of liberation; and on the basis of the Jaina theory of substance it should be maintained in all its states. Expounding the position of the Nyaya-Vaisesika M. Hiriyanna observes, "The selves are many, and although they are all-pervading, their capacity to know, feel and will is originally manifested through the physical organism with which each of them is associated for the time being. The very disparity in the circumstance characterizing the lives of beings is regarded as an index to their fundamental distinction of their selves. This difference being intrinsic, continues in the state of release also, and, though another difference between any two selves disappear, when both of them are released, there will be *viśeṣas* then, as in case of atoms, to distinguish them from each other."[33] The similarity of thought on the point between the Jaina and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣka is worth noticing. The Sāṁkhya also establishes the plurality of *puruṣas* on the ground of the individuality of experience. The famous dictum 'cogito ergo sum' given by Descartes does not only establish the truth of the soul but also provides a strong proof for its singularity. About Kant's position it may be said, "The plurality of appearances must depend on the plurality of noumena, or the necessity of noumena will become utterly obsolete reducing Kant's philosophy only to a form of subjectivism.[34] There is no room, in the realistic philosophy of Jainism, for holding the plurality of souls to be apparent delusive or unreal. The souls are

distinct substances, hence they are structurally distinct and must lead to individually distinct series of functions.

A number of attribute or capacities are distinguished in the soul to determine its various functions. Just as the soul is seen to have knowledge attribute for determining its cognitive manifestations, so there must be another attribute to determine its affective manifestations. Rajamalla observes. "In the soul there is a self-established and immortal attribute of bliss (*sukha*). Being disturbed by the destructive type of *karmas* it has become obscured."[35] "It is true that the *jīva* has the attributes of bliss like the attribute of cognition etc. It becomes disturbed in the form of pain on account of the operation of eight kinds of *karmas*."[36] Bliss is a special attribute of the soul. Bliss is a member in the infinite quarternary i.e. infinite knowledge, infinite conation, infinite power and infinite bliss, attainable by the pure souls. Throughout a soul's existence bliss or *sukha* continues, as pain and pleasure in its mundane existence and as bliss or ecstasy in its pure states. As regards the faculty of the soul lying behind pleasure and pain Aurobindo remarks, "Pleasure can become pain or pain, pleasure because in their secret reality they are the same thing differently reproduced in the sensation and emotion."[37] The basic capacity of feeling takes varied forms as pleasure and pain in the association of different *karmas* and environment; and when freedom from these conditions is attained, it works naturally and produces the states of bliss. There is a close relation between the emergence of omniscience and bliss. This has led some of the Jaina thinkers to propound the identity of the two faculties.[38] This view is taken to be justified and valid for the unfailing accompaniment of the two functions from a collective or non-distinctive point of view. To conclude, just as sensory and perceptual types of knowledge differ from omniscience only in manifestation and not in essence, so pleasure and pain differ from bliss only in manifestation but not in essence.

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5

Ahiṁsā: The Essence of Jainism

Samaṅtabhadra, a great *āchārya* of Jainism, announces that *ahiṁsā* or non-violence is the highest ideal for living beings in the universe. The well known saying '*Ahiṁsā* parmodharmaḥ—non-violence is the highest religion—fits the texture of Jainism'.[1] Jainism and *ahiṁsā* are almost synonymous. Jainism is a religion of *ahiṁsā*. It prescribes universal application of the principle of *ahiṁsā* for monks and for the laity, the two main divisions of the Jaina society according to Jainism. As we shall see, there is hardly a religion in the world that does not harbour *ahiṁsā* in some form. Equally known with Jainism for upholding the principle of *ahiṁsā* is Buddhism, but a slight difference of outlook is noticeable between them. Jainism is a religion of *ahiṁsā* and compassion is harnessed to serve the cause of *ahiṁsā*; while Buddhism is mainly a religion of compassion and *ahiṁsā* is harnessed in its service. Actually speaking, *ahiṁsā* has got many facets and aspects which emerge in various contexts as its sister principles or corollaries. It is a question not of difference but of choice of elements to lay emphasis upon anyone of them. Such differences of emphasis and form may be located in various religions of the world but recognition of *ahiṁsā* behind them is an unquestionable fact about them. Mahatma Gandhi was a great apostle of *ahiṁsā* for the modern age. It was due to his efforts that new avenues were opened for *ahiṁsā* and it found entrance and application in the sphere of politics, economics and international relations. He introduced *ahiṁsā* in the world as an efficacious way of life and as the solution of our problems even in the wider

contexts. Still the contribution of Jainism to *ahiṁsā* in the form of a deep and minute approach to the principle is unique and deserves consideration.

Ahiṁsā, as its etymology of the term shows, is the antithesis of *hiṁsā* or violence. It is why it has sometimes been taken to be a negative principle of non-killing. The negative command of non-killing is also tantamount to saving life. Besides, the various dimensions of *ahiṁsā* known to us point to the positive elements covered under the principle. While *ahiṁsā* prohibits something, it prescribes other things as well. The gain which is expected to result from the practice of *ahiṁsā* is always positive. The negative aspect of *ahiṁsā* is only apparent, while it includes and implies much more that is positive. For a discussion of *ahiṁsā* resort to its positive aspects is equally made. It is only for the sake of effecting an easy comprehension of the principle that authors have generally been found to make a start with a treatment of *hiṁsā*, the antithesis of *ahiṁsā*.

The term *hiṁsā*, the antithesis of *ahiṁsā*, is derived from a Sanskrit root which means injury or destruction of life. In general parlance, *hiṁsā* is taken as equivalent to killing of living beings along with the process of killing culminating in the death of the victim or leaving it in a state of suffering. The extent to which the living beings are troubled and tortured to meet their death or to suffer pain can only mark a difference of degrees of violence. So in Jainism *hiṁsā* has been defined as *"pramatta yogāt prāṇa vyaparopaṇam hiṁsā"*.[2] Violence means destruction of vitalities on account of *pramāda*—a term which requires explanation. The definition makes use of the term 'vyaparopaṇa' derived basically from *ropaṇa*. The term *ropaṇa* or *āropaṇa* is used for plantation or planting saplings. Its opposite is *'aparopaṇa'* which means uprooting the plants, and the prefix *'vi'* is attached to it to imply an intenser way of the process of uprooting. Vitalities are there in an organism to sustain life, hence uprooting of these vitalities is taken to mean violence. Thus the meaning of the term *hiṁsā* can be understood on the analogy of the uprooting of plants. The term *pramatta* means a state of insanity or madness or indolence or loss of normalcy, hence a state of delusion about one's true identity. By true identity,

Jainism means a state of the self which is free from the contamination and effect of *karmas*. A perverted state of the self gives us distortion of spiritual powers in the form of ignorance, passions and delusion enumerated under the title *kaṣāyas* in Jainism, and they work as motives to our actions. These *kaṣāyas* go to determine the state of *pramāda*, the shades of which may be distinguished from gross hostility to indolence or purposelessness. So *pramāda* accounts for a perverted mental state, perverted with respect to the pure state of the self. This raises the issue of considering the problem of violence in its two aspects, the subjective and the objective, distinguished in Jainism as *bhāva hiṁsā* and *dravya hiṁsā*. Thus *bhāva hiṁsā* is the polluted state of the mind of a violent agent, while *dravya hiṁsā* points to the violent action in the external world.

Thus the true implication of violence comes out to be identical with killing oneself, so says an *āchārya*, "The *jīva*, the victim of violence, may die or may not, one who performs an action with *pramāda* invariably incurs the demerit of violence".[3] At another place it is said "For being overwhelmed by passions the soul first kills itself in an action of violence. Later on, it may or may not lead to violence in other living being (the victim).[4] The idea can be literally compared with an expression about Gandhian *ahiṁsā* given as "Non-violence is natural, while violence is unnatural. To follow the path of violence is like committing suicide."[5] On the ground of the above discussion we may draw the conclusion that all cases of physical violence are not the cases of violence in the true sense of the term, and the invariable and necessary condition for an action to be violent is its association with *pramāda* or passions.

This situation can also be interpreted in terms of intention or motive leading to an act. If your intention behind an act is non-violent, whatever may be the consequent result of that action, you are immune from any type of bondage or spiritual accountability for it. Conversely, if your intention behind an act is violent, you are accountable for your action of violence and the intention behind it, though the victim may not suffer in any way. It is, in brief, the Jaina view of violence and non-violence. Thus, in Jainism, moral accountability is directly

determined by subjectivity. The avoidance of external violence is considered desirable and advisable as a means for maintaining the purity of mind by an agent. "All the sins like falsehood etc. are the forms of violence being destructive to the purity of mind or souls. They have been separately enumerated only to facilitate their understanding on the part of the disciple."[6] Really speaking the non-emergence of passions like attachment etc. is non-violence. The emergence of the same is violence. It is, in brief, what the Jaina scriptures mean.[7] "Violence is never caused merely by the destruction of vitalities of the living beings, if one is maintaining the purity of his conduct without suffering from passions etc."[8] Non-abstention from violence or actual indulgence in violent acts both are counted as violence, because for their appearance they presuppose *pramāda* in whose presence violence is invariably there."[9] The concept of *pramāda* is vital to the philosophy of non-violence. It alone explains many intricacies about the principle of *ahiṁsā*. Still bipolarity of the subjective and the objective sides of a violent action is recognised in Jainism on a logically consistent ground, "One who ignores the objective side has been called an indolent person failing in the observance of the rule of *ahiṁsā*."[10]

Jainism, as a religion of non-violence was conscious of this disgracement between the subjective and the objective forms of violence or non-violence; and the solution given by it involves the concept of *pramāda* or carelessness as already mentioned. Regarding the non-violent conduct of the monk it is said "The entire universe—the lands, the seas and the peaks of the mountains—is all full of living beings. The saints who observe abstentions with carefulness are not liable to any violence (though physical violence may be there)."[11] The secret and inner meaning of Jaina *ahiṁsā* has been explained by Amṛta Chandra in the above statements.

Under the principle of *ahiṁsā* the practice of consuming meat has been vehemently denounced. In practice the Jainas are mostly vegetarians, and in our usual conversation it sound odd to say that a Jaina is indulging in meat-eating. No one can obtain meat without destroying the vitalities and hence life of the living beings. Therefore those who take meat incur violence necessarily.[12] "One may get meat of bulls and

buffaloes dying their own death, still consummation of such meat is violence because it leads to the destruction of very subtle living organisms germinating therein."[13] Whether the meat in raw, cooked or being cooked the subtle living organisms are constantly germinating in it. Hence one who eats or even touches raw or cooked meat kills a host of crores of lives housed therein.[14] In Jainism meat eating is objectionable and disallowed not only for the callous way of obtaining it, but it points to a theory of science of fine life which is conceived thriving in meat. Jainism would not choose to recommend meat eating, whatever may be the purpose behind. According to Jainism meat eating is irreligious, immoral and unjustified. Meat eating is very closely connected with killing, and killing is never human. "I know I would not have the right to kill you, however painlessly, just because I liked your favour, and I am not in a position to judge that your life is worth more to you than the animal's to it."[15] Every living being has got a right to live, by killing it we simply sow death and pain to perpetuate similar catastrophes.

Mahatma Gandhi was the greatest upholder of *ahiṁsā* for the modern world. Though Jainism does not lack in the positive implications of *ahiṁsā* in its philosophy, but its approach to the principle, for a lack of balanced emphasis on the social and national side of life, has been understood to be only negative. It is why the emphasis on compassion in the treatment of *ahiṁsā* in the hands of Buddha was welcomed as a novel and positive contribution. Mahatma Gandhi has gone far in the same direction by bringing in the positive virtue of doing good to others to the already accepted virtue of abstaining from injury to others in thought, word and deed. For him *ahiṁsā* became the very way of life leading to truth which he identified with God. "To slight a single human being is to slight those divine powers and this is to harm not only that being but with him the whole world."[16] To justify the non-violent means to achieve a non-violent end Gandhiji draws a distinction between an evil doer and his evil actions. As followers of non-violence what we are to fight and hate are the evil actions and not their doers. "It is quite proper to resist and attack a system but to resist and attack its author is tantamount to resisting and attacking oneself."[17]

And for this also, as Gandhiji prescribes, the right way will be the non-violent non-cooperation with the evil, leading to passive resistance and civil disobedience in the context of society and nation. His well known method of meting out the evil is called *satyāgraha*—a fearless pursuit of Truth, where violence finds no place. Thus Gandhiji chose violence neither as an end nor as a means to achieve the end. The Gandhian way of life is through and through non-violent. It may not give us a minute philosophy of *ahiṁsā*, but it is most appropriate, useful and advisable for application to human society. "To see the universal and all pervading spirit of Truth face to face one must be able to love the meanest of creation as oneself."[18] Gandhian *ahiṁsā* implies love for all human beings, but we may consistently affirm that it embraced the entire sentient creation. Gandhian *ahiṁsā* presupposes the universality of the life principle, and hence respect, love, and non-violence to it emerge as rules in Gandhian ethics.

To regulate the practice of *ahiṁsā* in the sphere of day-to-day life Jainism has conceived violence in its four aspects related with the four departments of life. The department of *āraṁbha* is concerned with the day-to-day activities of a family like running the kitchen, maintaining cleanliness in the house etc. The department of 'udyoga' is connected with the conduct of trade and other occupations for livelihood. Another department of life refers to the conduct of defensive activities in the interest of the self, society and nation. In these departments the violence involved is considered necessary for the conduct and sustenance of life, though such violence is equally motivated and chosen but under a necessity to serve some better ends. Where there is no such compulsion the violence involved has been given the name *saṁkalpī* or willed and intentional. Herein violence is motivated and chosen only for the sake of violence with no purpose of saving and maintaining one's life or serving higher ends. The main consideration behind this classification of *hiṁsā* along with its prohibitions and prescriptions is the sustenance of life by a layman. Still some trades have been prohibited for a Jaina layman and he is expected to conduct his activities in such a way that, though covered under permitted categories, he incurs as little of violence as possible.

Considered in the modern context the idea may be presented in a little different form. Man stands uppermost in the organic evolution both scientifically and traditionally, hence the most heinous and sinful form of *hiṁsā* should mean the destruction of human life. So the first rule of abstention from *hiṁsā* should relate to the avoidance of killing human beings. Below the human level lies the world of beasts and sub-humans. This world may be divided into two regions i.e. the visible and the invisible. The next rule of abstention from *hiṁsā* should relate to the visible sub-human world. Then the avoidance of *hiṁsā* in the invisible sub-human world may be prescribed for practice. From the sub-human world the world of vegetable life may be separated. It is externally visible but occupies almost the lowest strata of evolution of life. Hence the rule relating to avoidance of *hiṁsā* in this realm comes last of all, and a layman is not asked necessarily to observe this rule, though he should avoid unnecessary destruction of plant life. These divisions of living beings and the traditional divisions of *hiṁsā* may be considered side by side to assign a more satisfactory and consistent place to both of them in the Jaina system. The aim behind both these classifications is to cover as many life-situations as possible for the practice of *ahiṁsā*.

There may be some life-situations which may appear not to fall under these divisions. In such cases a reference will have to be made to the underlying principles to find out a way for practice of *ahiṁsā*. Various rules relating to the conduct of human beings, both the laity and the monks, transgressions of these rules, the concept of *bhāvanās* connected with the fanning and strengthening of our faith and the quality of observance of such rules have the same spirit behind and help us in finding a suitable non-violent way for ourselves under varied situations. The enumeration of negative and positive cautions in the form of transgressions and *bhāvanās*, as given in Jaina scriptures,[19] is meant to bring to light some such facts of life as one would like to keep off (in case of transgressions) and resort to (in case of *bhāvanās*) with a view to observing the vows in a flawless and pure way.

In the field of life-sciences Darwin gave the principles of struggle for life, natural selection and the survival of the

fittest. The individual organisms have to wage a struggle with other organisms to make their own life possible. The stronger organisms thrive upon the weaker ones by destroying them. Thus what we got at the end is the fittest or the strongest residue. This is the law of nature, nature selects the fittest for the perpetuation of the species. This is taken to mean that the world of living beings continues by violence and aggression and there is no escape from them. As such the talk of non-violence is futile, as nature will not admit of it. On the other hand Gandhiji held, "If hate and violence were the laws of mankind, the human race would have become extinct long ago."[20] At another place we find, "Non-violence is as natural as good smell to a flower".[21] A mistake seems to have crept in understanding the laws of nature. Co-operation and co-existence are mainly suggested by the laws of nature, the world sustains itself by them. It is only due to a sort of distortion of our basic faculties that the living beings learn the way of violence and try to live by it. Such violent ways are not natural to them. A thoughtless destruction of vegetable life is bound to lead to odd effects on the workings of nature. Similarly the destruction of animal life is bound to create some oddities in nature. This is one view of things. Jainism would bring in the idea of pure and basic nature of the soul to solve the difficulty. The closer we are to the pure state of the soul, the more non-violent we are in our thought, action and behaviour. Our inclination towards violent actions is due to the distortion of our tender and pure emotions, it is not our natural function. Our family life, social life and national life are possible only on the basis of co-operation and co-existence. This situation has led some thinkers to uphold the principle of *ahiṁsā* in the form of love, compassion, brotherhood, service and well-being of all in place of the philosophy of power, struggle for life and survival of the fittest, all aiming at destruction of life.

Some complain that "Jainism has carried the doctrine of *Ahiṁsā* to its logical conclusion and thus has made it impracticable for ordinary layman".[22] Sometimes it is also felt that the *ahiṁsā* of the Jainas is *mokṣa*-oriented, and for that reason it is individualistic and unfit for application to society and nation. "The application of *ahiṁsā* is mainly aimed at

the purification of the soul. Whatever avoidance of violence is possible in case of political affairs, it should be done. It is the application of *ahiṁsā* in the field of politics."[23] But *Ahiṁsā* is not found to be unfit to enter the secular fields of life. Samaṅtabhadra explains the fruits of the observance of *dharma*, the religion of non-violence, by means of two Sanskrit terms, *niḥśreyas*, and 'abhyudaya'. He himself and his commentator Prabhacandra explain 'niḥśreyas' as *nirvāṇa* or liberation and 'abhyudaya' as the attainment of a high status like that of the king of the gods, and pleasures of the world."[24] This double fructification of religious observance just points to the application of religion of *ahiṁsā* for social purpose and individual emancipation. When one falls short of complete selfless observance of religion for one reason or the other, he gains a merit which helps him to achieve social good. Thus the practice of *ahiṁsā* does not come out to be unsuited for the social good, but the two spheres of spiritual freedom and social good should not be confused. "One should not serve the cause of social improvement in the name of spiritual emancipation."[25] Jainism believes in complete freedom from attachment to attain liberation. Says Akalanka, "One who cherishes no desire even to attain liberation attains liberation."[26] The ideal of *ahiṁsā* lies in the complete liquidation of desire, attachment and aversion. It may also be called a state of equanimity making *ahiṁsā* quite natural to life. In this way *ahiṁsā* can be said to serve our social, national and spiritual ends, and its universal application to life is well justified. To be moral our actions must be directed by the principle of *ahiṁsā*. It is true, as generally held, we cannot observe *ahiṁsā* fully, but we must keep this ideal always before our eyes and try to approach it. Such an attitude of mind is bound to create an atmosphere of fearlessness, co-operation, mutual faith and self-sacrifice, which again would lead to non-killing, non-hunting, non-struggling and non-warring. The symbol of a cow and lion taking water from the same pond just draws a utopian picture of a society where hostility is totally eliminated. It is an ideal state for a nation to be achieved through the practice of *ahiṁsā*.

One of the well-known grounds on which the adoption of *ahiṁsā* as a way of life depends is given as "All living beings

desire life and don't desire death, therefore the *nirgranthas*—the followers of Jainism—renounce the horrible killing of living beings."[27] The same idea seems to have been embodied in the dictum "one must not do to others what one does not desire to be done to oneself."[28] This very clearly points to the possibility of the application of *ahiṁsā* to the realm of living beings, thereby making *ahiṁsā* a universal principle. Hence by way of a necessary condition it has been said, "How can one who does not know life as well as non-life, being ignorant of life and non-life, can practise *saṁyama* i.e. abstention from *hiṁsā*? One who knows life as well non-life, knowing both life and non-life can practise *saṁyama* i.e. that is abstention from *hiṁsā*." The practice of *ahiṁsā* presupposes the recognition of life in all the forms of its manifestations. One, for the practice of *ahiṁsā*, should have the capacity to distinguish between the living and the non-living. This distinctive knowledge is sometimes described as the very start of religious life. Says Mahatma Gandhi, "*Ahiṁsā* means having an equanimous feeling for all living beings from subtle organisms to human beings."[29] Complete non-violence is the absolute absence of ill will against all living beings. Hence *ahiṁsā* embraces even living beings other than men including poisonous insects and the violent beings."[30] Any delimitation of the scope of *Ahiṁsā* can be understood only as a delimitation in the recognition of the principle of life in the world. "Every religion worth counting recognizes the sanctity of human life. Jainism (with Mahatma Gandhi) wants the compassionate feeling to be extended to the other forms of life as well, namely beasts, birds and small creatures."[31] Considered in terms of moral philosophy the famous maxim of morality enunciated by Kant runs as "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, always as an end, and never as a means."[32] "It should be so interpreted as to cover the entire realm of living beings and should not be confined only to the humans. One should not make others a means for his own good, because they themselves have their ends like oneself. Morality, then, will cover the entire field of living beings—which is the very ground of the principle of *ahiṁsā* in Jainism. Universality of *ahiṁsā* must take the whole universe under its purview. *Ahiṁsā* is a positive

doctrine where love is central to the whole concept. It is slightly different from St. Paul's concept of love and also from its ordinary meaning in daily life. St. Paul confined his love to human beings only while Gandhiji goes a step further when he includes insects, flowers and plants also in his concept."[33] "As regards the actual practice of *ahiṁsā* in full, we must try to understand its spirit and do our best to make it a reality in our lives."[34] "The abandonment of violence, so far as it is possible, leads to build a non-violent society."[35] There is a great resemblance between Gandhian and Jaina ways of thinking about *ahiṁsā*, its ingredients, and ways of its practice, both of them being most concerned with the universality of the principle of *ahiṁsā*.

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6

Non-Possession

Very closely connected with the principle of non-violence or rather more fundamental and important than it is the principle of non-possession or *aparigraha* propounded in Jainism. In Jainism violence is undesirable, because it goes against the spiritual nature of the soul. Possession, as its Sanskrit equivalent '*parigraha*' etymologically means, implies the entrapping or clutching of the soul from all sides, and for that reason it is also undesirable. Under the effect of possession the soul loses its purity and freedom and becomes subject to the enslavement of what is called the non-soul or the antithesis of the soul. Umāsvāmī defines 'Parigraha' by the term 'Mūrcchā',[1] thereby meaning that possession is responsible for generating a sort of senselessness or forgetfulness or delusion in the soul, on account of which it is bound to go astray. Says Amṛtacandra, "By *mūrcchā* we must understand this '*parigraha*.' The manifestation appearing in the form of belongingness and possession due to the operation of the deluding *karma* is called *mūrcchā*."[2] Structurally speaking external possession becomes effective, when it is supported by the operation of *karmas* bound with the soul. It is like taking a psychological view of the phenomenon of possession. If a person entertains feelings of belongingness and possession, he is suffering from *mūrcchā*, even though he may have no external possession. Still there is a close relation between the internal and the external possessions, certainly not admitted in an absolute manner. Hence the ācārya states, "Giving up of the two types of possession is non-violence, and to entertain them is violence."[3] The measure

of *mūrcchā* directly depends on the internal possession, the external possession is connected with it only indirectly. To hold the external possession absolutely ineffective is to take a jump to the other extreme, and is not a consistent way of thinking. For practical purposes it is advisable to hold the correspondence between the two quite possible. Such is the ideal form of the principle of *aparigraha* in Jainism. Non-violence and non-possession, thus, seem to be only the two sides of the same coin, and with a purpose of emphasis in view either of them can be brought to the front. Tīrthaṅkara Mahāvīra, one of whose appealations is *nirgraṅtha*, can be said to be as much an apostle of non-possession as of non-violence.

A state of perfect non-possession comes out to be an ideal in Jaina ethics, meant for those who, after renouncing the world, devote their full time and energies to self-purification and self-realization. Jainism conceives of two types of possession or *parigraha*, external and internal. The former includes property, wealth, servants etc., the latter points to wrong belief, sex feelings and passions etc. Persons who are externally possessionless, are expected to become possessionless internally as well. While defining *parigraha* or possession as *mūrcchā* or senselessness the stress is on the internal possession, the external one only leads to it. The real grip of a soul is effected by the internal possession, the external one becomes an instrument to it. Thus Jainism traces the concept of possession from its grossest forms enumerated under the former to the subtlest ones falling under the latter one, i.e. from the external things to the internal psychological states of a conscious being. Possession, in both of its meanings and forms, is considered obstructive to spiritual progress, and hence its complete dissociation is prescribed for spiritual emancipation.

With this philosophical background the principle of non-possession descends to the level of society and the house-holders in the form of a mini-vow of delimiting the external possessions. This vow is the fifth cardinal virtue prescribed in Jaina ethics for the householders, the other four being *ahiṁsā*, truthfulness, non-stealing and chastity.[4] It means putting a limit to wealth, corn etc. in an avowed way and to

cherish no desire for things beyond the fixed limit.[5] For the sake of ethical discipline limits on one's possessions are necessary. They help one to inculcate a sense of detachment with possessions beyond limits, whether required or not. Such a practice also leads to weaken the feeling of belongingness within the limits, because the practice is prompted by the basic philosophy of renunciation behind the vow. Thus the observance of this vow brings a double gain in the realm of spirituality for the individual. Considered socially this principle directly helps release of means for the uplift of the society and the country. It adversely hits the practice of hoarding which is one of the greatest evils and a hurdle on the upward way for the country even in the present age. It is bound to lead to a balanced distribution of means of livelihood among the people. It will train the people in the sober habits which a state or a society would like to inculcate among them.

The mini-vow of non-possession, while prescribing delimitation of one's possessions, also requires truthfulness and honesty in industry, trade, and other professions with a view to maintaining the vow consistently which must lead to an equitable distribution of the national wealth and production. "Trade and industry for a profit motive is a base social ideal. The ideal is well expressed in the term *mahājana* which is a word for the business community in India and which means a noble person."[6] The aim behind is to grant to the businessmen only a status of agents and thus to maintain a good social order to carry out the social plans. Gandhiji wanted that non-possessing and non-thieving should go together for his new social order. "If I take anything that I do not need for my immediate use and keep it, I thieve it from somebody else. It is the fundamental law of nature, without exception, that Nature produces enough for our wants from day to day, and if everybody took enough for himself and nothing more, there would be no pauperism in the world, there would be no man dying of starvation—you and I who ought to know better, must adjust our wants, and even undergo voluntary prevention, in order that the people may be nursed, fed and clothed."[7] This gradually developing sense of detachment from the worldly and material wealth and objects will tend to promote what M. Gandhi desired under his theory of

trusteeship. Everyone, whether rich or poor, will think himself only as a trustee of the possessions under his control and will not use them for his selfish satisfaction disregarding the interests of the society. The right of private ownership will gradually lose its grip on the minds of the people, and thus many an economic problem of the present world will find their solution. Non-thieving is very essential to non-possessing for one's own purity of mind as well as for the social good it is bound to bring. Honesty of purpose lies at the very root of the entire structures so designed.

Jainism lays emphasis on the principle of non-possession or delimitation of possessions as a way of life. Non-possession is an ideal, but the limitations of possessions is a practical creed, requiring its practice at every stage of an individual's life. Its practice is prescribed by putting a ceiling on our possessions and keeping the vow so taken flawlessly under various odds in life. Explained in terms of psychology the vow also requires a delimitation of our desires and feelings of want to provide purity of self to the individual. Besides, one is also asked to give away his surplus accumulations falling within the limits under the vow in charity (as free action) for the help of others. The idea behind this double control of possessions in Jainism is the gradual detachment from them, reducing the proprietorship of the individual only to what M. Gandhi called trusteeship, or renunciation as Jainism would label it. Thus there is great resemblance between the conceptions of non-possession as held in Jainism and by Mahatma Gandhi. Differences of practice may be treated in accordance with the need of the society and time. The conclusion drawn by Prof. J.K. Mehta that "the conflicting urges in man find their peaceful solution in the state of wantlessness"[8] is quite relevant in the context. This identity of a basic truth of Jaina philosophy with the findings of an eminent economist is a happy coincidence.

A socialistic state directs its activities with the same aim in view. It enforces the principle of non-possession with its legislation. Where there is some obstruction in voluntary limitation of possessions, the state devises various means to achieve it with its laws and regulations. The success in this respect depends on the good intention and temperament of

the state, and on the honesty and devotion of the people who are there to work for it. It also depends on the fact how far the people are able to abstain from devising ways for defying and evading the state laws. The laws relating to ceiling of property, imposition of various taxes and the schemes of rationing and control of various items of necessity are examples of measures adopted to achieve the limitation of possessions and their use by the people. The law-abiding persons follow them out of a sense of duty, the rest are expected to train themselves to live a lawful life in this respect. Jainism, as a religion and creed, goes to inculcate the same habits and ways of living among the people to serve both the spiritual and the social objectives. Thus with its principle of non-possession Jainism has got a great potential to solve our social and economic difficulties.

We have been so far viewing the application of the principle of non-possession extending from individuals to society and nation. This extension can be allowed to enter the international field as well and thus cover the various countries of the world. Just as we are required to devise a machine to apply the principle within the bounds of a country, so also in the international field a well thought-out plan in the form of international institutions and laws is necessary for its implementation. As a result it will raise the status of the weak and backward nations with the means which the richer and the stronger ones are prepared to spare for their sake. Thus all the nations attaining a status of equality, the temptation and possibility of wars will be reduced considerably, and the world as a whole can be expected to achieve peace and happiness for humanity to a great extent. Whatever may be the origin of the principle of non-possession, whether it is Jaina, Gandhian or of any other brand, in its details of faithful practice, it is bound to serve the interests of humanity and also the entire sentient world as Jainism would like to uphold.

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7

Ācāra

In Jainism the path of liberation is constituted by right faith, right knowledge and right conduct taken in union.[1] Taken severally none of these constituents are competent to achieve the aim. It is right faith which makes one's knowledge and conduct fit constituents of the *mokṣa mārga*, and it is attained much earlier in the process of evolution. Actually speaking the journey to *mokṣa* starts with the emergence of right faith. "On the destruction of the darkness of delusion a novice who has obtained right knowledge on account of the gain of right faith adopts the course of conduct for the purpose of getting riddance from attachment and aversion."[2] The ultimate end in Jaina ethics is the realization of the spiritual purity, and for this reason Jainism may be held to be a *mokṣa*-oriented religion. These three components of the *mokṣa* mārga, even when achieved partially, do not lead to the bondage of the soul; so far as it is under the influence of attachment it suffers from bondage. The three jewels are the cause of liberation alone, and not of its antithesis i.e. *saṁsāra*. Whatever merit flows to the soul (in their presence), it is due to meritorious modification of the soul, and it is anti-spiritual.[3] Unless knowledge leads one to conduct or action, it is not potent to achieve the end, just as one will not be able to free himself from the chains only by knowing or thinking of the chains. Thus Jainism recognizes conduct or *ācāra* an equally important component of the *mokṣa mārga*.

The Jaina community has been called the *caturvidha saṁgha* i.e. an order having four dimensions in the form of monks, nuns, laymen and laywomen. Jainism, though *mokṣa*

oriented, does not hold that the practice of religion is confined to those alone who have renounced the world and taken to the life a recluse. The inclusion of the householders in the order is just a recognition of their capacity and claim to religiousness. It is also clear that the conditions under which the house-holder happens to live will not allow him as pure a practice of religion as a monk can do. This incapacity on the part of the householders has necessitated the need of a milder type of religious discipline known as the *srāvaka cāra-ācāra* for the householders as distinct from that for the monks. This division in the Jaina ethical code should not be taken to give us a double standard of morality. The code of the householder's conduct does not stand parallel or against that of the monks. It only provides a course of preparation for the monkish stage. It is adopted only because we feel weak to adopt the higher code directly. The moral heights attainable under the householder's code take us nearer and nearer to the monkish stage. The highest attainment of the former just brings the novice to the threshold the monkish life. One should not see any antagonism between the two codes, the lower one is only preparatory and complementary to the higher one. Practising the lower code one cannot get complete freedom from attachment, hence by it, as already explained, one secures for oneself easy and pleasurable conditions of life as a result of his religious observances but is not able to achieve full freedom for oneself. This difference in attainment is well explained in Jainism. The adoption of the lower code for the practice of religion by weaker followers is fraught with attachment and falls short of the effort required for attaining complete freedom.

This very situation has led the Jaina ācāryas to formulate two types of ethical code, one meant for householders and the other for the homeless seekers of truth. Says Samantabhadra, "*Ācāra* or conduct is of two types: *Sakala* (complete) and *Vikala* (partial). The first is for the homeless monks who have renounced all sorts of possessions. The second is meant for the householders who are with various kinds of possessions."[4] "The conduct of the monks requires complete renunciation, and is different from the popular one."[5] This division of the code of conduct is as old as Jainism itself. The

householders were never neglected in Jainism, but, on the contrary, were recognized very essential to it as they could render real help to the practice of monkish religion. The code of the householders has got a double purpose i.e. to enable the common people to tread the path of religion and to render all possible facilities like providing pure food etc. to the monks who now no more indulge in the worldly activities even for their own sake.

Jainism recognizes five categories of sinful activities and conduct consists of abstinance from them. "Non-violence, untruth, theft, unchastity and possession are the five inlets through which demerit or sin flows into the soul. To refrain from them is the conduct of a person with right knowledge."[6] Without the attainment of right faith, right knowledge and right conduct are not possible. Hence conduct presupposes right knowledge to be directed towards righteousness. So we come to the five cardinal virtues of Jainism as the antitheses of the five sinful activities. They are non-violence, truth, non-stealing, chastity and non-possession. The wide acceptance of these virtues in most of the religious systems of the world is worth noticing. The minute treatment of the concept as found in the Jaina works on the subject is in no way less appealing to a critical thinker. "All these activities are the forms of violence being a cause of vitiating the modifications of the soul, the remaining ones like untruth have been mentioned for an easy understanding on the part of the disciple." The adjective which was originally used to qualify Jainism is *nirgraṅtha* i.e. total absence of possession, and the last tīrthaṅkara Mahāvīra was also called Nirgraṅtha Jñatrputra Mahāvīra. This fact may be interpreted in favour the principle of non-possession rather than that of non-violence. The idea behind is that possession leads the soul to a state of delusion and attachment which in itself is a form of violence or killing of one's soul. The immortal soul can never be killed, and violence to it can only mean a perversion of its purity, which is, in the true sense of the term, an act of violence for the soul. So far as the killing of living organisms, however tiny it may be, is concerned, all sects of Jainism unanimously disapprove, but as regards abstention from possession it is the Digambara sect that has gone to the

extreme. Thus non-violence and non-possession are now considered to be the vital principles of Jaina ethics.

This brings us to a consideration of the *caturyāma dharma*—four dimensional religion of tīrthaṅkara Pārśvanāth as against the *pañcayāma dharma*—five dimensional religion of tīrthaṅkara Mahāvīra. These two tīrthaṅkaras were separated from each other by an interval of 250 years, as the historians hold. The spiritual status attained by them was the same, as the karṁānuyoga department of Jainology will support; and for neither of them the attainment of final release would have been in any way cheaper or concessional. The term *caturyāma dharma* appears in a Buddhistic work, and there too with no elaborate explanation as to the four items implied by it. As regards the ethical principles in Jainism and Buddhism, there is a great similarity in conception and expression. Moreover Jainism and Buddhism had been prevailing in the same area and at the same point of time. Hence it is quite probable that the principles of one might have been read in terms of those of the other. So the Buddhists could read only a copy of their four *āryasatyas*—noble truths—in the seven principles of Jainism. The principles of soul and non-soul of Jainism could not find an appreciation in the hands of the Buddhistic writers, as they presuppose no substantial reality behind them, while for Buddhism the universal flux—a kind of process only—is real. So far the Buddhist there remained only the four principles of influx (āsrava), check of influx (saṁvara), expulsion of *karmas* (nirjarā) and liberation (*mokṣa* or *nirvāṇa*) for his consideration. Moreover this view is based on *caturyāma saṁvara* for which there is a reference in the Buddhistic literature. If the number four in the *caturyāma dharma* is interpreted in the above manner, it in no way violates the spirit of Jainism. It has been only with some commentators that it was taken to mean only the four cardinal virtues with the exclusion of the great vow of chastity (brahmacharya). The wrong tradition, once initiated, was carried over with varied interpretations of the vows. How could Pārśvanāth practise and preach Jainism without the vow of chastity? How can we suppose that the condition of sexual relations in the society of Pārśva's time was so satisfactory that people did not require any regulation

regarding sex in the society as well as in the monastic order? How could these conditions deteriorate, within a period of only 250 years, to such an extent that Mahāvīra could not pull on without the vow of chastity in his order? To cover chastity under non-possession is just to reduce the status of woman to mere property—which is not a healthy symptom of a good social order. The position may also suggest that in the Pārśva's time and order the sanctity and significance of the institution of marriage was not duly recognized. Theoretically the ideal of Jaina ethics as regards the regulation and renunciation of sex is so high that even an slight digression may not be tolerated by it. Hence the substitute interpretation of the concept of the *caturyāma dharma* does not fit in the context.

Sanyāsa dharma or *muni dharma* or the higher course of spiritual training is concerned with *mokṣa*—the final release from all sufferings and distortions of spiritual powers—as the only ideal of life. The aim before a homeless monk or *sādhu* is nothing less than the status of goodhood; even the meritorious earnings lose all charm for him. So the course of life he adopts starts with the great vows as against the mini-vows meant for the householders. These vows are non-violence, truthfulness, non-stealing, chastity and non-possession in their absolute form.[7] These *vratas* (promises to keep off the sinful activities), *guptis* (check over activities of mind, body and speech), *samitis*—attentiveness (carefulness in movements, partaking of food, talking etc.), *dharmas*—observances (practice in righteous ways of life, *anuprekṣā*—contemplation (repeated thinking about the nature of the soul and the world), *parīṣahajaya* (conquest over sufferings of various types) and *caritra* (improvement in the realm of conduct) constitute the code of conduct of a monk to effect a check against the flow of *karma* towards the soul. He is also required to wage a battle against the already accumulated *karmas* with a course of penance and meditation which purify the soul as fire purifies gold.[9]

A monk, observing absolute non-violence, will not cause injury even to the lowliest form of life, nor would he make others to cause such injury, nor would he approve of it in any way. The vow of truthfulness, for him, will mean telling a lie

under no circumstances. If speaking truth leads to injury to some living being, he would choose to keep silent. Under the vow of non-stealing he will not take even earth and water if not given him by the owner. His perfection in chastity is so high that he wants to keep his mind free from sexual ideas by engaging it with thinking of the spiritual qualities. He becomes an ideal of non-possession by renouncing all that he had so far. He makes use of only such things as may help him in the practice of his religious duties. The three *guptis* are related with the check of mental, vocal and bodily activities to earn worldly gains.[10] The *samitis*, five in number, are concerned with a very careful conduct of activities like movement, speech, taking food, placing and picking up of things with attentiveness and excretion of bodily waste products.[11] The *dharmas* or righteous observances are ten and are concerned with the practice of virtues like forgiveness—absence of anger, humility—absence of pride, straight forwardness—absence of deceit, purity—absence of greed, truthfulness, control of senses, austerity, renunciation, absence of the sense of belongingness and chastity.[12] The contemplations are twelve and have subjects like the transitoriness of the world, its utter helplessness, and that it is a whirlpool to revolve the soul round, the soul is different from the rest of the things, the worldly-existence is impure, it is very difficult to attain true knowledge, there is a constant inflow of *karmas* into the soul, the religious practices can check this inflow, the expulsion of *karmas* from the soul is a way to its redemption, the universe contains many regions substances and forms of life and that the way to the welfare of the *jīvas* is the religion preached by the Jina.[13] Under the *parīṣahajaya* they count twenty two situations in life like hunger, thirst, cold, heat, abuse, begging, lack of respect, lack of knowledge and faith etc. which cause suffering and disturbance to the soul. These are to be conquered by the monk by enhancing his power of forbearance and thus not getting disturbed by them.[14] Under *caritra* five stages of the evolution of conduct are described, gradually lifting the soul to higher and higher stages and at last placing it in the highest one known as the *yathākhyāta* which is identified with the pure state of the soul.[15]

Equally important are asceticism and meditation for the

monk on the path of liberation, as these alone are competent to burn the dust of *karmas* bound with the soul. Meditation is only a category under asceticism in Jaina ethics, but because of its unique importance it finds a separate treatment in the Jaina works. Jaina penances just generate a capacity in the soul by which the bonds of the conjunction of the soul with the *karma*-matter get weaker and weaker and finally completely dissociate the same from it. Jainism conceives of a variety of such penances grouped under two broad divisions i.e. the external and the internal. The external penances cover those items which are related with the body. They are fasting (anaśana), taking less food than required (avamaudarya), imposing restrictions on the obtainment of food (vṛttiparisaṅkhyāna), renunciation of sex-enlivening eatables (rasa parityāga), living at deserted places (vivikta śaiyāsana), and placing oneself in odd and uncomfortable conditions (kāya kleśa).[16] Apparently all these practices are seen to aim at bodily discomfort, but this is in no way the aim behind them. Unless one can bring about some spiritual good, they cannot be said to be valuable on the path of spiritual welfare. Hence fasting is observed for achieving sense control, breach of attachment, destruction of *karmas*, meditation and knowledge of scriptures.[17] The *avamaudarya* is practised for an easy achievement of abstention, wakefulness, pacification of blemishes, contentment and self-study. The third is aimed at getting freedom from expectations of various kinds. The fourth is resorted to with a view to curbing the uprise of the senses, conquest over sleep, and an easy accomplishment of self-study.[18] A monk chooses lonely and deserted places for sleeping and sitting to avoid disturbances and achieve chastity, self-study and meditation. The sixth type of external penance, in the form of not caring for the roughness of weather,[19] sleeping without covering the body and adopting various postures, is meant to habituate the body to bear pain, to lose attraction of pleasure and to propagate the word of the Lord.[20] These are called external penances, because they depend on external things and are perceivable by others. So, for Jainism, the external penances are much more than mortification of flesh.

The group of internal penances is divided into atonement

(prāyścitta), reverence (vinaya), service (vaiyāvrtya), self-study (svādhyāya), renunciation (vyutsarga) and meditation (dhyāna). They are said to be internal, because they regulate the mental activities. The first takes the form of confession, introspection, and acceptance of punishment for one's commiting of faults and mistakes due to mental lethargy and inalertness.[24] It is practised in the presence of the head of the organization or a senior monk. To keep all those who deserve our respect in due regard is what is required by the second category. Reverence is shown towards knowledge, faith and conduct themselves by making honest and truthful efforts for their acquisition.[25] A respectful behaviour towards the members of the order is also necessary and it is taken to be a form of internal penance. To serve the head of the order, the professor, the monks performing severe penances, student-monks, diseased monks etc. is the next category under internal penance. These forms of service are adopted to enable one to attain self-absorption, conquest over the sense of disgust and love for the divine word.[26] A programme of the study of scriptures in the form of reading the text, putting questions regarding its contents and a discussion about them is also a form of internal penance; and it is practised to improve one's understanding, the spirit of world-renunciation, the quality of penances and to ward off the transgressions.[27] The penance of renunciation is concerned with the removal of obstructions on the way by the external things as well as the passionate conditions of the mind. The purpose behind this penance is to develop a sense of un-belongingness, fearlessness and indifference towards hope for life.

Thinking is a mental process well experienced and well known to human beings. It may be distinguished from perception where a direct use of the senses is involved. Thinking makes use of the sensuous cognitions and goes beyond them. It is fluctuating because it admits of a variety of objects for its functioning. When it is directed to a particular object or topic by diverting it from the rest, it becomes an instance of meditation. What we mean by meditation is knowledge itself. When knowledge shines like a motionless flame of fire, it becomes meditation. So an important fact comes to light that meditation is basically a form of knowledge,

but it should be so deep and sound that it does not suffer from fluctuations. So far as knowledge does not attain a stage of decision, it must suffer from fluctuations. It is the lucidity and firmness of knowledge that leads to the state of meditation. Externally, when one fixes his down cast eyes on the tip of his nose, sits or stands straight with his hands resting in his lap or his arms hanging downwards and looks mentally so busy as to be forgetful of the surrounding environment, we can say he is in meditation. Internally meditation implies centering of our cognitive energy on a pointed subject to get at a comprehension which does not waver. Such a meditation has been enumerated as a kind of internal penance in Jaina ethics.

Another approach to the topic of meditation may be seen in the quotation, "If you desire stability of mind and accomplishment of wonder-raising meditation, you must not be deluded by or cherish a feeling of attachment or aversion for the objects of your like or dislike."[30] A control over the emotional side of human personality must lead to a keen and clear capacity for judgement. So also a clear vision of things must make one conscious of his spiritual good and values. The processes meant for the improvement of self in its cognitive and affective aspects are not only internally related but they actually help each other. The cumulative effect of these processes is the state of self-realization where the soul is said to be established in itself.[31] This is the highest meditation. The entire code of Jaina ethics is directed towards the achievement of this end.

The efficacy of penance in general and meditation in particular lies in the fact that it dries up, so to call, the glue that keeps the soul closely tied up with the *karma*-matter. One may devote himself to the performance of meritorious activities; but, according to Jainism, it will not serve one's true purpose of life. These activities generate the glue, though of a different kind, to result in pleasurable conditions of life. Hence it does not allow the soul to attain its purest form. Meditation is potent enough to dry up both these kinds of glue. How it, being an ideal state in the cognitive process, helps the process of *nirjarā* or expulsion of *karmas* from the soul is well illustrated by the fact that a person with true

knowledge is able to bring about this expulsion of *karmas* in an innumerable times greater magnitude than one who is devoid of such knowledge. It is in this way Jainism recognizes the importance of knowledge supported by a spirit of unattachment.

As has already been mentioned that there is no basic antagonism between the ethical codes of a monk and a householder. The idea of one being drawn from the other is only a conjecture lacking evidence for proving it as an historical fact. Under the religious order of Mahāvīra, and similarly of other tīrthaṅkaras the position of the householders, both male and female, was never underrated. This must necessitate the simultaneous existence of the two codes in the Jaina society. Moreover the conception of gradation of the householders according to their attainment of religious piety is also very old. Actually speaking there is a continuity between the religious practices of the householders and the monks. A householder belonging to the highest stage of his religious practice is virtually a monk, but he is distinguished from the latter on the ground that a certain type of passions still cling to his soul while the monk is free from it. This difference refers to the *karmic* structure of the two souls. Just a step beyond the householder's *dharma* qualifies one as a monk, a homeless seeker of the true welfare of one's soul. This stage is characterised by the initiation (dīkṣā) ceremony in Jainism. The monk is now unattached with all types of possession. A peacock feather whisk to safeguard non-violence even towards tiny insects and creatures and a gourd to store some water not to quench his thirst but to cleanse his hands and feet when necessary are the only possessions with a Digambara monk better known as a *muni*. The Śvetāmbara monks are allowed to keep a few pieces of cloth to cover the lower and the upper parts of their bodies, a piece of cloth to cover their mouths, some wooden pots to collect and consume food, and a brush of cotton yarns in place of the peacock feather whisk. They keep all these articles only to help their religious practices and not as means of bodily comforts. They do not bathe, do not clean their teeth, and pluck their hair by the root instead of getting them shaved. They do not stay at one place to avoid attachment with the locality and the society except during

the rainy season when the period of their stay extends to four months to avoid injury to creatures which germinate during the season. They draw special programmes of study, preaching and observing other rules of monastic life for the rainy season. They generally pass most of their time in meditation and *sāmāyika*—a practice that aims at equanimity. After attending the calls of nature the Digambara saints go on a round to the houses of the laity for taking food. They do not beg for it, but enter their houses only when they are received with respect and devotion. They take food from their hands as they do not have any cup or plate with them, and they take it only when it is found clean and pure and free from all the faults as given in the scriptures. This meal and water will suffice for the whole day and night, and in no case they will think of getting it again on the same day. The purpose behind is the maintenance of the body to the extent it helps the practice of religion, they do not attend to the pleasures and comforts of the body. This practice is little different among the Śvetāmbara saints. They go about on their begging tours, collect articles of food from a number of houses in their begging bowls, bring it to the monastery to be shared by the other saints, and take it in the company of other saints from the bowls with them without allowing any waste of food. They are also allowed to take food more than once during the day, as no Jaina saints take any food or drink at night. Like food, sleep for them is only means of recouping energy for carrying out their religious duties. So they go to sleep late at night and rise early in the morning, the objective in view being the conquest of sleep to allow more alertness and time for religious practices. The Jaina monks pay their respect, in the proper manner, only to the tīrthaṅkaras and the senior monks in the organization. If some householders happen to be there, they will give them religious sermons and talks and will not discuss worldly matters with them. Ladies are equally ordained in the order in all the sects of the Jainas, and are given an equal status with men except in case of the Digambaras who externally accept the saintly life of the nuns but allow only an inferior spiritual status for them. As such, the *āryakās*, as they are known, have been allowed some laxity in the rules of conduct as against the Digambara male saints. The

āryakās can cover their body with a simple saree and can take food in a sitting posture. They are not allowed to visit the houses of the laymen alone, they live in the company of other *āryakās* i.e. nuns. The idea behind the Digambara practice is that a woman cannot rise so high on the spiritual ladder as to attain liberation from her female form; she is required to be reborn as a man to achieve the final release from the *saṁsāra*.

The *ācāra* or the ethical code meant to be practised by the householders is known as the *śrāvakācāra*. Like the *ācāra* of the monks *śrāvakācāra* is also an important topic of the Jaina ethics. It has attracted the attention of many *ācāryas* to write on it. We have a vast literature dealing with the code of conduct for the householders. In this connection the remark made by a foreign writer on *śrāvakācāra* gives a clue to unravel the situation. He observes, "The term *śrāvakācāra*, current among the Digambaras but unknown, it would seem, to the Śvetāmbaras, serves both as a general name for the topic and as a title for individual expositions designed to serve as breviaries for the householder composed on parallel lines to the *yatyācāra* which explains the duties of monks." To account for the greater interest of the Digambaras in *śrāvakācāra* the same author writes, perhaps because they disclaim the continuity of the tradition the Digambaras seem to have felt more keenly than the Śvetāmbaras the need to concretise and systematise the lay doctrine, and, in attempting a more logical presentation of the creed, they have effaced more than one discrepancy." Whatever may be the origin of the *śrāvakācāra*, it seems certain that the two fold code of *ācāra* is an essential part of Jaina ethics, and *śrāvakācāra* cannot be dropped from it safely and consistently without causing a damage to the system. So long as we recognize the existence of laymen and lay women in the Jaina order, *śrāvakācāra* must remain indispensable to the moral philosophy of the Jainas.

Like *yatyācāra*—the conduct for the homeless monks—*śrāvakācāra*—the conduct for the householders also marks a step on the way to final emancipation. The observance of *śrāvakācāra* qualifies a soul to enter the fifth stage of spiritual evolution, which immediately precedes the stage of the monks.

It starts with the five great vows of the monks, taken in a mini-form to make them practicable even while participating in the worldly activities. These vows are devised to ennoble the general life of the people in such a way that they are brought nearer and nearer to the monkish life. The vows are known as the *aṇuvratas*, the small vows or the mini-vows. Then the code of the householders proceeds to cover the *guṇavratas* or the augmentative vows and the five *śikṣāvratas* or the instructive vows. All these thirteen vows constitute the partial *ācāra* meant for the householders.[32] The severity of the great vows is reduced in the mini-vows so as to suit the capacity and conditions of a layman. This is done by an avoidance of gross forms of violence, untruthfulness, stealing, unchastity and possession. So the mini-vow of non-violence directs not to injure the mobile (trasa) organisms intentionally with mind, speech and body or to get such injuries done by others and appreciate such acts of injury.[33] It may be noted that in case of the monks this vow required absolute abstention from violent acts, while for the householders the scope of non-violence is limited to the mobile organisms. A person who takes the mini-vow of truthfulness will not tell gross lies, nor ask others for the same, nor would he speak the truth if it leads to violence.[34] A monk will always speak the truth, in case it may cause violence the only way for him is to observe silence. When one does not accept the ownership of things kept, lost or forgotten by some one, nor does he give them to others, he is said to be observing the vow of abstention from gross theft.[35] As against it the monk will not accept even earth and water, if it is not given him in a proper way. One who does not indulge in sexual relations with other ladies except one's own spouse for fear of incurring sin, nor does persuade others to do so, one is observing the vow of refraining from others' wives. It is also called the vow of contentment with one's own spouse.[36] This is a limited form of chastity confined to sexual indulgence with one's own wife. In case of the monks there is no question of sexual indulgence. The mini-vow of non-possession takes the form of limiting the possession of wealth and property and cherishing no desire to go beyond the limit so fixed is the vow of limitation of one's possessions. It is also called the delimitations of one's wants

and desires.[37] The double definition of this vow just marks the objective and the subjective or psychological approaches of the writer. As we have seen, no such alternative for limiting possessions is open to a monk who, in the extreme sense of the term, has become possessionless. The scheme of the mini-vows is a well thought-out plan to cover the laymen for a suitable training for the development of their souls. In the works on *śrāvakācāra* a list of five transgressing activities is appended to every vow with a view to enabling the followers, in a concrete way, to understand the act which they must not do, for they spoil the purity of his vows. To get the full reward the followers are advised to observe the vows without any such blemishes.

The *guṇavratas* or the augmentative vows are three in number, and they are so called because they enhance the quality of the practice of the mini-vows.[38] The base of the householders' ethical code is formed with the mini-vows. The augmentative vows just help a person to rise higher on the plane of the mini-vows by achieving greater purity on the same level. A marked difference in the quality of purity achieved through the mini-vows must be there, when one accepts the augmentative vows. We are now to see how it is achieved. The first augmentative vow is called *Digvrata* which means avowed limitation of one's movements in all the ten directions by well-known boundaries. This vow is taken for the whole of life. The secret behind this vow is that one is able to guard himself from even subtle forms of sin.[39] As one breaks his relation and attachment with things beyond the bounds he has drawn for oneself under this vow, he is not present there to commit sins whether gross or subtle. Thus, though actually observing mini-vows, his practice amounts to an observance of great vows outside the limits.[40] But by this he does not actually become an observer of the great vows, for subtle passions which obstruct the observance of the great vows are structurally present there and they function in a very fine way. So we are now able to appreciate how this vow enhances the purity effected by the mini-vows. The next vow under this category is the *anartha daṅda vrata* which means refraining from actions which serve no purpose of the agent but cause unnecessary suffering to other living beings. Such

harmful activities follow four channels in the form of sinful preaching, giving away instruments for violence, thinking of entrapping, killing and piercing of others' relatives out of attachment or enmity, hearing such stories as pollute our minds with delusion, aversion, attachment, pride and sex feelings, and performing useless activities like disturbing earth, water, fire and air, cutting vegetables, and roaming and causing others to roam.[41] Under this vow a long list of such activities which are not of much use to us but lead to unnecessary and useless violence to others have been covered. The avoidance of these activities also adds to the quality of conduct achieved with the mini-vows. Out of indolent habits we are sometimes seen indulging in useless activities which do not serve any purpose of ours but make us liable to sin we do towards others. Such behaviour is objectionable and a householder proceeds to take this vow against them. The next augmentative vow is concerned with the curtailment of objects of sense enjoyment within the limits in order to attenuate attachment and engrossment in them.[42] Possessions which have been once delimited under the fifth mini-vow are further curtailed, when this third augmentative vow is taken; and it is not very difficult to understand how it is able to increase the quality of the mini-vow concerned.[43]

The *śikṣā vratas* or the disciplinary or instructive vows constitute the next category which is enunciated to give the householder such training as would place him on the threshold of monkish life. The first vow under this category is concerned with further delimitations of the bounds already fixed under the *Digvrata*. This curtailment takes place in terms of shortening the area and time already determined. As is evident the practice of this vow will be characterised by an advance in purity already attained. The second instructive vow is called the *sāmāyika* which is a sort of preparation for meditation. It consists in thinking about such subjects as the transitoriness, helplessness, insecurity and painful nature of the world as against the state of final release. One makes choice of a suitable place and sits to observe this vow for a fixed time daily without indolence.[44] Because in the state of *sāmāyika* all connections with domestic duties and possessions are broken, the householder almost attains the status

of a monk who has been covered with clothes by way of an *upasarga*—an unexpected calamity.[45] The next vow in this series is concerned with fasting and is known as the *proṣadhopavāsa*. On the auspicious days of the month one renounces all types of food, domestic duties, adorning of his body, use of flowers, bathing etc. and keeps oneself engaged in study and meditation.[46] The last vow under this category aims at service and charity in the form of providing pure food, books etc. to the homeless monks for the sake of earning righteousness for oneself.[47] This service of the monks who pay a visit to the householders without prior appointment destroys the *karma* they attract by the discharge of their domestic duties, just as water cleanses spots of blood.[48] Acts of charity are said to bring about immensely multiple fruits to the agent.[49] There is a linkage between the mini and the great vows, because the former generally prepare a householder to adopt the latter vows, but the instructive vows are particularly practised with this aim of raising the householder to such a standard of purity of character that he is well equipped to enter upon a monkish career.

Now we come to the discussion of a vow which is equally prescribed both for monks and the householders. So this vow of *sallekhanā* or religious death can be appended to both the codes of the householders as well as the monks. Actually speaking the practice of the various vows and penances is aimed at the maintenance of equanimity throughout one's life and specially at the moment of death. According to the *karma* philosophy of Jainas there are special moments in life when the age-determining *karma* for the next life is bound by the jīva. If it has not been bound throughout one's life, it must be bound at the moment of death; hence death is an important occasion in one's life, and one is advised to make all possible efforts to maintain an equanimous state of mind at the time of death to bind good *karmas*. If this *karma* is already bound on any of the previous occasions, the mental states at the time of death count very much to improve the conditions of life within the determination. It may look like a philosophical problem but it is a fact of strong faith for the practitioners of Jainism. Sometimes they explain the position in a different way. Death is taken to be a great calamity of life, because it

is going to put an end to whatever we have accumulated during the course of life. If our minds are disturbed by attachment, fear and aversion, we are bound to be at a loss even internally. So, as a wise man would do to save the costliest articles of his house when it is set on fire, the religiously wise man would like to depart from this world with religiousness which he has been able to earn with hard labour and practice. The most certain thing in one's life is death. Then, if one decides to meet it in the interest of his spiritual good i.e. in a religious way, we should not find fault with him. He cannot take anything external with him to the next life, and there is no point in losing the internal religious merit at the time of death.

As the most certain event in life is death, so also life is not only dearest to everyone but also most valuable for him. Hence preservation of life becomes equally imperative with the preparation for death. The injunction to observe the vow of religions death is prescribed only for certain irrepairable occasions in life. Says Samaṅtabhadra, "In case of some calamity, famine, old age and disease where there remains no possibility for repair, to sacrifice one's life for the sake of religion has been called 'sallekhanā' by the great ones."[50] Realizing that it alone is capable to carry my religious earning with me (to the next life), the vow of *sallekhanā*, to be observed at the end of one's life, should constantly occupy my mind with devotion."[51] The sacrifice of one's life has never been objected, if it is to serve a noble cause. When the noblest cause of securing one's religiousness is there, no one should find fault with the sacrifice of life by observing the *sallekhanā* vow.

The main objective of *sallekhana*, also known by the term 'saṅthārā', is to attenuate the passions that disturb equanimity, and it is always kept in view during the course of its observance. A man with a pure mind, giving up love, enmity, attachment and possession makes a start with pardoning the members of his family and other persons with sweet words.[52] With no deceit in his mind, and criticizing himself for all sinful activities done or got done or approved by him, he takes on this great vow till death.[53] Psychologically he is to fight against the feelings of grief, fear, anguish, exhaustion and dislike; and, with might and enthusiasm, he has to make himself elated with the embrosia of scriptures. Proceeding on a course

of fast he would renounce solid food, liquid food, drinks and water one after the other to attain complete detachment, purity of mind and concentration on the nature of the soul. Finally, with the memory of the holy souls in his mind, he would drop the physical body.[54] Apparently it would appear that he has been all the time trying, though slowly, to invite death; but internally what he aimed to achieve or has been able to achieve is the conquest over passions like attachment, aversion, fear, worldly expectations and all his lower nature. It is certain that one would be able achieve more, if he so chooses, while in body; but, when the protection of the body becomes impossible, there can be no spiritually better way of living than observing the vow of religious death. Those who miss it for one or the other reason, certainly are at a great loss.

Still the external procedure of *sallekhanā* has led some critics to identify it with suicide. Mrs. Stevension remarks, "It is strange that a religious system which begins with the most minute regulations against the taking of the life of the lowest insect should end by encouraging human suicide."[55] Dr. Radhakrishnan is also of opinion that *sallekhanā* is a form of suicide. It must be so, if you confine your vision to the external procedure of its observance. When considered internally the man observing *sallekhanā* will be found gaining spiritually every moment of his life, particularly in a situation when the safety of the body is out of question. The problem is to be viewed from an internal point of view, for *sallekhanā* and suicide agree with each other externally. Again, if one gains the whole world along with his body but loses his soul, it will in no way be a gainful transaction. On the other hand the loss of the body is negligible in view of the gain of the soul. *Sallekhanā* is concerned with the gain of the soul. T.K. Tukol views the problem in respect of intention, situation, means adopted and consequences. He shows that these factors are totally different in the two cases of *sallekhanā* and suicide, and finds nothing common between the two except the physical death.[56] He further states, "The observance of the vow is a conscious and well planned penance for self-realization."[57] If *sallekhanā* is observed only by way of a ritual or a tradition, the external accomplishment may be there, but spiritually

it will lead to no gain. Such a practice must invite the adverse criticism of *sallekhanā* from various scholars who will be giving a true picture of the external scene. Worse becomes the case when a person proceeds to observe *sallekhanā* with an ulterior end of gaining reputation, or saving himself from the sarcasm of the people, if he does not resort to it at the end of his life.

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8

Doctrine of *Karma*

I

The doctrine of *karma* is an integral part of Jaina philosophy both from the points of view of history and philosophy. It stands between the Jaina conceptions of soul and liberation. The soul, the *karma* and liberation taken together may be said to constitute the complete Jaina philosophy of the soul. The doctrine of *karma* provides the principle of causation for psychical events and mundanity which result from an external influence on the soul. The basic source of this external influence is *karma*. There is a general belief that this theory of *karma* is as old as the Jaina philosophy itself. Karmas cripple the soul in such a way that it is not able to live a natural and pure life. A good amount of literature on the *karma* phenomenology of the Jaina, both old and new, is available. Some Jaina works take a note of the theory only in a general way, while others include minute details relating to it. The *Bhagavatīsūtra* makes a start with the chief eight kinds of *karma*, and also marks a transition to a complex form of the theory expressed in terms of stages of spiritual ascent. The most advanced and detailed discussion of the doctrine of *karma* is found in the *Ṣaṭkhaṅdāgama* written by Bhitabati and Puspadanta in aphoristic form. As usual the brief formulations regarding the doctrine are expanded and explained in detail in its well known commentaries, the *Dhavala* and the *Jayadhavala*, by Vīrasena and then follow the works like the *Gommaṭasāra* by Nemi Candra Siddhānta Cakravartī and the *Karmagranthas* by Devendra

Sūri. The later works are like abridgements of the *Ṣaṭkhaṅḍāgama* and its commentaries to enable the readers to appreciate the line of treatment and the main contents of the theory. Among the modern works on the subject *The Jaina Doctrine of Karma* by H. Von Glasenapp may be well cited.

In general by *karma* is meant a deed or an act, and the same meaning is conveyed by the well-known saying 'As you sow, so you reap.' But the general view does not bother to make it clear how actions lead to their results, it is only an unreasoned belief of the common masses. The very idea was philosophised in the hands of various thinkers; and concepts, one after the other, to explain the difficulty were formulated. For some *karma* meant only an impression created on the self of the agent—a real modification of the self; for others the story of *karma* was a delusion through and through. For the Jaina, *karma* does not mean a deed or an act, nor is it only a modification of the self. It is a complex of very fine matter which enters into the soul and determines various changes of its state. It is something other than the soul, and causes limitation, obstruction and distortion of its powers. Karmas must be different from the soul, for the soul itself cannot be detrimental to its own functions. The *karmas* cannot be even the functions of the soul. If they are qualities and the functions of the soul, they cannot be held responsible for the limitations of its powers.[1] C.R. Jain observes, "Karma thus, is a force which binds the soul to the consequences of its good and bad actions."[2] Again in the words of the same writer it would be ridiculous to maintain that a thing could be affected by that which has no substantiveness whatsoever.[3] To hold the principle of *karma* and the changing world only as a delusion is not to solve the difficulty, but is rather a device to evade the question, for delusion itself requires an explanation. There is an inherent and unavoidable difficulty in holding such a position pointed out as. If the Vedantist maintains that he understands what he is talking about, *māyā* ceases to be incomprehensible, but, if he says he has not been able to comprehend it, then he is talking of things which he does not understand and has no right to be heard."[4] It is to be noted that Jaina concept of materiality of *karmas* is also as old as its doctrine of *karmas* itself, for it is the very

backbone of the principle of bondage which is solely responsible for the mundane existence of living beings, and whose complete annihilation alone can bring about the state of siddhahood or liberation for a soul. Thus the Jaina maintains the truth of the *karma śarīra*, constituted of a very fine type of matter which always accompanies the wandering souls.

This new situation as propounded by the Jaina has its own difficulties. The Jaina is required to explain how and when this contact between a conscious and incorporeal principle like the soul, and the unconscious and inert substance of matter, however fine it may be, was made possible. The Jaina holds this contact as having no starting point in time, the mundane soul has ever been in bondage by *karmas*. If we choose to assign a beginning to the process, the pure soul and *karma*-matter will be required to come in contact and to be found with each other in their pure form before bondage. This will lead to the fall of the pure souls, and Jainism does not uphold such a theory. Moreover, as in case of the liberated souls, no cause to bring the souls in contact with *karma*-matter is perceivable. Thus, the story of the fall of the soul, therefore, becomes meaningless. For the same reason the first contact between the soul and matter is unimaginable and inconsistent. Hence this relation between the two must be held to have no beginning.

With every mundane soul the cause for bondage is always there in the form of its impure activities and perverse manifestations to attract the *karma*-matter which, in turn, gets bound with the soul to form its *karma*-body. This mutual relationship between the two makes the process of bondage possible. "Like the needle attracted by a magnet both the *jīva* and *karma*-matter possess the power of distortion which effects their mutual bondage."[5] The *pudgala*, having obtained the conscious manifestation of the *jīva* as an auxiliary cause, transforms itself into *karmas* by itself. The *karma-pudagalas* become auxiliary causes for the conscious manifestations of the soul undergoing transformations in itself."[6] Here the potency of auxiliary causation is admitted and appreciated, for being auxiliary it cannot be dismissed unrecognized. The presence of certain conscious manifestations of the soul becomes an occasion for the fine matter to transform itself

into *karma*-matter, and without such a coincidence the process will not be possible. So also the soul accepts the entry of the *karma-pudgala* into itself in the same manner. The two together seem to constitute one personality—the self of Jaina psychology. Regarding this affinity between the soul and *karma* Brahmadeva raises a question and answers it thus "The pupil asks whether attachment, aversion etc. are the products of the *jīva* or of the *karma*. The answer is that they are the joint products of the two like the a son born of the contact between a male and a female, and like the particular colour born of the mixture of lime and turmeric.[7] The idea behind is that the conscious activation of the soul belongs to the soul but it is contaminated by the association of *karmas*, and also the matter gains a quality to become *karma*-matter and to work in cooperation with the soul. The position which Jaina philosophy is very careful to safeguard is the mutual non-transformation of the substances of the soul and matter, though they are seen working in cooperation with each other. Such a position is admitted in Jaina ontology.

Karma-matter and the soul are the two components of the doctrine of *karma*. The spiritual manifestations of the mundane souls make the input of *karma* into the soul possible. So the Jaina conceives of *karmas* in two ways. The spiritual manifestations are termed as the subjective *karmas* or the *bhāva karmas*, which are the psychological states of the self and are responsible for the influx and bondage of the *karma*-matter with the soul. The fine matter transformed into *karma*-matter in the process of bondage is termed as the objective *karma* or the *dravya karma*.[8] This division of *karma* provides a psychological base for the *karma* theory and also makes it stand on a psycho-physical basis, for which the Jaina theory has been specially credited.

According to Jainism mere activation of the soul, towards mental, vocal or bodily activity called the 'Yoga' (different from the yoga which implies realization of Godhood by an individual), is sufficient to attract the fine matter towards the soul. This process has been given a distinct name in Jainism. It is called the *āsrava* or the influx of *karmas* distinguished in its two aspects—the sujective (bhāva) and the objective (bhāva).[9] All our activities are coloured by passions. The

complex of *yoga*—activity and *kaṣāya*—passion is now ready to bind the soul with the *karmas*. It is the actual state of bondage and it has been dealt with in its four aspects known as the *prakṛti baṅdha* (bondage as determination of the nature of *karmas*), *sthiti baṅdha* (bondage as determination of duration of bondage of *karmas* with the soul), *anubhāga baṅdha* (bondage as determination of the intensity of fruition of *karmas*), and *pradeśa baṅdha* (determination of coevatity or fusion of the soul and *karmas*).[10] Till now the fine matter was lying in space unattached with a soul. It had only a capacity to transform itself into *karma*-matter, when there was an occasion. Space around us is densely filled up with such matter; but as it is very fine, it does not exert any resistance and is not experienced by us with our senses. The moment it comes into contact with the soul the four types of determination of bondage as enumerated above take place. The causal factors responsible for these determinations have also been analysed and distinguished. The *yoga* (activity) determines the first and the last types of bondage, and *kaṣāya* (passion) determines the remaining two types.[11] Now the soul is actually in the grip of the *karmas*. The analysis of the factors of bondage into yoga and *kaṣāya* becomes intelligible, when as the Jaina holds, in a higher stage of spiritual uplift the bondage is determined by the *yoga* alone because passion is completely destroyed there. This bondage, in the absence of the determination of duration and fruition of *karmas* is only nominal and not effectual. The last stage of the spiritual uplift which involves the cessation of *yoga* is marked by the total absence of influx and bondage. Then, taking a very short interval of time, to purge the *karmas* left in stock with the soul, the soul becomes liberated.

The determination of the nature of *karmas* takes us to their classification. The basic classification deals with as many as eight types of *karma* to obscure and distort the various faculties of the soul. These eight kinds of *karmas* are known as the *mūla prakṛtis* or the primary divisions.[12] The first of these, as per order unanimously given in the Jaina scriptures, is the *jñānāvaraṇīya* (knowledge obscuring) which effects distortion and limitation of the knowledge attribute of the soul. Various kinds of empirical knowledge result from

the function of this type of *karma*. The second kind of *karma* is known as the *darśanā-varaṇīya* (conation obscuring, distorting the soul's capacity for conation). Jaina epistemology recognizes a stage of conatus or initial stirring of the mental energy determined by a faculty named as *darśana* before the actual process of knowledge takes place.[13] This category of *karma* is responsible for obscuring and distorting the *darśana* faculty of the soul, which is not identified with any type of ocular perception as its nomenclature is likely to suggest. The third is the *vedanīya* type responsible for generating the feelings of pleasure and pain in a living being by distorting the faculty of bliss. The fourth is called the *mohanīya* the deluding type—which deludes a soul by effecting a perverted faith and conduct in it. As the entire process of emancipation of the soul depends on faith and conduct, this category of *karma* is considered to be the greatest obstacle in the way and needs to be attenuated and eradicated to qualify one to tread the path of liberation. Then comes the category of *āyu karma*—the age determining *karma*. The determination by *āyu karma* relates to the length of period for which a living being is found to live in a particular form of life. So long as the *āyu karma* is working with the soul one has to continue in that life; death occurs only when this *karma* is exhausted and dropped of from the soul. The conception of *nāma karma* under the *karma* theory of the Jaina is a valuable contribution towards biological studies. The function of the *nāma karma* is spread over the process of formation of an organism, its various parts like bones, blood, muscles etc. and its maintenance against organic disorders. This class of *karma* lies behind all biological structures of the organism with their growth and maintenance. The name given to the next category of *karma* is *gotra*. It is concerned with the determination of the family and social status of a living being. The last category of *karma* is the *aṅtarāya*—the power-obstructing one. A living being is possessed of capacities to enjoy the things of the world and avail of the gains it can bestow upon him. This *karma* just stands in the way of a successful functioning of these capacities. The doctrine of *karma* is meant to determine, certainly in cooperation of the environment, the events of one's life, in its various facets. This aspect of the

doctrine will become clear, when a study of the further divisions of the *mūla prakṛtis* is aimed. The Jaina literature is very rich in the treatment of *karma* theory in its various aspects.

The functions of the eight *karmas* are illustrated by a number of examples to make them easily comprehensible even for a simple ordinary student. The function of the knowledge obscuring *karma* is explained by means of a curtain placed between the object and the perceiver. It will not allow the perceiver to see the object. The example of a gate-keeper, the man on duty at the entrance, is given to explain the function of the *darśanāvaranīya*. It does not allow even to make a start towards having preliminary prehension about an object and thus thwarts the process of knowledge in its very start. The function of the third category of *karma* is made clear by the example of a person who is licking honey from the blade of a sword, thus having simultaneously both painful and pleasant experiences due to the cuts on his tongue and the sweet taste of honey. The *mohanīya karmas* causes a delusion and thus disenables one to understand things in their right perspective, as does wine with a man, The age-determining *karma* works like fetters put on the feet of a prisoner so that he is kept confined to his cell; so the age-*karmas* keeps a living being confined to a particular form of life. The example of a potter or a painter is picked up to explain the function of the *nāma karma*. The painter makes a variety of pictures with his brush and colour on the canvas or as a potter makes a variety of pots from the lump of earth in his hand; so also the *nāma karma* produces a variety of bodies for the souls to inhabit in their worldly existence. Just a potter makes big and small jars out of the lump of earth before him, so the *gotra karma* goes to determine the family and the social status for a living being. The example of a store-keeper is mentioned to explain the function of the *aṅtarāya karma*. Just as the store keeper creates difficulties in the way of obtaining particular things which otherwise can be easily had; so the *aṅtarāya karmas* obstructs the way of procuring something which is otherwise obtainable.[14] The unseen power of *karma* comes in the way of the natural functioning of the souls faculties by causing limitation,

obscuration and distortion. A particular form of manifestation of a soul's capacity is delimited, made to appear in a distorted form and is totally obscured according to the nature of *karmas* operative with the soul. The worldly souls do not enjoy omniscience, it is an example of total obscuration. The enjoy sensuous and perceptual knowledge, it is an example of limitation. They cannot have a right vision of things and do not behave in a manner suited to their spiritual upliftment, it is an example of distortion. It may be noted that *karmas* are never able to destroy a basic capacity of the soul completely. So knowledge, being such a capacity, cannot be totally destroyed by *karmas* so as to reduce if to an unconscious entity.

Before taking up a discussion of the secondary divisions (*uttara prakṛtis*) of the *karma*-forces it is worthwhile to consider another classification of the *karma* forces into two groups i.e. *ghāti* (destructive) and the *aghāti* (non-destructive) ones. This classification is primarily based on the full manifestation and total absence in the form of distortion of some of the attributes of the soul and refers to the stage of *arhat*hood i.e. emancipation with the body. In this stage infinite knowledge, infinite conation, infinite bliss and infinite power are manifest along with the association of the body. These powers emerge in the soul on the destruction of the knowledge-obscuring, conation-obscuring, deluding and power-obstructing *karmas*. So these four classes of *karmas* are covered under the *ghāti* group, as they do not allow the appearance of godhood in a soul so long as they are with it. The remaining four classes of *karmas* work in a way that their function is not detrimental to the status of *arhat*hood, they have been put under another group called the *aghāti* one. The use of the prefix 'a' in its nomenclature should not be taken to suggest no harm is done to the soul by this group of *karma* forces. They are certainly checking the soul from entering the stage of *mokṣa*—the final emancipation and becoming a *siddha* or an accomplished one. *Siddha*hood also requires the destruction of the *aghāti* group of *karma* forces; and for it a soul makes special efforts and takes a cognisible duration of time to attain it. Moreover, *karma* is antithetical to the pure functions of the soul. Hence a *karma*, to whatever type it may

belong, must obstruct the attainment of the final stage in one or the other way. So the prefix 'a' in *aghāti* may be taken to mean 'not very serious' which is a permissible usage in Sanskrit language.

It will not be out of place if the traditional classification of the *karma*-forces is studied in the context of modern psychology. Psychology is concerned with the self and its powers, the physique and the nervous system, and the environment. The psychic event may be seen to result from the working of these factors. So it should not be objected to regroup the *karmas* into psychical, physique-determining and environmental classes. According to Jainism, psychology is possible only where the soul is found in association with the *karmas*. Actually speaking the mundane soul is the psyche of Jaina psychology and the limited, distorted and perverted powers of such a soul are the psychical powers which manifest in a soul in the form of cognition, conation and affection. Hence the knowledge-obscuring, canation-obscuring, deluding and the feeling class of *karmas* may be included in the psychical class. The *nāma* and *āyu karmas* may be taken to constitute the class of the physique-determining or the physiological class of *karmas*. The further divisions of the *nāma karma* are related with the various parts of the organism including the apparatus of the senses in their complete or incomplete forms. The *āyu karma* determines the duration of association of the self and its physique. The gross matter required for the formation of the body is different from the *karma*-matter, the physique determining *karma* is there to give it a shape and potency. The matter of the body and the matter of *karma* work in mutual cooperation. The working of the self is also hindered or helped by the environment in which it happens to be placed. This environment may be taken to be constituted of the family, society and similar other factors lying outside the self. Thus the *gotra karma* and the *aṅtarāya karma* may be taken to fall under the environmental class. The power-obstructing *karma* is concerned with the conjunction of the external objects for the fulfilment of the psychic and bodily functions of the self, so it also falls under the third group.[15] The environmental class of *karmas* raises a problem how the *karmas*

which are coeval with the soul and the body the soul inhabits are able to effect a change in the things lying outside them. The answer may be sought in the concept of 'field' in psychology. Field psychology extends the scope of the self beyond the organism. Jacob Robert Contour holds that "the real whole, however, is not the organism but the organism in its effective environment."[16] Koffka says, "We should regard behaviour, not as composed of responses to stimuli but as governed by a field, the organismic field of interacting forces, a field that is self-organised into definite though changing patterns."[17] It is further said, "For Levin the field means the life space containing the person and his psychological environment."[18] "Basically we are confronted with the problem of action at a distance. Such instances are there in the physical world as well. The action of a magnet is explained by postulating a magnetic field. According to the Jaina *karma* theory the secret of the workings of the environmental class of *karmas* is to be sought in the structure of the self in Jaina philosophy which is a compendium of soul and *karma*-matter. Such a self is able to generate a field round itself and thus is able to contribute to the course of things at distance. Some type of medium like the action-currents may be supposed to emanate, on account of the presence of the environmental *karmas*, from the self to effect changes in the external world. It is not very surprising that the self and the environment are found to function in mutual cooperation and coordination.

So far our treatment of the Jaina doctrine of *karma* has been confined to the eight primary divisions called the *mūla prakṛtis*. The secondary divisions of the *karma* forces are enumerated as five of *jñānāvaraṇīya*, nine of the *darśanāvaraṇīya*, two of the *vedanīya*, twentyeight of the *mohanīya*, four of the *āyu*, fortytwo of the *nāma*, two of the *gotra* and five of the *aṅtarāya*. The fortytwo classes of the *nāma karma* are further divided into ninety three divisions. Thus the total number of the secondary division of the *karma* forces comes to one hundred forty eight. These divisions are recognised as the base for all necessary discussions about the doctrine of *karma*. The further elaboration of the theory in its relation with the stages of spiritual evolution in the form

of *karmas* to be bound, *karmas* already bound, *karmas* in operation and *karmas* not to be further bound is based on these secondary divisions of the *karmas*. The five sub-divisions of *jñānāvaraṇīya* obscure the soul's faculty for sensuous knowledge, *śruta* knowledge (knowledge based on the interpretation of signs), clairvoyance, telepathy and omniscience.[20] The nine sub-divisions of the *darśanāvaraṇīya* interfere with the soul's conatus for ocular and non-ocular prehension, clairvoyant perception, perfect prehension and several types of sleep.[21] The two classes of the *vedanīya* are responsible for pleasurable and painful experiences. The sub-divisions of *mohanīya* are grouped under two heads—the *darśana mohanīya* (belief deluding) and the *caritra mohanīya* (conduct deluding). Three sub-divisions which obstruct right faith are covered under the first head, the remaining i.e. sixteen kinds of passions (*kaṣāyas*) and nine kinds of minor passions (*nokaṣāyas*) fall under the second group.[23] The four subdivisions of the *āyu karma* are concerned with the determination of the span of life in various conditions (gati) such as the celestial, the human, the sub-human and the hellish ones.[24] The ninetythree subdivisions of the *nāma karma* go to determine the condition, general type, body, principal and subsidiary limbs, structure of the body including the union of the cells, form of the body, formation of bony skeleton, colour and so many other details concerning the body.[25] The two subdivisions of the next *karma* i.e. the *gotra* are concerned with securing one's birth in a noble, influential, prosperous and the opposite kinds of surroundings.[26] The five sub-divisions of the *aṅtarāya karma* are concerned with interference with making gifts, procuring gains, creating difficulties in the way of enjoyment of things which can be used once or repeatedly and obstructing the effectiveness of our efforts. This gives a picture of the entire range of the *karma* forces as conceived in Jainism. There is no bar against further division of these secondary *karma*-forces, but keeping in view the vast and deep elaborations already found in Jaina scripture, it will not be very useful, because to develop and recast the *karma* theory in the light of these new divisions will be a Herculean task and may not be accomplished with an equal amount of consistency.

Some of the systems of Indian philosophy distinguish among the *āgāmī*, *prārabdha* and *sañcita karmas*. The *prārabhda karmas* are those that are bearing fruits, and the *sañcita* ones are those that lie in store with the soul. The *āgāmī karmas* are explained as, "Every present act, every present thought, every present desire becomes stored in his subtle body as *āgāmin* (augmentative)."[28] Modern psychology also distinguishes among the elements of mental structure in the same way. Every complex or disposition has a moment of assimilation; so long as it does not start its function, it remains there in the mental structure. It then rises to an operative stage after attaining maturity, and after effecting its fruition it passes away and gets detached from the mental structure. Both these ideas suggest three stages in the working of the *karmas* and the mental dispositions. There is the moment of their assimilation, there is the period of its association, and then comes the moment of their fruition or operation after which they are no more attached with the self. In Jainism these stages and a few more besides, are considered as richly as the other components of the *karma* theory. Jainism believes that with every activity of mind, body and speech there is the influx of the *karmas* which immediately gets bound with the soul because of the attendant passions. This is the stage of bondage—the first step in the life-history of a *karma*. Such a *karma* requires a definite period for getting mature to bear fruits. This period has been technically called as the *ābādha kāla*—the period of maturation.[29] When the period of maturity is over, the *karma* starts bearing fruits after which it must drop off. Says Kundakunda, "Just as a fruit, when ripe, falls from the tree and cannot remain attached to it, in the same way the *karmas* do not attain the state of operation again, when they are once shed off."[30] A similarity of ideas regarding the functioning of the self, when in association with its limiting conditions, among the above thinkers is very striking. In Jainism these three stages are known as *bańdha* (bondage), *sattā* (endurance) and *udaya* (operation). The other stages of the *karmas* mentioned in the Jaina works on the doctrine are *utkarṣaṇa* (increased realization), *apakarṣaṇa* (decreased realization), *saṁkramaṇa* (transformation), *udīraṇā* (immature

realization), *nidhatti* (not subject to *udīraṇā* and *saṁkramaṇa*) and *nikācita* (beyond *utkarṣaṇa*, *apakarṣaṇa*, *udīraṇā* and *niddhatti*). All these stages are technically called the 'dasa karaṇas'—the ten stages of the *karmas*.[31] The stages of *utkarṣaṇa* and *apakarṣaṇa* may take place in respect of the length of duration and intensity of fruits of the *karmas*. Thus a possibility of such changes in the accumulated *karmas* is also admitted and made dependent on the nature of actions of an individual. The stage of *saṁkramaṇa* points to a change of one type of *karmas* into another, but it is confined to the secondary divisions of a particular primary division only. When one is able to decrease the duration of a *karma*, it is brought to an operative stage before its due time. Such a stage is termed as *udīraṇā*. Then there are some *karmas* which do not yield to immature realization and transformation. This stage of the *karmas* is said to be *niddhatti*. The *nikācita* stage of *karmas* points to such adamant *karmas* which do not yield to any type of change and follow their own course of fruition unobstructed. It is not necessary that every *karma* should pass through all these stages necessarily. Some stages of *karmas* occur only by negating other stages. The essential stages through which a *karma* must pass are those of bondage, endurance and realization after which it must fall off from the soul.

The souls may undergo five types of manifestations of their powers in the context of the *karmas*. These manifestations are peculiar to the souls and are known as the *bhāvas*.[32] Some faculties of the soul, as Jainism holds, are no subject of karmic influence and they function freely and naturally. These are the *pārṇāmika bhāvas* or the natural manifestations. When the soul, by undergoing necessary discipline, is able to shake off all the shackles of *karmas*, its faculties which were so far suppressed and distorted by the karmic forces become free to function in their full purity. These are called the *kṣayika* (destruction-born) manifestations of the soul. In liberation souls are possessed of these two types of spiritual manifestations. The remaining spiritual manifestation depend on the association of *karmas* in their various stages with the soul. Sometimes the soul, with special efforts on its part, is able to quieten some of the *karma* forces and thus

to disallow them to come to an operative stage. The manifestations of the soul relating to these faculties are called the *aupaśamika bhāvas*—the subsidential manifestations. In this stage the *karma* forces are only suppressed and not eradicated, hence after sometime these forces will become operative and disturb the soul in their usual manner. When the stage of *upaśama* is already achieved and the operation of some other *karmas* is there, then the soul will have the *kṣāyopaśamika bhāvas* or the destructive-cum-subsidential manifestations. Then there comes the last class of such manifestations which are totally determined by the operation of the *karmas*. These are called the *audayika bhāvas*—the operative manifestations. This theory of five types of spiritual manifestations is a unique contribution to the field of psychology which can be recast in terms of these manifestations and can be consistently entitled as the Jaina or the *Karma* psychology—a psychology which very clearly asserts the existence of the soul. C.R. Jaina remarks, "The Jaina or the Higher psychology, as it might be termed, is not connected with that elementary branch of the subject which exhausts itself in the measurement of sensations, the effect of emotions on the inter-physical body and the like, but which studiously avoids to ascertain whether the soul be a reality or myth. Its province is the higher department of thought which seeks to understand the nature of the thing whose presence is the source of life and light in the body and also of action and the inhibition of action, and of the diversified impulsions and promptings of the mind."[33] Such is the nature of Jaina psychology which emerges on account of the karmic association with the soul.

It is not only with the Jaina that he is required to explain the workings of the empirical selves, but it is a general problem for all to find out the secret of misery, happiness and diversity of living beings in the world. In the Indian systems of philosophy the term 'karma' interpreted variously, has been supposed to give a clue to the solution of this great problem of differences and variations in the behaviours of the individuals. It also implies a connection with the past of such individuals. So in a way *karma* may be looked upon as a principle of continuity of worldly life. This orderliness in the

workings of *karma* brings to us the concept of the law of *karma*. This force and law of *karma* takes a special form in Jaina philosophy as has been explained in the forerunning pages. Now we would like to see and evaluate how the subject has been treated in other systems of philosophy.

According to the *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* system of Indian philosophy, "the soul is supposed to possess some non-eternal qualities of attachment, aversion and delusion which lead it to the activities of mind, body and speech. These activities cause some traces in the soul in the form of merit and demerit and the store of such traces is named as *adṛṣṭa* or the unseen, perhaps, for its fineness and imperceptibility. "It is maintained that our good actions produce a certain efficiency called merit (*puṇya*), and bad actions produce some deficiency called demerit (*pāpa*) in our souls and these persist long after our actions have ceased and disappeared. This stock of merit and demerit accruing from good and bad actions is called *adṛṣṭa*."[34] "This *adṛṣṭa* is responsible for bringing about a conjunction with sense organs, mind and sense objects, which in turn leads to pleasure and pain. Hence for final emancipation the last vestige of *adṛṣṭa* is to be eliminated to avoid further conjunction and origination of a new body. It is more or less a theory of impressions which somehow are detained by the souls after the actions are over, and after an interval of time become active so as to cause various states of the empirical selves. In the state of liberation there is no contact between soul and mind, which is held responsible for the appearance of the empirical phenomena regarding a soul; and as such, the soul is left there with no knowledge and joy.

A similar idea is postulated by the Mīmānsakas under the term '*apūrva*' to explain the workings of the merit one gains by performing the religious duties. It is held that the ritual performed here generates in the soul of the performer an unperceived potency (i.e. power for generating the fruit of the action) called *apūrva*, which remains in the soul and bears fruit when circumstances are favourable.[35] By extending the scope of such a potency we can bring the concept of *apūrva* very near to that of *adṛṣṭa* or *karma* to cover the entire field of empirical activities. Some type of modification of the soul

due to its actions and its retention is implied by such theories. We may also notice that attempts to explain the details regarding the actions of the selves, the consequent modification of the selves, duration of this modification, the consequent fruition and other connected processes in these systems in their own ways are also available.

Like the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika schools the Sāṁkhya and the Yoga systems also agree with each other in the formulation of the theories about the soul and its bondage by *saṁskaras* or impressions. The *Sāṁkhya* lays emphasis on the philosophic side of the system, while the Yoga is very particular about giving a practical way for achieving the final release for the soul. So in the Gītā the union of two systems is prescribed as an actual course to attain liberation.[36] *Avidyā* or ignorance is described as the sole cause of a soul's bondage. It is effective by way of creating some *saṁskāras* or impressions which are retained by the self for determining its future behaviour and experience.

For the *Sāṁkhya* the *puruṣa* is an immutable entity, the entire responsibility of differences, pain and pleasure is transferred to *buddhi* or intellect, a manifestation of *prakṛti* which is basically unconscious. "The enjoyer is immutable and incapable of transferring itself to *buddhi*. But it seems to assume the modifications (of the *buddhi*) and its changes. The activities of the *buddhi* are then transformed to the *puruṣa* (the conscious self) and the *puruṣa* seems to own them as its own functions.[37] A material metaphor of reflection seems to be most employed to explain the relation between the *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* in the Sāṁkhya system ignoring the inconsistencies arising from such a situation. Still a drift towards the actuality of bondage by the *karmas* and its transference to the region of intellect are unique in this system. It may be taken to be an extension of the principle of *karma* to the region of unconscious *prakṛti*. In the hands of the Sāṁkhya the *karmas* are gradually finding their material lodging which is made very clear only in Jainism.

Śaṅkara's advaitism appears in the field with its absolute monism of Brahma; and as such it should have no problem regarding limitations and distortions of the empirical world because they are false and unreal as against the absolute

reality of Brahma. But how could it close its eyes against the experienced facts of existence and knowledge? It had to find out a principle in *māyā* to explain the process of the world, whatever status of reality it could assign to it, to its products and to the world itself. *Māyā* came out to be the power of Brahma, but not for its infinite manifestations. It was recognised more as a principle of limitation and distortion of the basic reality though delusive, in the hands of Śaṅkara, but real in those of Rāmānuja. It should be there to account for the worldly process, our problem then being confined only to the status of existence to be assigned to it. The conception of *kośas*, created by *māyā* as a depository of actions may be taken to be a step in the direction of the search for the material basis of the *karmas*. After all, proceeding from one delusion to another, finer and finer in form, we have to make it stand against the conscious principle, or it remains unexplained throughout. Later developments of Vedānta philosophy demonstrate this trend to a great extent.

Buddhism comes to us with its great principle of universal flux which is maintained even at the cost of a loss of the central principle at the back of the flux in the form of *nairātmyavāda*—non-persistence of the principle of soul, in its absolute phenomenalism. This missing principle has been supplied in the form of *vāsanā* or impression to account for the experience of continuity. One impression is supposed to perfume another before its disappearance, and thus the element of persistence is allowed to continue through change. In case of conscious selves the series starts with *avidyā* (absence of the knowledge of reality) or *moha* i.e. delusion. Successive impressions being modulated by *avidyā*, lead through various stages, to the experience of pain and suffering. This is the bondage of the self, if not of the soul, in Buddhism. Thus the principle of empirical existence is found embedded in ignorance and impressions in Buddhism. It has also been conceived in a form of covering in the terms *jñeyāvaraṇa* and *kleśāvaraṇa*. The former means that which keeps off what is knowable from the knowing self and the latter means an obstruction which brings about a state of anguish and suffering for it. Somehow the limiting principle intervenes the life process to cause ignorance and anguish.

The approach must be only functional and psychological because the central principle is throughout missing in Buddhism.

The Buddhistic theory of impressions and coverings as discussed above is very suggestive as leading to the concrete and substantial existence of the principle of limitations of the powers of the conscious self. As in case of other systems, so also in Buddhism, we notice a tendency towards locating an intelligible basis for the principle of limitation of the powers of the soul, which has been very clearly recognized and dealt with in Jainism.

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9

The *Nirvāṇa*

In Jainism the terms *mokṣa*, *mukti*, *śiva*, *nirvāṇa* and *siddhagati* are used to denote the emancipated state of the soul. The category of *jīva* has been divided into two broad classes—the mundane (*saṁsārī*) and the emancipated (*mukta*).[1] The idea of emancipation of souls is as real and prominent in Jainism as that of the mundane souls. The concept of the soul's bondage by *karma* comes in to determine their mundane existence, the reality of this concept of mundane existence leads to the concept of emancipation. Thus the Jaina theory of *mokṣa* or liberation requires for its basis the existence of the soul, the reality of its bondage and the possibility of its liberation. Generally speaking the system which propounds the reality of the soul, must formulate the theory of its bondage and liberation in one form or the other.

Basically the souls have an eternal existence. So long as they are not emancipated, they are held to continue in their mundane existence which has no beginning. As such the mundane souls have remained deprived of their blissful nature in the past. But when they attain *nirvāṇa*, their mundane life comes to an end, and they enjoy the glories of their divine nature for all time to come. As in this stage the soul is perfectly pure and above *karmic* effect there is no cause to drag it back into mundane existence. It is why this state is conceived to continue for ever. Jainism does not believe in the fall of souls that have once attained liberation. The liberated existence of the soul must have a beginning but no end.

The association of the *karmas* with the soul is beginningless

but it comes to an end where causes to break it are made available. Umāsvāmī observes, "*Mokṣa* is the complete freedom from all the *karma* on account of the absence of the causes of bondage and the presence of the causes of expulsion of the accumulated *karmas*."[2] The mundane existence of the soul is determined and prolonged by its association with the *karmas* and their function. This influx of *karmas* is checked by a course of discipline covered under the term *saṁvara*. The problem of dealing with the *karmas* already bound with the soul still remains to be tackled. Penance and meditation along with the spiritual discipline are harnessed to break these shackles of *karmas*. When a soul comes out successful in its attempt to achieve this objective, it attains complete freedom from *karmas*. This state of the soul is called the *mokṣa*. The emergence of spiritual qualities like right faith etc. which are opposed to the causes of bondage just proves the absence of their bondage in the soul. As regards the possibility of *nirjarā* or the expulsion of *karmas* it has been said, "In some soul the *karmas* are totally shed off, because their existence is terminated by their fruition. This termination, in turn, is proved by the fact that their fruition is not found to be eternal."[3] It is true that where the soul has developed the function of its pure qualities, the causes that go to contaminate these qualities should no more be there in existence, but the expulsion of *karmas* after their fruition is very likely to lead to further bondage as is generally noticeable about the mundane souls. Hence special efforts in the form of penance and meditation are required to free the soul from the grip of the *karmas* that lie bound with the soul. This aspect of the process is duly emphasised in Jainism, as it alone can lead to what is called the *akāma nirjarā* i.e. expulsion of *karmas* without allowing them to fructify. It alone is potent to bring about a speedy and massive liquidation of *karmas* from the soul. The entire monkish life is aimed at achieving this objective. Samaṅtabhadra has advanced an argument in support of the possibility of liberation. He observes, "The total destruction of the obstructions and the obscuring *karmas* can be held to be complete in some soul because of the degrees of such destruction of *karmas*, as we get the removal of the internal and external blemishes on

account of the presence of (such) causes."[4] It points to the fact that the eradication of *karmas* is not an impossible task. Let us procure and attain the necessary means, it will follow there as a natural result. Like the degrees of the destruction of *karmas* the degrees of the distortion of spiritual powers are also noticed in mundane existence of the souls. One is very likely to draw a conclusion in favour of complete disappearance of such powers from the souls. The above argument enunciated in favour of the complete freedom of the soul may be viewed in the light of the basic Jaina theory of the soul. The spiritual attributes which are obscured by *karmas* cannot be completely wiped out from the soul by them, being intrinsically connected with it. On the contrary the distortions effected by the *karmas* being external can come to an end on account of the means which a soul employs for their eradication. In this context Dasgupta has rightly remarked, "Though it is beginningless yet it can be removed by knowledge, for to have a beginning or not to have it does not in any way determine whether the thing is subject to dissolution or not, for the dissolution of a thing depends upon the presence of the thing which can cause it, and it is a fact that when knowledge comes illusion is destroyed, it does not matter whether the cause which produced the illusion was beginningless or not."[5] In view of the reasoning advanced by the Jaina ācāryas liberation is not an essential event in the life of a soul, but where the proper causes are present liberation must follow.

Every system that propounds the theory of the soul in any form has also to discuss the problem of its release from the pain and disquiet of the world. The theory of liberation is closely connected with the ontology of the concerned system. In Nyāya philosophy the soul is held to be a substance with knowledge, feeling, desire etc. connected with it on account of the category of *samavāya*. Consciousness is held only accidental to the soul. In liberation the soul achieves freedom not only from suffering and pain but also from consciousness. It exists there only as a substance. This philosophy also holds that the fall of the soul is due to the lack of discriminatory knowledge between the soul and the body, and it is knowledge alone that can free it from worldly fetters. It is strange to note

that such an important accompaniment of the soul as knowledge is denied existence in the state of liberation. The Mīmāṅsā theory of liberation marks an advance over the Nyāya theory, otherwise it almost agrees with the latter. According to Mīmāṅsā philosophy the soul loses consciousness because its connection with the body and the senses is totally cut off, but then it retains a potentiality for consciousness. Regarding Mīmāṅsā conception of *mokṣa* it is said that "It is a state where the soul remains in its own intrinsic nature beyond pleasure and pain. The soul in its intrinsic nature can be defined only as a substance having existence and a potentiality for consciousness though no actual consciousness."[6] Coming to Buddhism, in the light of its theory of no-soul (*nairātmyavāda*) we generally take liberation to mean only the cessation of the chain of sufferings leaving behind nothing like the extinguishing flame of a lamp. For Buddhism there was no central entity entrapped in suffering and hence liberation, in such a context, becomes meaningless. On the other hand T.R.V. Murti thinks, "Buddha has taught the doctrine of momentariness not as an ultimate proposition but a step leading to relativity (*śūnyatā*)."[7] The silence of Buddha is a classical illustration of the truth that the final truth cannot be expressed in words, to take Buddha to be a nihilist is to mistake his philosophical stature."[8] Thus the concepts of soul and liberation in Buddhism are not empty ones, they are rich with contents which language fails to describe. Such a state is denoted by the term *śūnyatā*, and the Buddhistic monks undergo a course of discipline to attain it. It is not negative, it is not a void, but it only escapes expression. Between the *Sāṁkhya* and the *Advaita Vedānta* systems of Indian philosophy we note a striking similarity. In the *Sāṁkhya* the *puruṣas*, many in number, are perfectly immutable, all perversions relate to the other entity *prakṛti* which is intrinsically unconscious. In Advaita *Vedānta*, Brahma is the ultimate reality, one and conscious, all plurality and change belong to the realm of *māyā* which is granted no status of reality as it is through and through delusive. Only the Brahma is real, all else is false. For the former the *puruṣas* were never in bondage, for the latter the Brahma was never really contaminated. Hence there appears no necessity of

prescribing a way for the redemption of the souls in these two systems; and for this very reason a talk about liberation for them comes out to be a futile attempt. The *puruṣas* of the Sāṁkhya, must in some way, suffer from the bondage to make room for a plausible theory of liberation in the system. So also in *Advaita Vedānta*, the introduction of *māyā* and its products will not help us if they are not allowed to enter the bounds of reality somewhere.

As against these philosophies but partially in agreement with them stands the Jaina system with the reality, plurality, distortions of powers of the soul and a chain of worldly existences assigned to it. What is intrinsic to its nature can only be distorted by its association with the *karmas*, its total extinction in the course of a soul's life is not consistent with the ontology of Jainism. Hence what we take to be lost in the worldly existence is only regained in liberation, The kingdom of God, as Christianity would have it, was within, but it only needed an unfoldment. The psychical faculties of the self are born of the association of the soul with matter. Perception, memory, intellect and feelings of pain and pleasure were all distortions of the intrinsic powers of the soul. The body and the senses were also determined by the karmic association as limitations to the soul's powers. All these products of *karmas* being dissociated from the soul it is left free with its pure faculties which will now encounter no obstruction from within or without. In liberation the soul is perfectly self-determined. Sensuous and perceptual knowledge gets transformed into omniscience, and pain, pleasure and passions are replaced by perfect serenity and bliss. The Jaina scriptures are very positive in enumerating some of the powers of the pure soul. These are perfect faith, perfect knowledge, perfect prehension, extreme subtlety, infinite power, perfect bliss and complete absence of obstruction in liberation.[9] In Jainism the state of liberation is not negative and contentless, it is positive and rich with pure spiritual powers.

In Jaina philosophy the principle of soul has been unambiguously granted the status of a substance. Even in its mundane existence there is no loss of this status. It ever continues to be a substance, only taking different forms. So also in the state of liberation it continues enjoying the status of being a

substance. But in liberation there being no higher heights to be attained by the soul, the idea of change or dynamism is likely to be taken to be inconsistent with the perfection of the soul. It is true that the soul has now reached the summit of self-evolution, but as a substance it cannot escape the universal dynamism of reality. The modes of the soul's attributes then take place in such a subtle way that a comprehension of their mutual distinction is beyond ordinary knowledge. We can only say that in the liberated state the change is not towards the higher but towards the similar. Similarity between any two emancipated souls, as the Jaina ontology would require, should not be interpreted in favour of their identity because that will reduce Jainism to monism. Such souls remain distinct from each other substantially, which must lead to the distinction among their attributes and modes in the aforesaid manner. The plurality of the souls which we could recognize in their mundane existence is also maintained in the state of their liberation.[10]

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11. Rājamalla: Pañcādhyāyī, Verses 942-43.

10

God

The theory of soul and liberation discussed in the forerunning pages must help us in framing an idea of Godhood in Jainism. A plurality of souls is conceived in Jainism, and each soul is held to be intrinsically divine. By abolishing the alienation attached with the mundane souls, they are supposed to rise to the status of Godhood. The basic plurality of the souls must lead to a plurality of Gods (certainly spelt with capital G) in Jainism. This plurality of Gods as against the general acceptance of a singular God is in no way perplexing to the Jaina. Jainism very consistently accommodates the plurality of Gods in its philosophical system. So it holds a series of twenty four *tīrthaṅkaras* or the propounders of truth for an aeon of time, and counts so many such aeons that have already passed and are still to come. Besides the *tīrthaṅkaras*, a number of other souls has also attained liberation during the past ages. The status of these souls in the state of liberation is in no way different from that of the *tīrthaṅkaras* as regards spiritual purity. All are *siddhas* or accomplished souls with nothing left for further achievement by them. They individually enjoy the free and pure manifestations of their powers; and are absorbed in their pure identity which is constituted by infinite knowledge, prehension, bliss and power technically known as the *anaṅta catuṣṭaya*—the infinite quaternary in Jainism. There is no danger of one's individuality being lost in liberation as the merger theory of Vedānta holds; nor is God in Jainism worried about reincarnating in the world to perform certain functions for the sake of living beings here. The answer to the question whether

Jainism is a theistic religion or it is atheistic in nature depends not on the assumption of a God in the system, but on the right conception of Godhood there. Jainism has been labelled as an atheistic system in the past or some people choose to call it so in the present only accounts for an illogical and hasty opinion on their part. They expected a God of their own make in Jainism; and failing to find such a God there, they hastily jumped to the conclusion that Jainism is an atheistic system. The issue has remained a topic of hot discussion for a long time. God is there in Jainism, and the plurality of Gods therein should not astound the readers if they impartially try to appreciate the Jaina position.

God has been generally understood as a super-human agent responsible for the creation, protection and destruction of the universe in various systems of religion. All men in their weaker moments, are seen to place an appeal for help before such a deity against whose will they think themselves the weakest of creatures. The different centres of powers in nature, including living beings, are held to work not because of their intrinsic capacity but because of the will of God or with some type of intervention by Him. The creation theory of the world, though supported in various ways, has also been fatally attached from so may corners. Jainism holds that the workings of the world depend on the powers inherent in the various constituents of the universe and their mutual interaction. The principle of conservation and indestructibility of energy not only of matter but of all that can be called a substance, strongly stand in the way of the creation theory. The cosmos is a self-consistent and self-sufficient system, never in need of any extraneous agency to look after it for fear that another agency will be required to look after it, and this position may suffer from infinite regress when extended backward. When the creation theory is found unable to face the test, the destruction theory also falls to the ground with it. If there is any destruction, partial or total, in the universe, it must result only as a form of existence determined by the constituents of the universe. Thus goes on the process of the universe, and we do not require an agent even to protect it. It is why Jainism does not assign any such function to its Gods.

Man, like all living beings forms a part of nature. We also

perform some actions and hold accountability for them. To establish a connection between these actions and their fruits the *karma* theory of the Jaina provides, as if, a self-registering ledger of the good and bad deeds one does.[1] Like natural events the *karmas* bear fruits on maturity, and we do not even need a law-giver to impart justice in respect of our actions. The Bhagvad Gītā rightly mentions "The Lord creates neither agency nor actions for the universe, nor does he bring about the union with the fruits of action. The nature of things so proceeds. The Lord does not grant demerit to some nor merit to others. Knowledge is contaminated by ignorance and the *jīvas* are deluded by it."[2]

God, in Jainism, is above all worldly activities and concerns, he is an embodiment of pure spiritual powers functioning in a self-determined natural way. He knows the universe, as knowing is his nature. He enjoys infinite bliss, as it is intrinsic to his nature. He does not interfere with the activities of the world, nor has the world to add anything to his nature and pure functions. His is a passive grace, one can avail of it if one so chooses. His example is a great source of inspiration for his devotees who adore and worship him with nothing like a demand on him. What they get from his worship and adoration is the enlightenment and inspiration for advancing on the path of spiritual development which, in turn, can lift them to the status of the object of their veneration.

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1. C.R. Jain: *Key of Knowledge*, p. 86.
2. Bhagvadgītā. Verses 14 and 15.

11

Jainism and Indian Life

India is a vast country. It holds together a variety of religions, ideologies, languages and societies. Its variety has been thriving along with its unity. It gives us a unique example of unity in diversity. We may say so many mini-cultures have been prospering side by side within its bounds. For this reason the mutual action and reaction among the ways of life of the people was quite natural and necessary. Moreover, beginning from the Aryans down to the Europeans, a good number of races migrated to this country and many of them stayed here to influence the ways of its people, and to be influenced by them. Besides there were some sections of the people of this country which arose within its bounds, distinguished themselves as religio-social organizations and contributed immensely to the ways of life of the country. Such being the nature of Indian culture what Jainism and the Jainas, with their origin within the country, have contributed to it may be called the Jaina culture. The impressions of the Jaina ways of living can be easily seen in the life, literature and culture of this country.

Mrs. S. Stevension, in the introduction of her well-known book *The Heart of Jainism* remarks, "Mahāvīra Buddha, Gośāla, Jamāli all founded their own sects and there were others who vied with these either in propounding rival heresies or in establishing separate monastic organizations. Yet out of all these ancient orders one only has survived in India down to the present day, and that one is the Jainism founded whether by Mahāvīra himself or by his reputed master Pārśvanāth."[1] Jainism has been prevailing in this

country for last three thousand years passing through so many odd situations which many other sects could not survive. It has not been very much able to spread beyond the boundaries of India, and also we are not able to think exactly whether it could ever cover the major area of the country under its sway. At present the Jainas constitute only a minority, though we see them scattered over the whole of the country and even outside its borders. It must make us think as Prof. A. Chakravarti observes, "It is only on the strength of their intrinsic merit that such a minority can hold its head aloft with respect and dignity."[2] It is regretted that this intrinsic merit of the Jainas could be recognized only with the efforts made by the Europeans.[3] With the researches of the European scholars in the field of Jainism, our interest in it has also been awakened and enlivened Jainism. The scholars in general, are seen taking more interest in the Jainistic studies at present.

Professor Chakravarti mentions four pillars which had supported the social organization of the Jainas. They are the Temple, the Ascetic or Muni, the attachment for the Saṅgha or community based on religious instinct or way of living and the scripture.[4] The institution of Temple and the connected ritual of worship rendered unique service to enliven and strengthen the Jaina Organization. The Jaina ascetics have been the great carriers of Jaina religion and culture throughout the ages gone by. Their constant contact with the masses wonderfully helped the sustenance of the Jaina society and brought many others into its fold. They also enlivened the interest and devotion of the people towards the Jaina order, for which they were prepared to make sacrifices in various ways. The Jainas cherish a very high regard for their scriptures, which has roused in them a strong love for their religion and philosophy. Besides, the use of a contemporary living tongue for dissemination of the knowledge of religion and philosophy was a unique way of the Jaina ācāryas to take their culture and religious awakening to the common masses. Even Lord Mahāvīra spoke in the popular regional tongue called 'ardha māgadhī' which was then the lingua franca of the neighbouring people. Though the original scriptures of the Jainas are written in Prakrit, the adoption of regional

languages for the expansion of their religion was a very common and popular practice among them. The Jainas could feel the pulse of the time and did not lag behind even among the intellectuals of the age. When Sanskrit became the language of the learned, they produced marvellous and varied works in Sanskrit as well. All these factors imparted strength to the Jaina organization, and it was well able to enrich Indian culture and life with contributions singularly its own.

In the field of philosophy the greatest contribution of Jainism to Indian ways of living is the concept of Anekānta which, while inculcating an attitude of catholicity among the people, explains the true nature of reality and knowledge. This doctrine does not deal mainly with a particular theory, but attempts to assign proper places to various theories in the total structure of knowledge, and is thus able to accommodate the varying thoughts into an organized system. It makes our minds ready to hear and understand others and supply them proper contexts and conditions wherein they will find a consistent lodgement for themselves. This type of training in the realm of thinking has ever been a need of the people and is equally significant at present to reach a peaceful and consistent solution of our problems. This function is well performed by the principle of Anekāntavāda, a doctrine of open-mindedness, as some would like to call it. The modern methods of cooperation, persuasion, mutual understanding, reconciliation and negotiation can be understood as corollaries of the principle of Anekāntavāda.

As regards the theory and practice of *ahiṁsā*, the Jaina contribution is really unforeseen. "I am sure" says Dr. P.S. Lamba, "I shall not be overestimating if I say that no other religion in the world has worked out the principle of *Ahiṁsā* in its minutest details and no other philosophy has brought out the profoundest ramifications of Anekānta as Jainism. Thus if *Ahiṁsā* is the flower of Jainism, Anekānta will be its crown."[5] For a fuller expansion of the principle of *ahiṁsā*, Jainism recognizes life even in the tiniest organism and non-violence to it becomes the ideal for the followers of Jainism. Grades in the practice of *ahiṁsā* have been recognized only to bring the entire sentient world under its purview and provide a way for practice of non-violence for every person, whatever

may be his position and station in society. This type of universality in the practice of *ahiṁsā* is singularly a Jaina contribution to the country. Again vegetarianism, through and through, is a Jaina idea and practice, as it limits violence to the vegetable world for the sustenance of human life, and that too not to the extent of exploitation. It is a general belief that Jainism and non-vegetarianism do not go together. Vegetarianism is mainly based on the principle of respect for life, other considerations may be only appended to it. Persons who are Jaina by faith or who uphold *ahiṁsā* and respect for life even to a mild extent, will be seldom seen indulging in non-vegetarianism. Thus they would be saving the animal world from a great havoc of violence and torture. It is perhaps the Jaina influence, through its principle of *ahiṁsā*, that a part of human population abhors meat-eating and similar practices in every field of life. Jainism, truly speaking is aimed at achieving a neat, respectable and worthy life for its adherents through its ethics. It may also be noted, as already pointed out, that there has been no tyranny under the Jaina rulers, commanders and administrators in the history of India, because their careers were motivated by the principles of *ahiṁsā*. Hence where a good sympathetic and loving treatment is given even to those who follow a different faith and ideology, it reflects directly or indirectly a Jainistic influence, otherwise the examples of carnage of life and torturous treatment in the name of religion are not lacking in the history of the world.

The great Jaina principle of *aparigraha* or non-possession was represented in its ideal form by Lord Mahāvīra who moved naked from place to place giving his sermons to the people. The homeless saints of Jaina community are also the examples of the same practice because they live with almost no possessions with them. They put forth an example of a very high type of renunciation and sacrifice before the people. This very ideal descends to the society of the common people and the householders in the form of limiting and curtailing their possessions to the best of their capacity. The surplus resources, as the religious injunction goes, should be utilized in helping others with food, medicine, shelter and education. This supplies channels for an outflow of surplus wealth and

collections, and works as a check on the tendency of hoarding and grabbing possessions. The inculcation of such virtues of generosity has ever brightened the name of this country in the past, and these acts of charity are still remembered with due reverence by the people. Non-possession gives us a form of self-imposed socialism which may be attributed to a great extent, both theoretically and practically, to Jainism. Jainism believes in the voluntary surrender of wealth and property by the people to be used by those who require them. Thus a channel for the outflow of such possessions is always kept open to the people with an elevating motive behind. This accounts for the vow of charity prescribed for the householders who are the guardians of a country's resources and production, The householders allow a good amount of their possessions to go to others by delimiting them for themselves under the vow of non-possession. This process of voluntary surrender of one's property and wealth is carried further with the vow of charity. While Anekāntavāda introduces, what Mahatma Gandhi called, the familyhood of all religions, in the realm of thought, it is *aparigraha* in its various forms which fulfils the same objective in the realm of society leading to a fair distribution of the country's wealth.

The principle of soul, life or consciousness has always been posing a bewildering problem to the thinkers and scientists. So much so that on one side some of them almost lost the principle in their adventure to locate it. There are others who could find it only in an abstract and etherial form. Jainism steers clear between these two extremes. Equipped with its theory of substance it is well able to bring the principle of consciousness under it, but at the same time it draws a distinction between the material and the spiritual substances. The soul is said to belong to the latter group. It attributes extension to the soul, for if it at all exists it should exist in the universe like other substances. The soul is held to posses a number of qualities or attributes as the other substances do. Its form of existence is determined by the states of its ever-changing attributes. It is able to travel from place to place along the body it inhabits. All these properties of the soul make it not only easier but also rational for the people to understand its secrets. Thus Jainism gives us a very

intelligible theory of the soul. If the soul is such a reality, the impairment of its powers must also be equally real. It cannot be only fictitious or delusive, as fiction and delusion too must have a basis to rest in reality somewhere. Besides, its impairment cannot be even self-caused, for no substance can be detrimental to its function and it must need something alien to itself to cause such impairments. Thus Jainism introduces the force of *karma* to account for the mundane existence of the soul. All this does not mean simply a design thought out to explain things, but it is a rational treatment of a concrete situation, where soul and *karma* are equally real and true and work in a close relationship with each other. Actually speaking Jainism has extricated human mind from a cobweb of philosophical complexities by its theories of the soul and the *karma*.

The soul and its bondage being real, its liberation in the hands of Jaina ācāryas could not remain mysterious and confusive. It follows as a natural and concrete inference from the Jaina theory of soul, What remains there in liberation is the pure substance of the soul. It is pure because its properties have become pure by completely shaking off the contamination caused by the *karmas*. In this way Jainism is able to make liberation an actual event in the life of a soul. It is, at the same time, very sure and emphatic about the impossibility of a fall of the soul after emancipation, as it sees no cause in the structure of the pure soul that can pull it down from the state of liberation. In liberation the soul is neither reduced to nothingness nor loses its identity by way of merger into something else. For Jainism liberation is only the regaining by the soul of what it had lost in its mundane existence, and thus it makes liberation a concrete ideal worth attempting. Jainism does not distinguish between Godhood and liberation. All liberated souls are Gods for it, and hence it believes in a plurality of Gods or the emancipated souls. This plurality of Gods does not create any difficulty for Jainism as these Gods, jointly or severally, are not considered responsible for creation, destruction or maintenance of the world. Jaina Gods are pure spirits enjoying the self-determined function of their pure attributes. The entire process of the world, with its creation, destruction and consequent maintenance, is dependent on

the various substances, themselves. As a matter of fact, as Jaina philosophy holds, creation, destruction and continuance are not different in essence. It is the context in which we happen to perceive an event or an entity to embody and reflect creation, destruction or permanence. This is a great and unique contribution of Jainism to the theory of substance, which equally covers the material as well as the spiritual world. These ideas go to influence the attitude of the people and the direction of the Indian way of living.

Unique is the contribution of Jainism regarding the physical existence of *karmas*. No other religion or philosophy has been able to go so deep into it as Jainism has gone. It is not only a vain conjecture or an empty idea, because Jainism employs sound arguments to prove its existence. The nature, classification and the process of fruition of the *karmas* have been so finely and consistently dealt with in Jainism that one is only struck with wonder at its minute details. *Karma*, so far was considered only as an action creating an impression on the soul. Jainism dives deeper to find a fine type of matter in the root, which clings to the soul and shapes the course of actions it happens to perform. Thus a concrete storehouse of *karmas* in the form of matter is attached with each soul, and the seeds of all variations associated with mundane souls are posited in this matter. In this way the *karma* theory finds a concrete shape in Jainism, and gives a real basis for the variations in life.

The course of spiritual discipline as planned under Jainism is very likely to suggest that it is a *mokṣa*-oriented religion. The ultimate end of spiritual life is nothing short of complete freedom from the domination of *karma* over the soul. So long as the *karmas* are associated with the soul, it will know no rest, and will not stop its efforts to place itself in excellent bliss.[6] It does not mean that there are no desirable stages between the worldly state of suffering and ignorance and that of final emancipation, Jainism doesn't fail to recognize the importance of social good. Tracing the origin of religion in accordance with Jainism Dr. H.L. Jain observes, "Thus according to Jainism, religion originally came in, not for safe-guarding the future life of men in heaven, but as a measure to keep peace on earth, promote goodwill amongst mankind

and inspire hope for higher life in the individual."[7] A good and noble life on this earth also becomes desirable for the religious uplift, and it is religion that bestows this gift too upon its followers. This very fact has, been epitomised in the term *'abhyudaya'* or progress in the world as contrasted with another term *'niśreyas'* which means the highest and ultimate good of the soul as already pointed out. Religion is potent to bring them to mankind.[8] The achievement of *abhyudaya* is bound to lead to the ultimate goal sooner or later by creating suitable conditions and guarding the soul against sinful situations. As such a true religion must go to promote peace, amity, goodwill and cooperation among the people. It must teach them all that is required of a good citizen. The scheme of the mini-vows with all the cautions given as their transgressions is meant to inculcate the civic qualities among the people. From a general review of the society of the Jainas one can also gather that the crime rate among the Jainas has been much lower than in the other sections of the society. We have already noted from the pages of history that people were hardly inflicted with inhuman and tortuous treatment under the Jaina rulers, commanders and administrators. The reason is not far to seek. The society has inherited the culture of *ahiṁsā* and *anekānta* from its ancestors, and it always guards the Jainas against anti-social and anti-national activities to a great extent. Jainism goes a long way to build a desirable character for the individual and hence for the society and nation. If these intermediate aims at which the mini-vows aim are not achieved, how can one think of going higher in the scale? The instructions prescribed with a view to achieving the good of the soul can be translated into social virtues conducive to evolution of a good social structure for human beings with due consideration even for subhuman form of life. A list of such virtues, though not exhaustive, may be drawn with their translation to social virtues to show how religion covers the social good under its purview.

RELIGIOUS VIRTUES

1. *Ahiṁsā*—non-violence.
2. *Satya* and *acaurya*—truthfulness and non-stealing.

3. *Brahmacarya*—Continence.
4. *Aparigraha*—non-acquisitiveness.
5. *Ekatva bhāvanā*—reflection on singularity and loneliness of the *jīvas*.
6. *Aśarana bhāvanā*—reflection on loneliness of the *jīvas*.
7. *Anitya bhāvanā*—reflection on transitoriness of life.
8. *Saṁsāra bhāvanā*—reflection on the painful wanderings of the *jīvas* in the world.
9. *Aśuci bhāvanā*—reflection on filthiness of the body.
10. Penance, renunciation and sense control.
11. *Kṣamā, mārdava, ārjava* etc. as antitheses of *krodh* (anger), *māna* (pride), *māyā* (deceit) etc.
12. *Pariṣaha jaya*—conquest of sufferings.
13. *Ākiñcanya*—absence of the sense of belongingness.
14. *Dhyāna*—meditation
15. *Svādhyāya*—study of scriptures.

CORRESPONDING SOCIAL VIRTUES

1. Making life possible with least of violence.
2. Making social life possible with good neighbourhood.
3. Regulation of sex in life.
4. Fair distribution of wealth and production.
5. Mutual cooperation.
6. Mutual help.
7. Relative stability in society.
8. Social justice and world peace.
9. Maintenance of health.
10. Sacrifice of the bodily comforts and pleasures to serve social and national interests.
11. These are equally social virtues requiring social field for their practice.
12. Forbearance under odd conditions.
13. Dedication of possessions to society and nation.
14. Sound thinking and understanding.
15. Laborious and deep study of useful subjects.

The above mentioned social virtues and many others are covered under the code of conduct for the householders. We can now imagine how far Jainism goes to build individual

character and prepare good citizens. Truly speaking the passage to the ultimate goal passes through the cultivation of the social virtues under the scheme of the mini-vows, and one cannot avoid these intermediate steps to reach the destination. Thus Jainism goes a long way in ennobling the lives of the people for good citizenship.

It will not be out of place if a reference is made here to the contribution of Jainism to the literature and architecture of India, as they also embody and reflect the ways and ideals of Indian life. Though the Jainas hold only a minority in the country, its contribution to these fields has been very significant. Some reference has already been made as to how the religious and philosophical tradition of the Jainas has come down to the present age. Creation of various literary works was an equally important activity of the Jaina monks along with the practices of religious conduct. Also learned scholars from the society took keen interest in the creation of the newer literary works of a high quality. Patronage from generous rulers and well-up persons encouraged their literary pursuit. There has also been a great zeal among the people to get copies of the manuscripts and place them in the temples and libraries to be studied by the people in general. This activity was well in practice in the past and is still kept in high esteem under the title *śāstradāna* i.e. giving away religious books. Now with the invention of the printing press the same activity is further extended by donating religious literature to the temples for use by the general masses. For the Jainas the temples are as much a centre of study as they are places of worship. Every temple, perhaps with no exception, will be found with some books to conduct the programme of study along with that of worship.

As has already been mentioned the Jaina monks chose the tongues of the masses for the propagation of truth and righteousness. They enriched the treasure of knowledge in Prakrit, Sanskrit, Apabhraṁśa, Kannada, Tamil, Telugu and Hindi. They did not spare utilizing even the regional dialects like Rajasthani, Gujarati, and Marathi for their mission. At present with the help of foreign scholars, the coverage of languages is being further widened to include English, German, French and Russian. Now an academic interest is

seen emerging among the scholars all over the world for a study of Jainism and Jaina literature. Jainism has thus ever been enriching the literature of various languages within and without the country with its valuable contributions.

Religion and philosophy have been the main themes of the Jaina literature, but by that we should not understand that the Jainas could not extend their activity beyond these. Under a plan of classification of the entire range of Jaina literature, it has been divided into four *anuyogas* or departments of knowledge. The first *anuyoga*, called the *prathamānuyoga*, covers the *purāṇas* and the narrative literature. The second i.e. the *caranānuyoga* is concerned with the moral philosophy. The third i.e. the *karaṅānuyoga* involves mathematical treatment of the universe and the *karmas* theory. The last i.e. the *dravyānuyoga* deals with the reality and various continents of the world.[9] This provides a way of surveying the scope of Jaina literature. Adopting the modern terms representing various departments of knowledge we shall feel no hesitation in saying that Jainism has contributed almost to most of them. We come across rare works on Mathematics and Astronomy in the sphere of Jainism. The elements of Physics, Biology and Botany are seen scattered here and there in the Jaina works. Even Indian Āyurveda, the science of medicine, could not escape the attention of the Jaina writers. Works on Kāvya-literature, Grammar, poetics, drama, logic, prosody and lexicography occupy an important place among similar works of the country. Modern writers have been successful in picking up the elements of psychology from the Jaina works and have developed their themes in the shape of treatises on Jaina psychology. So varied and extensive has been the choice of themes and subjects for the Jaina writers along with their equally varied and extensive choice of languages to ta' e wisdom to the people belonging to various regions. Regarding the importance of Jaina literature Dr. J.P. Jain rightly observes, "It has manifold attractions, not only for a follower of Jainism, or one interested in the study of Jaina philosophy, religion and culture but also for a student of comparative religion and philosophy, for a lover of literature and for the historians of Indian literature, culture and civilization. It is a very valuable

and important rather unavoidable source of Indian history in its various aspects."[10]

In Jainism visit to holy places has been prescribed as an item of religious practice. During suitable seasons Jaina pilgrims set out to pay their homage to such places. This item of their religious practice is technically called *'tīrthayātrā'*— a journey to the *tīrthas* or the holy places. These spots have become holy on account of being associated with one or the other event from the life of a *tīrthaṅkara* or some emancipated soul. Sometimes a miraculous event connected with the religious cult of the Jainas also goes to makes a place holy. These places are considered holy, as they provide a ford to cross the ocean of *saṁsāra*, as the term, 'tīrtha' implies. So important is this item for a Jaina from the point of view of religious and spiritual attainment that the term *tīrtha* is associated both with these places and the general title of the twenty four lords of Jainism who are called *tīrthaṅkaras*. The Jaina tradition has been keeping the memory of its religious leaders and the incidents connected with their lives by raising some type of structure at these holy places. Building temples with the images of Lord Jina installed in them is the most prevalent and popular way adopted by the Jainas to perpetuate the memories of the great souls. It is in this way the Jainas found a channel for contributing to the architecture of the country. The religious zeal of the Jainas has kept this tradition alive till date and a good number of temples are coming into existence every year in this country. Such *tīrthas* or holy places are spread over the whole of the country including the busy metropolitan cities and the lonely caves and hill-tops in the forests where the specimens of Jaina sculpture can be seen in abundance with their richness and splendour

One of the old, perhaps the oldest, form of architecture serving the same purpose was the erection of *stūpas*. There is a mention that a *stūpa* was erected at Hastinapura by *Śreyāṁsa*, the younger brother of the king of the city, in honour of the breaking of the one-year-fast with the juice of sugarcane by lord Ṛṣabhadeva. Several *stūpas* were raised by the kings of the neighbouring states, who assembled to celebrate the *nirvāṇa* of lord Mahāvīra, in the province of Bihar; but no remains of them are now traceable, all having dwindled away

with time. As Buddhism prospered in the country the erection of *stūpas* became popular with its followers, so much so that all the *stūpas* found in the country were indiscriminately attributed to the Buddhists; while some of them on a closer and critical scrutiny, may be found as belonging to the Jainas.

Image worship has been a very old practice, or rather a form of essential ritual with the Jainas for fairly a long time. Hence building of temples and shrines with images of the *tīrthaṅkaras* and *arhats* installed in them became not only popular among them but was considered to be a holy religious duty, the fulfilment of which could bring them greater fortunes and higher status of life. So we now come across Jaina temples and images scattered all over the country, and the practice is kept alive with great zeal and reverence to this date. Jainism as a matter of fact, gives a very rich heritage of Indian sculpture and architecture. The Jaina temples and images can be seen almost in every locality where a few Jaina families reside. In big and densely populated towns and cities one can see dozens of such temples built and maintained by the Jaina community. Known for their architectural design and beauty we may count the Temples of Deogarh, Khajuraho, Gwaliar, Gyaraspur, Mt. Abu, Ranakpur, Chittor, Achalgarh, Ajmer and Amer. The Dilawara temples of Mt. Abu belong to 11th and 12th century A.D. These are so beautifully and exquisitely designed and artistically ornamented that one would stand simply dumb and wonder-struck at the architectural accomplishment. The cave temples of Ellora, Ajanta, Badami and Dharaśiva are equally attractive and fascinating. There are the temple cities of Sonāgir and Śatruñjaya with a number of big and small temples built on the hills. On the tops of the Pārśvanāth hill in Bihar, in place of the temples, we see only the 'foot-prints' of the Jinas, which are equally important objects of worship and veneration for the Jainas. The Jainas have given to the country many colossal icons and statues, and that of Bahubali—a son of Ṛṣabhadeva—at Śravanabelagola in Mysore is a unique example. It is a rock-hewn statue, 57 feet in height standing on the top of the Vindhyagiri hill. Its serene beauty reflecting a spirit of renunciation along with inner peace and tranquillity is what attracts the visitors most. The images are made in white marble and in other coloured

stones. Small images made in precious stones like diamond can also be seen in a temple at Moodbidri in Karnataka state. Images of gold and silver are also installed in some of the Jaina temples.

One more architectural design adopted under the Jaina tradition is the construction of free standing pillars called the *mānastambhas* or the pride-pillars. It is said that at the entrance of the great pavilion where the *tīrthaṅkaras* used to deliver their sermons to a huge audience consisting of monks and nuns, gods and goddesses, laymen and laywomen and even the subhuman animals, there was a pillar-like construction surmounted with a canopy having four image of the Jinas facing in the four directions. One who happened to enter the pavilion could redeem himself of the prideful feelings at the very sight of the manastambha at the entrance. In south India such structures have been a general fashion and a good number of temples have these *mānastambhas* in front of them. This tradition has again gained popularity and during the current century numerous such pillars have been raised in front of the newly constructed temples in the country. A full religious touch is there with these *mānastambhas* as they recall to us the memory of the Lord's '*samavasaraṇa*', the great hall of audience, with the Lord seated on a raised pavilion at the centre. This samavasaraṇa embodies the original idea of the temple with the Jaina image installed in it. All these various specimens of Jaina architecture go to enrich Indian architecture immensely and form an important part of it. To conclude whether it be a field of religion and philosophy, history and literature, art and architecture or one of spiritual and social life, the entire range of Indian life and culture will be found studded with the distinct contributions made by Jainism and the Jainas. As a matter of fact these contributions are integral and indispensable to the ways of Indian life, a comprehensive study of which will not be possible without taking them into purview and recognizing their value.

REFERENCES

1. S. Stevenson: *The Heart of Jainism*, Introduction.